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My dissertation examines how some nineteenth-century British novels offer a 
critique of the dominant narrative of sympathy by suggesting that the most ethical 
encounter will preserve distance between self and other while retaining the ability to 
exchange sympathy in the face of difference. This distance prevents the problem of 
assimilation, the unethical practice of turning the other into the same that was a common 
way of performing sympathy in nineteenth century Britain. I propose that these critiques 
are best identified through a reading practice that utilizes discourse systems; the discourse 
systems I include are gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter. In the texts examined here 
(including Harriet Martineau's Deerbrook (1839), Elizabeth Gaskell's Cranford (1851), 
George Eliot's Silas Marner (1861) and Daniel Deronda (1876), Charlotte Brontë's 
Villette (1853), and William Thackeray's Vanity Fair (1848)) one encounters each of the 
elements listed above as more than just plot devices or character markers. For example, 
gossip occurs in Martineau's and Gaskell's texts as a communicative act used by 
characters, as a rhetorical device used by narrators, and as a narrative technique used by 
the authors. The cumulative effect of gossip's engagement with social relations thus 
critiques unethical uses of sympathy and illustrates more ethical encounters between self 
and other, challenging, in some cases, the limits of sympathy as a technique for 
approaching difference.  
          I elucidate these literary revisions of sympathy by reading them in relation to 
changes characterizing British society in the Victorian period. During the years from 
1830-1870, British life was marked by sweeping technological changes (railroads, 
printing), paradigm shifts (higher criticism, Darwinism, middle class moral code), and the 
climax of British imperialism. Writers responding to these tumultuous changes to the 
structure of nineteenth-century society used sympathy to undermine us/them categories 
that created unnecessary differences and to reveal the ability to sympathize when faced 
with difference. However, these texts also reveal ambivalence over sympathy: its reliance 
on identification and therefore the possible limits to sympathy's ability to negotiate 
difference. This ambivalence either restricts the extent to which these writers revise the 
model for using sympathy, or, when pushed passed the limits, revise not only social 
relationships but also the form of the novel itself. This project thus refocuses realism in 
the nineteenth century as a form concerned with relationships and not just representations.  
          These authors' treatments of sympathy led to the radical reformation of certain 
narrative techniques so that the distances modeled through character exchanges of 
sympathy are emulated in the text itself through narrative gaps. As difference requires 
characters to revise how they engage with the other, so too must readers revise their 
reading practices. The novelists addressed in this study attempted to form a different kind 
of reader in the nineteenth century, one who would not easily elide the difference 
between self and other by immediately identifying with characters or narrators, and who 
would understand the import and rhetorical effect of elements (gossip, gazing, silence, 
laughter) usually disregarded as trivial at best or innately unethical at worst. Such 
thematic treatments of sympathy necessarily lead to a different understanding of 
sympathy's trajectory in the nineteenth century as well as in our own time. These authors' 
unconventional use of gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter asks that we reconsider how 
these elements can play vital roles in the negotiation of identity and the interactions 
between self and other, broadening the scope of discourses that define an ethical 
encounter. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Novel gives a familiar relation of such things, as pass every day before our eyes, 
such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves. . . the perfection of it, is to represent 
every scene, in so easy and natural a manner, and to make them appear so probable, as to 
deceive us into persuasion (at least while we are reading) that all is real, until we are 
affected by the joys or distresses, of the persons in the story, as if they were our own. 
 ~ Clara Reeve qtd. in Ellis 16  
 
 The Imaginative understanding of the nature of others, and the power of putting 
ourselves in their place is the faculty on which virtue depends. ~ John Ruskin 27:627  
 
[Narrative involves] somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some 
purpose(s) that something happened.  ~ James Phelan 3 
 
  
 I am intrigued by two impulses that drive our human encounters: the impulse to 
tell and the impulse to know.  These impulses, I argue, form the basis for how we 
negotiate the tensions of difference between self and other and the role sympathy plays in 
forming ethical relationships. My project grapples with the most ethical way for self and 
other to interact. This was a pressing concern for the nineteenth-century audience of the 
novels I examine and still is a concern for audiences today. I define ethics as the choices 
related to how we treat other people. Rather than focus on the choice itself, which is the 
domain of morals, I instead focus on ethics as critical attention to a way of living and 
being in the world. Ethical, then, does not focus on the choices we make when 
 2 
following rules, per se, but rather refers to how we live in relationship.1
Reading is one way to extend horizons. The development of sympathy through 
reading as an established tradition reaches back at least into the eighteenth century. With 
the growing popularity of the novel, eighteenth and nineteenth-century debates focused 
on whether or not reading could help people make better moral choices, demonstrated in 
the epigraph that opens this introduction. In 1785, Clara Reeve defends the novel by 
connecting its formal qualities with the ability to make readers “affected by the joys or 
distresses” of the characters in the story. This is not a naïve assumption about the nature 
of such attachment, for Reeve says readers are “deceived” and “persuaded” into a feeling 
that probably only lasts “while we are reading.” Nevertheless, the connection between 
reading, sympathy, and ethical living only grew stronger in the nineteenth century and 
reached its heyday with such “social problem” novels as Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary 
Barton or Benjamin Disraeli’s Sybil. This connection relied in part on the development of 
the realist novel, a mode committed to exploring ordinary life and common people that 
fed into the assumption that readers would need a great deal more sympathy to connect 
with imperfect heroes and heroines than with the idyllic ones of epics and romances. 
 Although the nature and origin of sympathy continued to be the subject of many 
  To approach the 
other ethically requires sympathy in order to allow the limits of one’s understanding, 
trapped within one’s horizon of experience, to form a meeting point with the other’s 
horizon.  
                                                        
1 Appiah also distinguishes between these two terms so that morality has to do with governance, society, 
and laws while ethics has to do with being in relation to others, with one’s community (231).  
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debates in the nineteenth century, sympathy as a moral virtue became widely accepted. 
While I am concerned to show how sympathy and ethics are connected, in the nineteenth 
century most discussions about sympathy did not focus on how it could influence 
relationships so much as how it could help a person make moral decisions. Because 
sympathy and empathy are often conflated in our usage, I want to be clear about my 
choice in using the term sympathy. Empathy usually connotes that one feels with another, 
while sympathy connotes that one feels for another, or, as Lauren Wispe distinguishes 
them: “Sympathy is a way of relating. Empathy is a way of knowing” (318).  The attempt 
to know an other can have unethical implications when we replace motives, actions, 
traits, or some additional component of the other’s difference with something that we 
recognize. This constitutes the erasure of difference, the assimilation and homogenization 
of the other.  Thus, “to know” the other refers to the assumption that the other is just like 
the self; we overlay our own emotions and experiences onto the other, subsuming their 
unique identity into our own.   
I am privileging the preservation of difference as necessary for an ethical 
encounter with the other. The common understanding of sympathy in the nineteenth 
century employed the term in ways similar to how we understand empathy as predicated 
on the ability to know. The writers I examine in this dissertation revise that usage by 
employing the more ethical notion of extending care and concern without the need to 
understand based in similar experiences or even in agreement. Ethical sympathy, in this 
dissertation, refers to the concept of sympathy as a way of relating rather than a way of 
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knowing. The focus shifts to engaging with the other’s difference rather than trying to re-
define and re-categorize those differences.2
Some nineteenth-century philosophers define sympathy in ways similar to our 
modern conception of empathy. For example, the epigraph from Ruskin highlights the 
most common way of talking about how sympathy necessitates understanding “the nature 
of others” in order to put “ourselves in their place.” The role of the imagination was 
central to Victorian conceptions of how sympathy worked; imagination presented the 
possibility that one could fully understand what another was experiencing.
  
3
 The critiques writers like Eliot, Brontë, and Thackeray constructed were aimed at 
the notion of sympathy emerging from philosophers like Hume, Smith, and Ruskin, all of 
 The impulse 
to know—the desire to claim accurate insight into the other through shared experiences 
or feelings—was the special province of reading and the imagination. This dominant 
narrative about the workings of sympathy did not go unchallenged, and the writers that I 
examine in this dissertation were part of the voice of discontent that rose to contest, not 
the notion that sympathy was needed, but how sympathy was structured as a way of 
knowing. These writers constructed sympathy both as a way of engaging the other and as 
a way of reading that resisted the assumption that sympathy required knowing.  
                                                        
2 For other accounts differentiating sympathy and empathy see Suzanne Keen’s Empathy and the Novel 
where she defines empathy as a “spontaneous, responsive sharing of an appropriate feeling” that occurs 
prior to the more complex feeling of sympathy. Empathy that is outward-directed can result in sympathy 
(4-5). 
 
3Adam Smith argued that the ability to enter another’s experience relied solely on the imagination “By the 
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we 
enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him” (12). Thus, 
although he clearly places limits on the ability to know the other, he also underscores the importance of the 
imagination as enabling that knowledge.  
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whom predicated sympathy on knowledge of the other to varying degrees.4
 I argue that sympathy is intimately connected with narrative because of the 
relationship between knowing and telling, that is, the relationship between self and other. 
Central to understanding the connection between narrative and sympathy, then, is the 
rhetorical nature of narrative. To understand literature as rhetorical is to understand that 
 The novelists 
complicate sympathy by representing not only its positive aspects, as philosophers tended 
to do, but also by representing its negative aspects. In fact, they seemed to recognize that 
narrative could help tease out a broader view of sympathy, presenting the complexity of 
sympathy in all its glory and ruthlessness. One can desire to know out of genuine 
sympathy, or one might want to learn about the other for self-serving reasons. Similarly, 
the desire to tell (one’s story, someone else’s story) can also be driven by sympathetic 
motivations or devious ones. In other words, the two impulses of knowing and telling are 
not innately ethical. In either case, this impulse to tell and to know forms the very basis 
of the narrative drive in realist novels. James Phelan’s epigraph describes narrative as 
rhetorical because it contains these impulses. “Somebody telling somebody else” assumes 
both the impulse to tell (“somebody telling”) and the impulse to know (the “somebody 
else” who wants to listen). He also underscores that these are not aimless impulses, but 
exist with a purpose.  
                                                        
4 Both Hume and Smith held to the popular eighteenth-century notion that sympathy was innate. Ruskin, 
among others, claimed that virtue depended on sympathy. These theorists never debated the capacity for 
sympathy or the possible negative effects of sympathy. See Morris, Anger, and Mercer for more detailed 
accounts of these three philosophers arguments about sympathy.  
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writers intend their works to influence readers.5
Nineteenth-century Britain used sympathy to articulate an increasingly complex 
relationship with the other, whether on a national level between England and its growing 
colonies, or on a personal level between the sacred domestic realm and rising tensions 
with industrialization and urbanization. In novels, as well as other texts like moral 
treatises, conduct books, and newspapers, the term sympathy became an “attempt to 
ameliorate social differences with assurances of mutual feeling and universal humanity” 
(Jaffe 15). Gaskell and Dickens, for example, tried to improve the conditions of the 
 The task of interpreting literature, then, is 
the task of discovering how it influences us. We can only begin to understand how 
literature affects readers by considering form, an exploration with much at stake because, 
as Phelan claims, form has consequences for how readers respond and thus influences 
their ethical engagement with the text (Living to Tell 5). Understanding literature as 
rhetorical also means that, while readers will have different reactions to certain rhetorical 
techniques, they can also have some of the same reactions. In this dissertation I am 
looking specifically at how these novels call for sympathy from the reader. My 
methodology for revealing these writers’ complex revisions of sympathy uses the 
discourse systems of gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter. These discourse systems draw 
attention to the transformation of social relationships in the novel through ethical 
sympathy as a way of relating, not as a way of knowing.  
                                                        
5 In A Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke defines the basic function of rhetoric as “the use of words by 
human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents” (41).  As an “art of persuasion,” 
Burke highlights the intention of rhetoric to effect change in an audience. By insisting on the rhetorical 
nature of literature, then, I am emphasizing the active nature of literature to create real change in readers 
and social structures.   
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working class by stirring up sympathy in their readers as they used individualized 
characters to represent working class people and situations in their novels. In her preface 
to Mary Barton, Gaskell states that the more she witnessed the “unhappy state of things” 
between workers and employers, the more she determined to “give some utterance to the 
agony which, from time to time, convulses this dumb people; the agony of suffering 
without the sympathy of the happy” (3). In Oliver Twist, Dickens uses Oliver to critique 
the orphanage and workhouse system. This example in particular demonstrates the realist 
technique of providing an individualized picture that more easily produces sympathy in a 
reader, which directs the reader’s judgment toward the institution rather than the 
suffering individual. Sympathy in these two novels is relatively uncomplicated, assuming 
the ability of readers to understand what it was like to be poor, even though they most 
likely never experienced anything like the destitution of many working class lives. The 
sympathy extended toward the poor, then, was based on a distorted understanding of this 
group of “others.”  
The Victorian notion of sympathy builds on the Romantic version such as one 
might find in William Wordsworth’s “The Cumberland Beggar.” In this poem, the 
speaker defends the beggar to the Statesman who is ready to “rid the world of nuisances” 
by arguing the beggar is a record of all “Past deeds and offices of charity” that would be 
forgotten if people could not look upon the beggar and see the “kindly mood in hearts” 
(70, 82, 84). Our sympathy is stirred simply by seeing the beggar, and he becomes the 
figure that binds an entire community together because, after all, “we have all of us one 
human heart” (146). Wordsworth may struggle with sympathizing with a stranger in other 
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poems, but in this one at least he represents confidence in the ability to know the other by 
subsuming him or her under a common ideal, erasing the possible differences of the other 
and thereby encouraging sympathy for an ideal rather than for an individual.  
 The above examples represent just a handful of texts that evoke an uncomplicated 
sense of sympathy, which relies on assimilation and homogenization. Although such 
examples abound, they do not represent the only conception of sympathy in the Victorian 
period. I argue that some writers in this period attempted to articulate a more nuanced 
understanding of sympathy. Specifically, they constructed an alternative form of 
sympathy that relied on differences and perceived a certain distance between self and 
other as necessary for ethical sympathy. A more ethical practice of sympathy abandons 
the premise that sympathy must bridge difference and instead preserves the distance 
between self and other in order to maintain, rather than erase, difference. Sympathy must 
be re-imagined as a mode of engagement and a way of approaching the other, not as a 
moment of understanding (usually predicated on sameness). The ethical moment, which 
for Emmanuel Levinas is the approach to the other, occurs when one’s assumptions about 
universality are called into question through an encounter with the other. Levinas asserts 
that welcoming the other is an ethical practice of questioning our assumptions: “We name 
this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is 
precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics” (43). I 
look for the ways in which nineteenth-century texts employ sympathy in the service of an 
ethical encounter with the other, that is with a willingness to have one’s assumptions 
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challenged by difference rather than simply covering over that difference. As I examine 
these texts more closely, and in particular their use of marginal discourses, I find that 
they resist common notions of sympathetic identification in favor of representing this 
more ethical form of sympathy through difference.  
 
Theorizing Sympathy   
My theory of sympathy responds to recent debates about the ethics of sympathy. 
Feminist theorists have prompted a more cautionary impulse toward sympathy, 
recognizing in it the tendency toward overgeneralization and assumptions based on 
binary thinking and self-interest.6 Criticism of sympathy tends to focus on the tension 
that arises when identification is posited as a solution for the division between self and 
other, erasing the other’s subject position in order to create identification. Although these 
concerns are important, I argue that sympathy does not have to be unethical in these 
ways. Rather, I follow the lead of Max Scheler who insists on the importance of some 
emotional distance in acts of sympathy, thereby emphasizing the maintenance of 
difference rather than depending on sameness (qtd. in Bartky 80). He claims: “for 
sympathy presupposes that awareness of distance between selves which is eliminated by 
identification” (77).7
                                                        
6For an example of how recent criticism views negatively the use of sympathy in the nineteenth century, 
see the following interpretations of Eliot’s conception of sympathy as: narcissistic (Hertz), voyeuristic and 
sadomasochistic (Hinton), an “incentive to egoism” (During), and as the “spectacle of another’s suffering” 
(Redfield). 
 More recently, Kelly Oliver has suggested one solution to this 
  
7 Scheler delineates between different forms of sympathy, and it is “genuine sympathy” to which he refers 
here.  
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problem – a theory of non-recognition. Oliver objects to theories of identity that place the 
self in an antagonistic relationship with others:  
 
Relations with others are described as struggles for recognition. But if we start 
from the assumption that relations are essentially antagonistic struggles for 
recognition, then it is no wonder that contemporary theorists spend so much 
energy trying to imagine how these struggles can lead to compassionate personal 
relations, ethical social relations, or democratic political relations. From the 
presumption that human relations are essentially warlike, how can we imagine 
them peaceful? (4)   
 
Thus, while Oliver agrees with theorists like Charles Taylor and Judith Butler that 
identity is dialogic and intersubjective, she claims that the “tension at the heart of 
subjectivity need not produce antagonism between people” (5).  Instead of recognition 
producing subjectivity, she posits the notion of witnessing as a way to construct identity 
without relying on division or assimilation.   
 The problematic implications of recognition extend to the reading event as well. 
In The Erotics of Talk, Carla Kaplan asks, “How might we rethink the need for 
recognition – which suffuses both the private and the public spheres – in ways that do not 
also presuppose identification?” (26). The particular danger of using a recuperative 
paradigm to read texts, Kaplan argues, is that we may be reading only to see an image of 
ourselves reflected back to us. When we make the text our own, the subject, the other, is 
assimilated (37). Kaplan suggests that foregrounding desire in a text allows us to listen 
“without assuming, as identification tends to do, that we already know what the other is 
saying” (40). Desire thus structures how we identify with the other and even more 
importantly how we deal with disidentifications (45). Rather than separate desire and 
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identification, Kaplan argues that conflating the two can allow for both difference (which 
desire permits) and sameness (which identification requires).  
As should be clear by now, what I am calling ethical sympathy departs from the 
dominant discourse about sympathy in the nineteenth century and, to some extent, from 
current critical discourses about sympathy.8 I argue that although sympathy may fall into 
objectifying and assimilative practices, it does not have to do so. Given the connection 
between identification and the violence of appropriation, one can see how sympathy 
could indeed further the unethical move of assimilation if it is always predicated on 
understanding (turning the other into the same).9 If we no longer assume, however, that 
sympathy requires understanding, then the possibilities open for a more ethical encounter. 
While Philip Mercer acknowledges that in practice we tend to sympathize with people we 
know and like, he contends this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of 
sympathizing with someone we are unfamiliar with (40).  His definition of sympathy 
begins with the recognition that the other exists as a separate being from myself (16).10
                                                        
8 Hinton is one example of recent work on sympathy that tends to define sympathy as an innately unethical 
practice, one that must always objectify the other. Shuman remains skeptical of the “great promise of 
narrative,” which claims to help us “transcend personal experience, both by allowing us to see our own, 
seemingly unexplainable, experiences in other people’s stories and by helping us to understand the 
otherwise unfathomable experiences of others” (149). The ethical dilemma immediately obscured by such a 
claim, Shuman points out, is how they naturalize both experience and the subjectivities that experience 
constructs (156).  Keen expresses doubt about the translation of sympathy for fictional characters into real 
world altruism: “I find the case for altruism stemming from novel reading inconclusive at best and nearly 
always exaggerated in favor of the beneficial effects of novel reading” (vii). However, while Keen is 
interested in exploring if it is possible to actually prove the link between experiences of narrative empathy 
and altruism, I am more concerned to look at what the assumption that novels produce sympathy, indeed 
the obligation that they do so, tells us about the way social relations were conceived in the nineteenth 
century and what strategies were being constructed for encountering an other.   
 
 
9 For more on the unethical nature of identification, see Fuss.  
 
10Mecer’s definition sounds much like Levinas’ emphasis on the approach to the other as the basis for an 
ethical relation. To always strive for understanding as the precondition for sympathy usually results in 
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This kind of sympathy, Mercer argues, is based solely on the other’s “capacity to feel and 
to suffer. Differences based on class, race, nationality, religion, culture, possessions, 
education, character, intelligence, taste and all the other grounds which have been found 
for discriminating against people, are all pushed equally into the background” (4). 
Against critics who insist sympathy is innately unethical, Mercer highlights the 
possibility for sympathy that preserves the other’s difference and thereby produces 
ethical relationships.11
 Concern over the ethics of sympathy arises in part because sympathy is implicated 
in the construction of identity, a connection theorists make explicit by emphasizing the 
necessary role the other plays in the development of identity. Maurice Blanchot questions 
recognition as the basis for identity and insists instead that response is the most vital 
component of identity formation:  
 The novels I explore in this dissertation imagine this kind of 
sympathy, at the same time that they recognize and grapple with the limits of sympathy in 
the face of unbridgeable difference.  
 
An ethics is possible only when – with ontology (which always reduces the Other 
to the Same) taking the backseat – an anterior relation can affirm itself, a relation 
                                                                                                                                                                     
assimilation or misrepresentation. Rather than focus on understanding, then, Levinas suggests that simply 
listening and engaging in conversation, the approach to the other, is enough to make the encounter ethical: 
“the relation between the same and the other – upon which we seem to impose such extraordinary 
conditions – is language . . . the very fact of being in conversation consists in recognizing the Other a right 
over this egoism” (39-40). 
 
11 His discussion points to the tension of having sympathy that allows the other to remain other and not 
basing the sympathy on the self: “But it is not enough that I should imagine how I should feel if I were in 
the other person’s place; I have to imagine how he feels, having the temperament and personality he has” 
(9). The eighteenth and nineteenth-century conception of sympathy as putting oneself in the other’s shoes is 
not the best kind of sympathy, and Mercer proposes his theory as a corrective to a detailed analysis of 
Hume and Smith’s theories of sympathy. For Mercer it seems sympathy means fellow-feeling combined 
with concern (the active element that spurs us to do something). 
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such that the self is not content with recognizing the Other, with recognizing itself 
in it, but feels that the Other always puts it into question to the point of being able 
to respond to it only through a responsibility that cannot limit itself. (qtd. in Jay 
555)  
 
Blanchot asserts the moment of recognition is not the most important component of 
encountering the other. Rather, it is the impulse to respond because of the responsibility 
to the other for his or her influence on one’s own identity. For Blanchot that influence 
comes in the form of questioning the self. For theorists like Butler and Cavarero, that 
sense of responsibility comes from being hailed into being by the other (Butler) and from 
hearing one’s story told by the other (Cavarero). The scene of sympathy, then, is also the 
moment of identity formation. To see this connection, we must acknowledge the way 
sympathy is “a psychic structure through which the subject is produced, consolidated, or 
redefined” (Ablow 2). By defining sympathy in this way, Rachel Ablow suggests, we 
move away from focusing on sympathy as a feeling to emphasizing “sympathy as a mode 
of relating to others and of defining a self” (2). Shifting the focus away from sympathy as 
a reaction, emotion, or feeling to a way of structuring reality makes more evident, not 
only the ways in which sympathy structures social relations, but also the ways in which 
social relations structure sympathy. 
Theories about identity, like theories about sympathy, have recently been 
criticized for the tendency to homogenize groups within those categories where identity 
becomes a fixed concept. Identity is now more commonly understood in terms of 
subjectivity, constructed within and subject to myriad structures of power. While 
understanding identity as fluid and constituted within structures of power alters the way 
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we understand agency, this understanding does not necessarily do away with the idea of 
agency.12 The concept of a fluid identity critiques not only the notion of fixed identity, 
but also the concept of identity as sovereign or completely controllable or constructed by 
oneself. For Butler, the implication of subjectivity constituted through interpellation 
means that there is no subjectivity outside of the address by an other and means, 
therefore, that the subject is always and only constituted through language: “untethering 
the speech act from the sovereign subject founds an alternative notion of agency and, 
ultimately, of responsibility, one that more fully acknowledges the way in which the 
subject is constituted in language…agency begins where sovereignty wanes” (Excitable 
Speech 15-16).13
                                                        
12Feminist and postcolonial theorists complicate agency in important ways by striving to work beyond the 
binary of either/or, repression or resistance. Brown in "Feminism Unbound" contends that if we understand 
ourselves to be constructed by the very power we are subject to, resisting that power is more difficult than 
formerly conceived. She suggests feminism as a movement needs to complicate its understanding of agency 
and resistance. Mahmood’s The Politics of Piety draws on this idea from an Islamic perspective by 
considering alternative forms of agency that work against liberalism’s understandings of resistance: “The 
normative political subject of poststructuralist feminist theory often remains a liberatory one, whose agency 
is conceptualized on the binary model of subordination and subversion. In doing so, scholarship elides 
dimensions of human action whose ethical and political status does not map onto the logic of repression 
and resistance” (14). Mohanty in "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" 
argues similarly that "third world" women's resistance cannot be mapped onto a western hegemonic 
feminist idea of either oppression or resistance since woman as a category does not exist prior to or outside 
of individual socio-political contexts.  
 The responsibility toward the other that emerges through a discursively 
constituted identity, articulated here by Butler, informs the way I read responsibility 
toward the other as an integral part of sympathy and the connection between identity and 
sympathy. Within my own project I work from this notion of identity structured by 
  
13 According to Butler, sovereign subjectivity is a false concept that potentially inhibits spaces for real 
agency. By rejecting the idea of a sovereign subject, then, she does not think she is inhibiting agency but 
enhancing it. Spivak comes to similar conclusions about the mutuality of identity as such in her concept of 
the call from the other before will (a Levinasian concept originally) in "Righting Wrongs" and other parts 
of her work and so also contributes from a postcolonial perspective to the concept of post-sovereign 
subjectivity. 
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language. Specifically I look at how gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter are elements of 
language usually ignored in discussions of identity formation. Because these elements are 
not usually found within dominant discourses, they have the ability to work outside of, 
and sometimes even within, power structures in ways not immediately recognizable. 
They can thus offer alternative methods for constructing the relationship between self and 
other in ways that can prove more ethical than assimilative or objectifying practices.  
Sympathy must also be theorized alongside notions of the other since sympathy 
deals specifically with how the self relates to the other. Building from work by Jacques 
Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Emanuel Lévinas, J. Hillis Miller outlines the two 
major theoretical approaches to and definition of “the other”: “On the one hand, the other 
may be another version of the same, in one way or another assimilable, comprehensible, 
able to be appropriated and understood. On the other hand, the other may be truly and 
radically other” (2).14
                                                        
14 Miller’s approach to otherness examines this term not as a theoretical concept but as a verbal construct 
or, even more pertinent to my project, a performative aspect of literature that emerges during the reader’s 
engagement with the text.  
 In exploring alternative ways of defining sympathy, my project 
looks for a third way of constructing the other that does not have to fall into the binary 
described by Miller. Criticism of sympathy focuses on the first definition Miller outlines, 
turning the other into a “version of the same.” The limits of sympathy always seem to 
occur with the second definition of the “radical” other who remains so unknowable that 
sympathy is not possible. With this binary in place, there is no room for sympathy not 
predicated on sameness. I would like to add a third way of defining the other, one in 
which sympathy arises through difference, recognizing the other’s subjectivity as grounds 
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enough to produce sympathy. We extend sympathy ethically by giving the other our 
attention and acknowledging his or her perspective. I will illustrate what this practically 
looks like in each chapter by showing how gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter can each 
be a way of extending ethical sympathy.  
 
Sympathy and the Ethics of Reading 
An evolving body of theory provides us with new ways of understanding the 
debates about sympathy in the nineteenth century. Recent awareness of the complexity of 
sympathy draws attention to the strategies used by some writers in the Victorian period 
who bring to light that complexity as well. My connection between sympathy and 
identity, outlined above, is not solely a twenty-first century conception; indeed, as 
Audrey Jaffe claims, “sympathy in Victorian fiction is always about the construction of 
social and cultural identities” (23). Thus, although I am claiming a dominant narrative 
emerged about sympathy in this period, this does not suggest that there was one single 
understanding of sympathy. Debates about sympathy were often folded into a larger 
discussion about the practice of reading in this period.15
                                                        
15 While I am concerned to show in this introduction the important role the reader plays in this particular 
historical moment, and thus the historical reader will always be in the background of every chapter, my 
focus on the effects of each novel is geared toward the implied reader. I do not make an effort to identify 
actual responses to the novels; rather, I am more interested to explore the possible rhetorical effect created 
through the use of specific techniques within the text.  
 I would argue also that the kind 
of realism developed in the nineteenth century felt obligated to participate in the 
discourse about sympathy, in part because realism’s verisimilitude was supposed to 
induce actual reactions in the reader, and sympathetic feelings were among the most 
valued of these. Indeed, George Eliot, whom critics herald as the iconic realist writer, 
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declared enhancing sympathetic feeling in readers as the whole aim of her art. In Chapter 
17 of Adam Bede, often cited as a type of literary manifesto, Eliot announces the realist 
aim of presenting common, ordinary life as absolutely vital to the development of 
sympathy. To always present beautiful, pleasing characters would only teach readers to 
sympathize with those who are beautiful and pleasing in life. Eliot’s narrator declares:  
 
It is more needful that I should have a fibre of sympathy connecting me with that 
vulgar citizen who weighs out my sugar. . . more needful that my heart should 
swell with loving admiration at some trait of gentle goodness in the faulty people 
who sit at my hearth with me . . . than at the deeds of heroes whom I shall never 
know except by hearsay. (179)  
 
The novelist should not “straighten their noses, nor brighten their wit, nor rectify their 
dispositions,” but rather present characters with faults just like the people in readers’ 
lives. This is the kind of sympathy the realist novel fosters, and the kind of sympathy the 
narrator claims the novel should produce: “it is needful you should tolerate, pity, and 
love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, inconsistent people, whose movements of 
goodness you should be able to admire” (176). The connection between sympathy and 
reading develops in part, I suggest, because of the stated aims of realist writers such as 
Eliot. The difficulty that some writers found in working out sympathy within fiction 
accounts for the increasing doubts about just how much sympathy can accomplish. 
Although the height of realism is usually located in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the novel coexisted uncomfortably with debates about the dangers of reading, a 
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continuation of such discussions from the eighteenth century.16
Advice about what and how to read often occurred in conduct books, such as one 
finds in Reverend Wetenhall Wilkes’s conduct book A Letter of Genteel and Moral 
 Markman Ellis locates 
discussions about reading within the culture of sensibility’s concern over manners and 
proper decorum; reading became a way of instilling a sense of virtue. Hugh Blair, the 
first professor of Rhetoric and Belle Lettres in Britain, wrote in 1762 that the novel 
provides “one of the best channels for conveying instruction, for painting human life and 
manners, for showing the errors into which we are betrayed by our passions, for 
rendering virtue amiable and vice odious” (qtd. in Ellis 43). This hopeful view of novels’ 
ability to create moral citizens was not uncontested; many felt novels were more likely to 
corrupt readers. Vicesimus Knox argues in Essays Moral and Literary (1782): “If it is 
true, that the present age is more corrupt than the preceding…the great multiplication of 
Novels probably contributed to its degeneracy” (qtd. in Ellis 46). Metaphors of disease 
and infection were often applied to reading; Hannah More called novels a “complicated 
drug” whose corruption “has spread so wide and descended so low, as to have become 
one of the most universal as well as most pernicious sources of corruption among us” 
(1:190-191). If the benefit of reading for moral training was acknowledged, it was often 
attended by a need to qualify what kind of reading.  
                                                        
16 Aliaga-Buchenau suggests that debates about reading swelled to such heights in the nineteenth century 
because the nature of reading changed so drastically.  Printing shifted from the control of the church, 
patrons, and guilds, all of which restricted what was written and how, to commercial printing presses more 
concerned with profit than regulating reading material. Increasing literacy rates and cheaper books also 
meant that reading was no longer the domain of a limited group of elite readers who could ensure the 
“correct” interpretation (4-5). The debates centered on the lower classes and women as fears grew about the 
disturbance to social order if the poor became too educated through literacy and if women neglected their 
domestic duties. 
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Advice to a Young Lady:  “Novels, Plays, Romances, and Poems must be read sparingly 
and with Caution; lest such Parts of them, as one not strictly tied down to sedateness, 
should inculcate such Light, over-gay Notions as might by unperceiv’d Degrees soften 
and mislead the Understanding” (qtd. in Ellis 47). Those who felt reading could instill 
morals continually reinforced the idea that novel writing and reading should have as its 
priority the development of virtue: “Novels should be wrote and read as books which are 
to teach by illustrating the moral by the facts, where precept is enlivened by examples, 
and imagination brought in to strengthen reason, not to confound it” (qtd. in Ellis 181). 
One of the potentially positive roles attributed to novels was the ability to teach readers 
how to feel for other people.  
This sympathetic ability was felt to be particularly strong in women, a belief Kate 
Flint shows to be connected to the biological theories about women’s bodies and minds:  
 
[woman] is thus especially constructed by nature so as to have a close intuitive 
relationship with her offspring, then such instincts as sympathetic imagination, 
and a ready capacity to identify with the experience of others are unalterable facts, 
about her mental operation, and hence by extension about her process of reading. 
(56)  
 
In the case of women, then, sympathetic identification was a dangerous result of novel 
reading. Arguments about the danger of women reading were grounded on the conception 
of a strict gender binary.17
                                                        
17 Pearson cites several good examples of articles that begin by warning of the danger of reading for both 
sexes but end by focusing on women (18).  
 Many of the proclaimed attributes of women as angels – their 
compassion and care for others – also led to fears about their reading habits. Because of 
their caring natures, women were thought more prone to empathize and identify deeply 
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with heroines. This identification could be dangerous if the heroine did not reflect the 
proper or ideal woman. The distinctive attention given to the problem of women readers 
in this period forms an important interpretative frame for how gossip, gazing, silence, and 
laughter – themselves gendered discourses – would have been viewed within these texts. 
It was a risky endeavor for these writers to create new conceptions of sympathy using not 
only a genre that was unsuitable for women’s overwrought imagination but also using 
discourses that were ineffective because femininized.18
Although concerns over reading’s influence were focused on the minds of 
women, children, and the poor, the connection between reading and the development of 
sympathy extended to all populations. Jaffe underscores the visual nature of Victorian 
identification through sympathy, a connection she argues is based on the “spectatorial 
character of Victorian culture” (9). Victorian novels created and circulated the images 
that became closely aligned with representing sympathy (14). The process of turning 
sympathetic feelings into visible representations, Jaffe argues, elides differences by 
representing the other as part of a larger human condition. This is the complicated ethical 
nature of sympathetic identification largely ignored in the general discourse about 
sympathy as a necessary virtue to develop in a modern, civilized nation.  The novels I 
examine in this project are much more apt to question and complicate the effects of 
 
                                                        
18 Barker-Benfield describes the process by which sympathy became gendered within the context of an 
increasingly consumer and secular culture in the eighteenth century. At the end of his book, The Culture of 
Sensibility, he comments on the influence of this “cult of sensibility” on the nineteenth century: “Out of the 
final 1790’s fusion of evangelism with a sensibility made unequivocally respectable would emerge the 
flood of reform organizations rooted in a middle-class, female constituency” (394). Barker-Benfield’s study 
is crucial to understanding how sympathy became the natural province of the female gender, and how this 
categorization could both empower and destroy women’s ability to act in social and political arenas.  
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sympathy than the national and domestic discourses articulated through conduct books, 
treatises, magazines, and even many novels. These writers recognized that although 
sympathy was often used in unethical assimilative practices, it did not have to be 
implicated in the homogenizing impulse of Britain. Indeed, Jaffe connects sympathy to a 
“conceptual fluidity” because sympathy called for identification with society’s outcasts 
(beggars, fallen women), and yet such identification undermined the representation of a 
solidly middle class identity (19).  It is this sort of complexity, I argue, that these 
novelists highlight in order to find alternative ways of ethically encountering the other. 
 
Sympathy in the Nineteenth Century  
The discourse surrounding sympathy extended well beyond debates about 
reading, blending into the domain of nationalism, moral theory, religion, and science. 
Although these divergent areas of society interrogated and used sympathy in numerous 
ways, one can distill nineteenth century discussions to their most common understanding 
of sympathy: the ability to show compassion for the other by understanding the 
experiences of the other. Victorian understandings of sympathy cannot be understood 
outside of the ways in which the eighteenth century firmly connected sympathy to 
notions of virtue and even national identity. Britain began defining itself as the charity 
nation; an identity articulated by writers like Henry Fielding who claimed “Charity is in 
fact the very Characteristic of this Nation at this Time” (qtd. in Ellis 14). The actual 
charitable work done by organizations shaped ideas of sympathy, and the language of 
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sensibility began to spread beyond the boundaries of moral philosophy into economic and 
scientific discourse (Ellis 18-19).  
The Enlightenment played a role in eighteenth-century conceptions of sympathy, 
particularly in the separation of religion from human nature. What resulted was that 
“Above all, philosophers during the eighteenth century emphasize pity, compassion, 
fellow feeling, and sympathy, broadly construed, as the steering mechanism of individual 
interaction” (Steintrager xiii). Religious rules no longer governed behavior; rather, 
individual sentiment became the guiding principle for social relationships. Adam Smith 
outlined one of the most popular ways of thinking about sympathy in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, complicating David Hume’s theory that sympathy was a naturally occurring 
impulse.19
I should clarify at this point that sympathy can be ethical or unethical. My theory 
outlines the requirement for ethical sympathy, which is namely preserving difference. 
 According to Smith, we cannot easily determine what another person thinks or 
feels; this does not, however, negate sympathy for Smith so much as shift it further into 
the realm of the imagination: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men 
feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving 
what we ourselves should feel in the like situation…it is by the imagination only that we 
can form any conception of what are his sensations” (11). In the exchange described here 
by Smith, sympathy for the other becomes sympathy for the self (Jaffe 4). This version of 
sympathy, based on the ability to understand the other, contributed to the practice of 
extending sympathy only after differences are erased.  
                                                        
19 For a comparison of Hume and Smith’s approach to sympathy see Mercer. 
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Critics like Amit Rai identify unethical uses of sympathy in nineteenth-century Britain 
where sympathy was a way of rendering, as he claims, “the other an object of 
identification” to make the other seem “knowable, accessible, and so appropriable” (164). 
Rai situates sympathy squarely within the historical rise of humanitarianism in the 
eighteenth century, such as the establishment of numerous hospitals, charity 
organizations for chimney sweeps and prisoners, abolition societies, and the Royal 
Humane Society (33). The emphasis, as seen in Smith’s theory, remained on the role 
imagination plays in helping one feel another’s pain (46). Such an emphasis, Rai points 
out, encourages the kind of sympathy that relies on one’s ability to know exactly what the 
other is thinking and feeling. The problem with this conception of sympathy, Rai argues, 
is that “in comprehending the other what is lost is, precisely, otherness” (47).20
                                                        
20 The lack of concern shown for this kind of assimilation causes Rai to define sympathy within the 
eighteenth century as “a mechanism of differentiation and normalization” and “a principle of sociality and 
cohesion.” In short, sympathy was about governing the self, other, family, society. Because he grounds his 
analysis of sympathy in Foucault’s notion of governmentality, sympathy will always be an oppressive 
gesture for Rai. He argues that sympathy produces the differences it tries to overcome because sympathy 
needs those inequalities in order to perform the work of overcoming inequalities that happens through 
identification (xix). I argue that sympathy can be structured differently, and I think theorists today, as well 
as in the nineteenth century, found other ways for conceiving sympathy as an ethical way to engage the 
other.  
 He cites 
the British East India Charter and the abolition of the slave trade as two important 
moments in the development of an aestheticized sympathy (117-118). Very often, then, 
sympathy, in its unethical form, was a movement more interested in defining a nation 
than establishing ethical social relationships. I am suggesting, however, that we need to 
look at other constructions of sympathy that attempted to establish a different way of 
viewing the other. Rai makes a call in his book for “sympathy beyond sympathy through 
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a different kind of responsibility toward the other. A sociality with and through 
difference” (114). This is precisely the notion of sympathy that I elucidate in certain 
nineteenth-century novels that attempt, I argue, to criticize unethical uses of sympathy, 
such as Rai describes, and offer surprising ways of restructuring the relationship to others 
by means of typically disregarded forms of telling.  
 Several developments in the nineteenth century shifted the structure of social 
relations and increased anxiety about how to interrelate. The Chartist movement and 
Corn Law Crisis are two examples of movements that led to the need for imagining new 
social relations between classes (Morris 9). Additionally, the growing sources of wealth 
other than land, the crisis of sovereignty created by the American and French 
Revolutions, and the growing middle classes began shifting power away from the landed 
gentry, changing even the way nations were imagined; rather than a nation visualized as 
“expansiveness, spaciousness, grandeur, and freedom” now nation became “density, 
closeness, and proximity” (Morris 10-11). The crowded life of cities produced by 
industrialization led to more opportunities to interact with unknown others. An English 
man or woman in London experienced what Pam Morris describes as “the boundaries of 
self [giving] way before the unfixed, orderless chaos of sheer agglomeration” (25).  
As journal and magazine articles show, Victorians were highly aware of these 
changes to the structure of social relations. In the Westminster Review the repeal of the 
Corn Laws was interpreted as “the commencement of a new era.” (204) Likewise, the 
Westminster Review also commented on the changing structure in leadership, noting that 
the “number of vacant leaderships” results from “the general uprooting of old authorities” 
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(479). Titles of essays like Carlyle’s “Signs of the Times” (1829) and Mill’s “The Spirit 
of the Age” (1831) also represent the prevailing notion of change. Some viewed the 
changing face of British society with disapproval and fear, as expressed in Blackwood’s 
Magazine: “You may come to touch very disagreeable people; at present you are only a 
few yards apart. There are two things according to this Census, threatening you – 
‘density’ and ‘proximity’” (Eagles 445). The other is to be feared as “disagreeable,” 
posing the threat of unavoidable interaction. Events like the Great Exhibition in 1851, 
however, revealed a certain fascination for the growing complexity of society, at the 
same time expressing a desire to assimilate those differences into a unified concept of 
British identity. In the course of these changes, the middle class strove to subsume 
everyone’s behavior under a common moral code based on visible works rather than the 
upper class notion of inherited goodness.  Sympathy was given credit for prompting 
people to perform charitable deeds.  Thus, where notions of sympathy in the eighteenth 
century were often used to display one’s upper class sensibilities, in the nineteenth 
century sympathy became a middle-class phenomenon to provide stability for defining 
moral actions.   
The circulation of a coherent national identity through reading became one way to 
stabilize identity. A central part of this national identity was the refined quality of 
sympathy. In later editions of Smith’s Theory, he adds a new section that more clearly 
than before connects sympathy with nationalism: “The most extensive public 
benevolence which can commonly be exerted with an considerable effect, is that of the 
statesmen, who project and form alliances among neighbouring or not very distant 
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nations” (qtd. in Gottlieb 36).21
 
 Sir Walter Scott’s comments about reading novels draw a 
direct connection between sympathy, reading, and nationalism. He describes how Maria 
Edgeworth inspired his own writing of the Waverly novels when he saw how her novels 
stirred sympathy for the Irish:  
[her] Irish characters have gone so far to make the English familiar with the 
character of their gay and kind-hearted neighbours of Ireland, that she may be 
truly said to have done more towards completing the Union, than perhaps all the 
legislative enactments by which it has been followed up…I felt that something 
might be attempted for my own country, of the same kind with that which Miss 
Edgeworth so fortunately achieved for Ireland – something which might introduce 
her natives to those of the sister kingdom, in a more favourable light than they had 
been placed hitherto, and tend to procure sympathy for their virtues and 
indulgence for their foibles” (“General Preface,” in Waverly 352-353).  
 
As is particularly evident in Scott’s work, both novelistic discourse and nationalist 
discourse rely on the experience of sympathy, on the “substitutive empathy of 
identification” (Lynch 49). Reading can enhance the ability to imagine others as having 
similar experiences to one’s own; therefore reading becomes an important link in creating 
a stable national identity. The danger in this process became one of the problems in the 
dominant narrative about sympathy in this period: it often served as the moral ground for 
assimilating the other’s difference (and other here usually designates non-English) into a 
cohesive definition of Britishness.  
 
 
 
                                                        
21 See Gottlieb for a detailed analysis of the connections between sympathy and nationalism in Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. He concludes: “Smithian sympathy simultaneously naturalizes and encourages 
the moral basis of both social union in general, and the Anglo-Scottish Union in particular” (37). 
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Identifying Alternative Narratives of Sympathy: Gossip, Gazing, Silence, and 
Laughter as Discourse Systems  
 
 The concern over how to define the British subject greatly increased the 
conceptual link among reading, morality, and identity. Debates over the dangers of 
reading had the residual effect of conferring a great deal of power for novels to influence 
reader’s perceptions simply by invoking (fear or praise of) that power. While some 
novels were certainly written just to entertain, writers and readers alike could not read 
without an awareness of the supposed power of narrative to alter social relations. 
Historically, then, the novel and sympathy are intricately linked to discussions about the 
role sympathy plays in negotiating encounters with the other during the nineteenth 
century. In addition to these historical connections between sympathy and the novel, I 
also chose novels as the site of my exploration because I believe this genre combines a 
certain level of play and reality that provides a unique insight into what people were able 
to imagine out of what actually existed. The novel, as Mikhail Bakhtin has established, is 
a dialogic form that carries with it layers of meaning, both in the way it reticulates 
specific characters and situations within larger social matrixes, and in the way, as an 
interpretative enterprise, readings of novels remain varied and fluid. In the nineteenth 
century, novels offered a space for suggesting alternative narratives in ways that more 
monolithic genres, like treatises and conduct books, did not. I am also interested in the 
ways that writers imagined sympathy could work, the constitutive rather than prescriptive 
or descriptive function of novels. My aim in using discourse systems is to extend the 
scope of novels’ role in shaping sympathetic discourse by turning my focus to only one 
agent of transformation at a time. This sustained focus, provided by a discourse system’s 
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attention to one discursive element as it reoccurs throughout the novel, helps reveal 
alternative narratives about sympathy that often go unnoticed. These discourse systems 
also unveil the potentially ethical role for communicative acts like gossip, gazing, silence, 
and laughter that usually have negative connotations.  
Discourse systems are interpretive models for reading texts. A discourse system 
traces how communicative acts operate at multiple levels and on multiple rhetorical 
fronts to engage with both the story world and the extra-textual world. For example, 
gossip does not merely exist within a novel as a discourse that creates and propels the 
plot. It can also influence other discourses, social institutions, and ways of structuring 
identity. Silence indicates more than just a reticent or oppressed character. It can also be 
used to actively construct identity.  Such large claims can be made for gossip and silence 
when viewed through discourse systems that trace these forms of relating to the other 
through acts that run vertically (at multiple levels of story world and lived world) and 
horizontally (across textual events and spaces). Ultimately, I argue that we can better 
interpret the social critiques of sympathy in these novels by looking at these usually 
neglected elements in a sustained, systematic way.  
The term discourse has accrued densely layered and ambiguous meanings as it 
has been incorporated into vastly different fields and contexts. It is important, then, to 
distinguish how I use this term within the phrase discourse system. R. S. Perinbanayagam 
defines discourse as: “an interactional act capable of containing multiple significations, 
all of them delineating a self and an other in varying forms of dialogues and 
relationships” (xi). Discourse, then, is distinct from speech and language as discourse 
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alludes to the way speech manifests itself during interactions with the other defined by 
specific social contexts.22
My analysis follows Patricia Bizzell’s notion of discourse by looking at the 
constitutive function of language use in the way it contributes to constructions of social 
relations. Bizzell focuses on the communal role in shaping discourse through “shared 
conventions of language use among all members” of a community. In contemporary 
rhetorics, the idea of the communication as one person acting as the “author” trying to 
 More than just spoken words, discourse is a way of interacting 
in a particular place and with certain people that is inevitably governed by social norms 
but also can alter and inform those norms. I am drawing on aspects of Foucault’s concept 
of “discursive formation,” which recognizes the way groups of statements are structured 
around ideologies and can either reinforce established conventions or subversively 
undermine those conventions. Foucault’s discussion of discursive formations illuminates 
the relations of social and cultural power that work to structure the very discursive 
practices that reinforce the power of dominant traditions. We can easily overlook a 
woman’s use of silence as a form of resistance because gender ideologies inform the way 
silence will be interpreted. Although discourse systems can work in support of a nexus of 
social and cultural formations, the novels I examine in this project subvert conventional 
social norms through discourse systems that employ seemingly negative or frivolous 
discourses in ethical and powerful ways.  
                                                        
22Prior to the 1970’s, Discourse Analysis referred to the study of syntactic features. With the influence of 
anthropologists, sociologists, and sociolinguists, a consideration of social influences on language emerged 
and Discourse Analysis broadened to incorporate pragmatics and ethnography of speaking. Both of these 
movements consider language in use in a specific context. By the 1980’s and 1990’s, under the influence of 
gender studies, Discourse Analysis now also considers intersections of socially constructed roles and 
language use. My analysis of discourse utilizes this more recent notion of discourse studies. 
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convey an idea to another person who receives the message as the “audience,” has given 
way to the idea of “discourse communities,” which entails the dialectical exchange 
whereby participants in a communicative act are both sending and receiving messages 
concurrently. The term “discourse community” prevents discourse from becoming 
abstract, appearing as though it controls the formation of individuals, by locating the 
social and contextual element of discourse as the site of production.23
The role of “system” in my phrase discourse system indicates the three levels at 
which these elements work within the novel. The three levels include characters’ use of 
the elements as communicative acts, the narrator’s role in highlighting the elements’ 
rhetorical effects, and the writer’s use of the elements as narrative technique. The purpose 
of a systematic theory of gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter is to locate the complex 
connections between these elements in narrative and larger systems of social relations 
articulated through discourses like sympathy. Kathi Weeks cautions against the danger of 
notions of “system” that take on intentionality and are “credited with a kind of monolithic 
 As much as 
anything else, what the notion of discourse community highlights is the dialectic between 
social relations and discourse in the formation of institutional practices, social norms, and 
shared values. What such a model suggests, then, is that discourse has heuristic power to 
define, and thus alter, social relations. By exploring gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter 
within the context of their production and dispersion as systems, I mean to show how 
these elements critique dominant discourses.  
                                                        
23 Killingsworth cites Foucault as one critic who presents discourse as “an all-pervasive medium of power 
and manipulation that somehow remains subjectless; users of discourse are represented as victims of the 
communication media” (116). So long as we always consider discourse in tandem with community, we can 
avoid conceiving of discourse as an abstract and immutable object.  
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force that seems to guarantee its ability to recover from potential challenges to its 
power,” a warning also sounded by Foucault that a reductive analysis of systems 
constructs a one-way flow of top-down power (88). By their very nature, gossip, gazing, 
silence, and laughter resist becoming closed systems of power because they have not 
been accepted within “legitimate” forms of discourse. Unlike dominant discourses that 
maintain power by rejecting other narratives, these elements require a dialectical 
relationship that fosters, rather than resists, different forms of knowledge. Additionally, 
in their most ethical form these elements tend to work from the bottom-up, allowing 
those outside dominant structures to become part of larger cultural conversations. These 
discourse systems are not inherently ethical or unethical, rather they illuminate the 
workings of social relationships within a historical context and, importantly, present 
counter-possibilities to dominant narratives. What ultimately emerges from each 
discourse system, I argue, is a construction of ethical sympathy as a relationship that 
preserves the uniqueness of self and other by maintaining a sympathetic distance.  
A discourse system communicates above the level of language, incorporating 
social messages, the different horizon of experience for the speaker and the audience, 
intended messages, unintended ones, understood messages, and misconstrued ones. 
Communicative act is the most basic level at which I explore gossip, gazing, silence, and 
laughter, focusing on how characters employ these elements as forms of telling within 
their interactions. My use of “act” follows Butler’s notion: “an ‘act’ is not a momentary 
happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability 
that exceeds the moment it occasions” (14). Speech acts are important to Butler for their 
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possibility to create social change.24
Perhaps the most important element of a discourse system is the relational nature 
that inheres in the communicative act. This relationship can be ethical or unethical, but an 
encounter between self and other exists nonetheless. Looking at marginal communicative 
acts like gossip or silence, for example, within discourse systems, helps to illuminate the 
way these elements operate as more than just communication or responses. They can be 
intentional acts that disrupt dominant narratives by providing different ways of 
structuring social relationships. When part of a discourse system, these communicative 
acts become more than just language; they perform important social critiques and they 
construct alternative worldviews.  
 The elements I explore in this dissertation are 
positioned to perform the social change that Butler attributes to speech acts by 
challenging the prevailing understanding of how social relationships were built on 
unethical categories during the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, there is a certain amount of 
agency assumed in a discourse system because the intention behind the communicative 
act gives the speaker the agency to shape meaning, but also the reception and consequent 
interpretation of that communication gives the audience agency to create meaning.  
 The second level of the discourse system consists of the narrator’s use of these 
elements as rhetorical techniques. The relationship between narrator and reader is 
                                                        
24Butler wants to separate herself from theorists like Bourdieu by claiming that speech acts are 
insurrectionary rather than a rite of institutions. She argues language is not a closed system that relies on 
social positions to fix meanings. Rather, an utterance is forceful when it breaks from prior patterns and 
context: “Language takes on a non-ordinary meaning in order precisely to contest what has become 
sedimented in as the ordinary” (145). While Bourdieu only gives utterances the ability to create effects 
when used by someone who holds power, Butler finds a way for the speech acts themselves to bestow 
agency when the act uses conventional formulas in non-conventional ways (147).  
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founded on acts of interpretation. That is, both the narrator, in presenting the characters 
and action, and the reader, in trying to determine what to think about the characters and 
action, are primarily concerned with how the story world will be interpreted. Rhetoric is 
intimately connected to this act of interpretation. Indeed, according to John D. Ramage, 
the ability to construct and present identity resides in the domain of rhetoric: “It is this 
interdependence between identity and language – our capacity to use language as a means 
of representing our identity to others and in turn to interpret others’ representations of 
themselves – that makes rhetoric such a powerful tool for understanding, forming, and 
preserving identity” (34). The narrator relies on rhetorical techniques to construct the 
character’s identity and to elicit desired responses from the reader.25
The third level of the discourse system includes the author’s use of these elements 
as narrative techniques. Wayne Booth, Gerard Genette, Seymour Chapman, Suzanne 
Keen, Ruth Page, H. Porter Abbott and others have created a veritable vocabulary for 
talking about how texts work, making terms like implied reader and homodiegetic 
narrator, as well as techniques like withholding and indirect discourse, common parlance 
for understanding and interpreting texts. Gossip, gazing, laughter, and silence—as 
techniques—are important additions to that list of narrative devices. More than just a plot 
device or good writing practice, narrative technique is an ideology that “embodies the 
social, economic, and literary conditions under which it has been produced” (Lanser 5). 
Instead of assuming that narrative structures are formed by “essential properties” or 
  
                                                        
25 To influence the minds of readers is the rhetorical aim of literature according to Burke. The three 
components of rhetoric: identification, address, and persuasion, appear in literature as techniques intending 
to influence attitudes, not actions (50). In this project, I look for how rhetorical techniques influence the 
attitude of sympathy, or the attitude of engaging the other.  
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“isolated aesthetic imperatives,” Susan Lanser suggests that narrative structures are 
determined by “complex and changing conventions that are themselves produced in and 
by the relations of power that implicate writer, reader, and text” (5).26
For example, for a woman writer to use gossip as a narrative technique fits too 
comfortably with conventional constructions of femininity to perform a critique of social 
constructions of gender. The way in which Martineau and Gaskell place gossip’s power 
outside of the domestic realm (where it presumably belongs), however, disrupts the 
conventional use of gossip. In some ways Deerbrook is thus even more radical than the 
texts where Martineau adopts a more masculine writing voice. In Deerbrook she 
accomplishes social critique by using a feminine narrative technique, thus exploding not 
only the standard understanding of gossip as a frivolous discourse but also conventional 
ways of interpreting women writers and their work. As Robin Warhol explains, the social 
context of readers and the social context of narrative techniques each influence the way 
the text’s engagement with ideology will be interpreted:  
  When these 
narrative techniques serve to disrupt ideology, then, is when they work outside of the 
category that convention placed them in.  
 
each strategy or convention of fiction that a novelist can use will have certain 
connotations, inherited from its forebears, models, and antitypes among the 
fictions that preceded it. Depending on how actual readers situate themselves in 
                                                        
26 Lanser includes some misgiving about the “rise of women’s voice” during the historical context of the 
rise of the novel. Lanser thinks the narrative voice of women actually limits their real, public voice: “The 
question becomes, then, not simply whether there is ‘female voice’ in narrative, but whether the forms of 
such voice carry an authority that is more than private and fictional, establishing a place for women as 
subjects in the newly emerging public ‘sphere’” (41). While I agree with Lanser that the agency women 
gained within texts did not always translate into the lived world, I do think women writers contributed in 
powerful ways to reimagining the possibility for more ethical social relations.  
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regard to these conventions, their reactions to the text will be influenced by the 
text’s rhetorical moves. (27-28)  
 
I am not implying, then, that I can prove these writers employed gossip, gazing, silence, 
or laughter intentionally as strategies to elicit the specific response of a reformed 
understanding of sympathy within their readers. 27
I turn now to examine how each of these elements as discourse systems. Although 
in each chapter I isolate a particular discourse system, this does not indicate that I see 
them working as self-contained systems. In my explanation of each system, I consider 
briefly the way other critics have also engaged in a systematic analysis of gossip, silence, 
gazing, and laughter, as well contemporary and recent understandings of each element. I 
am not making a chronological claim for the development of a new understanding of 
sympathy as the century progresses. Thus, the chapters are not ordered chronologically 
according to each novel’s publication date. Rather, I trace a conceptual trajectory from 
the simplest revisions of sympathy, beginning with gossip in Deerbrook and Cranford, to 
more complex transformations of sympathy with gazing in Silas Marner and silence in 
 What I do claim is that the way these 
writers situate these elements within other conventions of fiction (like realism) and within 
certain social connotations (the debate about sympathy) creates a pointed critique of 
dominant narratives about each of those elements, about sympathy, and about social 
relations.  
                                                        
27 As powerful as they can be, narrative techniques do not guarantee the “correct” response from readers. 
As Warhol explains: “strategies are rhetorical features of texts, choices of technique indicating novelists’ 
apparent hopes about the emotional power their stories might wield. Strategies can misfire; they guarantee 
nothing” (25-26). However, because narrative techniques are nested within social conventions, the way 
writers use techniques, either upholding or subverting conventions, reveals much about the intended effect.  
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Villette. Daniel Deronda and Vanity Fair appear last because they retreat from the radical 
definition of sympathy in Brontë’s text to express the limits of sympathy through 
laughter.  
 In chapter two, I examine how the discourse system of gossip highlights the 
moments where gossip transforms social practices and relationships in Harriet 
Martineau’s Deerbrook and Elizabeth Gaskell’s Cranford. This transformative quality of 
gossip is part of Susan Philips’s claim that we must look beyond just the subversive 
qualities of gossip, in doing so we can see how gossip transforms orthodox structures and 
institutions. If we only look at gossip as a unit of talk, the tendency is to sweep it aside as 
a trivial or illegitimate conversational tool. Through a systematic analysis, however, we 
see gossip connected to social contexts, either upholding or transforming relationships 
within those contexts. Other critics who look at gossip as a system focus on the range of 
its effects and motivations. Ralph Rosnow and Gary Fine offer one example of a 
systematic exploration of gossip in that they attempt to establish typologies for gossip, 
but most importantly they examine how gossip works in various social contexts.  They 
demonstrate the wide range of gossip’s influence as it infiltrates a variety of institutions 
like politics, medicine, and the academy, focusing on the transactional nature of gossip 
that shows it to be purposive behavior with distinct social and psychological functions 
(131). Within a literary context, Elaine Bander explores Jane Austen’s portrayal of gossip 
in her novels, arguing it is not a simple “good or bad” approval or disproval. By engaging 
in a systematic analysis of gossip in all Austen’s novels, Bander can demonstrate how 
Austen employs gossip in all its many facets as comic, useful, benign, malicious, 
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damaging, etc. Critics have also looked at gossip compared to other forms of telling. Jan 
B. Gordon compares gossip, letters, diaries, and novels, Patricia Myer Spacks draws an 
analogy between gossip and letters, and Blake Vermeule compares literary narrative to 
gossip. These critics, in various ways, recognize the systematic critique gossip can make 
at higher levels like institutions of the family or ways of knowing.28
My analysis of the discourse system of gossip examines how gossip reveals the 
unnecessary boundaries that are constructed between self and other. As a discourse that 
travels across boundaries of public/private and male/female, gossip itself undermines the 
ideology supporting those boundaries. Sympathy can flow more freely once the identities 
of others are not so strictly consigned to categories of difference. In Deerbrook, 
Martineau uses the stereotypical figure of the gossiping woman to show the unethical 
potential of gossip to destroy social relationships. At the same time, Mrs. Rowland’s 
malicious gossip reveals the power of this communicative act to restructure an entire 
community in very public ways. Gossip wields such power primarily through its narrative 
and speculative qualities, two components of gossip that I discuss in this chapter. I focus 
specifically on the way gossip uses gaps, a function of its narrative and speculative 
nature, as a way to engage the other. Martineau will use the marginal figure of a disabled 
governess to illustrate the more ethical use of gossip; Maria brings healing to individuals 
and the community through her sympathetic gossip. In Cranford, gossip exposes the 
  
                                                        
28 Gordon examines the ways in which the discourse of gossip intersects with other discourses, like that of 
family inheritance so central to British class structure. This is just one example of how the social norms 
about gossip are partly informed by the social norms of other discourses: because legitimacy was such a 
concern for family structure, the fact that gossip usually has an unidentifiable source turns it immediately 
into a suspect form of knowledge.  
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destructive nature of the boundaries the Cranford women have erected between 
themselves and anyone who represents difference. I also focus on the relationship 
between the narrator and the reader in this novel, founded in gossip. Mary encourages the 
reader to extend sympathy to these “silly” gossiping ladies as she shows the reader how 
to reside in a liminal space, not able to fully understand the women and yet willing to 
share in their experiences enough to cross boundaries. Both novels classify ethical gossip 
as the opportunity to inscribe narrative gaps with new ways of defining the other, thereby 
transforming social relations. 
In chapter three, I use the discourse system of gazing in George Eliot’s novel 
Silas Marner to explore the possibility of sympathy created, not through recognition of 
sameness, but through identification in the moment of witnessing the other’s story. The 
discourse system of gazing departs from classical accounts of “the gaze” that construct it 
solely as an objectifying practice.29
                                                        
29Laura Hinton looks at the gaze constructed through sentimentality from Clarissa all the way to Recue 
911. Her evaluation of the gaze, and for that matter sympathy, is decidedly negative. She argues that 
“sentiment is reproduced by sympathy’s endorsement of sadomasochistic, scopophilic practices: in short, 
by the perverse gaze” (3). 
 Systematic analyses of the gaze tend to position it as 
an ideological function that influences other systems, such as systems of power and 
knowledge. In his book, Downcast Eyes, Martin Jay traces a complicated history of the 
gaze through the Middle Ages, emphasizing the complex interplay of religion and politics 
in the development of theories about sight and their manifestations in social practices. 
What Jay’s historical survey shows is the systematic application of visual theories that 
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give the gaze hegemony over social relations.30 Jonathan Crary engages in a systematic 
analysis of the gaze’s “massive reorganization of knowledge and social practices” in the 
nineteenth century “that modified in myriad ways the productive, cognitive, and desiring 
capacities of the human subject” (3). Levinas reconceptualizes the gaze in more positive 
ways by focusing on visual “face” as an openness toward the other.31
My term “gazing” is meant to employ this use of visual perception of the other. It 
is beyond the recognition that often reduces difference to sameness. Witnessing, a term I 
use to define the process of approaching the other with sympathy, emphasizes gazing as a 
relational discourse that negotiates the particular balance between maintaining the other’s 
difference and yet still sympathizing with the other. To understand how this act of gazing 
could be positive, I focus on two important aspects of gazing: the visual component, 
comprised of space and stance, and the storytelling component. Within gazing, it is the 
storytelling component that enables sympathy through the act of listening, thereby 
acknowledging the other has a story just like me. So while the story may not be one I can 
comprehend, the important ethical component to gazing is that I confer subjectivity on 
the other by acknowledging the other’s story. Gazing, in contrast to objectifying practices 
 Face is a category 
of understanding that emphasizes relationship with the other rather than knowing the 
other.  
                                                        
30Jay’s historical survey includes a detailed look at two ideas influencing our notion of the gaze today: 
Foucault’s “unimpeded empire of the gaze” (from The Birth of the Clinic) and Debord’s commonly cited 
phrase, “society of the spectacle,” as another controlling idea for how we understand the gaze today. 
Debord centers his critique on the separation of people (alienation) that results in social relations mediated 
by images. Foucault stressed the dangers of being the object of the gaze, Debord the dangers of being the 
subject.  
 
31 Handelman and Robbins both discuss Levinas’s concept of “face” as not emphasizing the visual in the 
way that gaze studies have commonly constructed encounters with the other. 
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of “the gaze,” constructs a performance of telling and listening that creates a relationship 
between self and other, enhancing sympathy without erasing difference. Identification is 
based on the self’s recognition that the other has a story just like I have a story, even if 
the stories may be incomprehensible to each other.  
Although I have not overtly discussed gender yet, it should be clear by now that I 
cannot ignore this category when dealing with the elements of gossip, gazing, silence, 
and laughter that have historically been gendered themselves, nor can I ignore gender 
when exploring strategies of sympathy. Important to the inflection of gender throughout 
this project, then, is an understanding of gender as a social construct, as a way of ordering 
reality. Ruth Page defines gender as “socially constructed norms, practices, and codes 
which facilitate the identification of an individual or his or her behavior as ‘masculine,’ 
‘feminine’” (191). I use gender, not as strictly an identifying mark to delineate male or 
female, but as a way of structuring knowledge, discourse, and reality. This definition 
follows Elizabeth Langland’s approach to gender as a category of analysis rather than a 
focus on women or “woman” (xv). In using gender, I am aware of the tendency to affirm 
the dichotomy so rampantly reproduced in the nineteenth century whereby masculine and 
feminine domains became the binary by which all society could be structured. Indeed, my 
hesitancy for making claims about gender in this project emerges from the fear that others 
will read my argument as an essentialist one. My use of gender, then, is an historical 
necessity. It would be impossible to talk about nineteenth-century novels without 
acknowledging that these writers are both working within and challenging categories of 
gender. Nor could I write about gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter without 
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acknowledging how vital gender is to the ways these elements are interpreted. It means 
something different, for example, when a woman laughs than when a man laughs. It is 
harder to detect a woman using silence as a strategy because of the social assumption that 
women are silent out of obedience. In other words, I would be missing an important part 
of how each of these elements work within the text if I did not heed the ways in which 
gender informs readers’ interpretation. Within my analysis, gender works both as a social 
category and as “a fundamental textual trope that reorients familiar or traditional plots 
toward innovative formal ends” (Langland xviii). Gender designates more than 
male/female, it is way of knowing and a trope for interpretation. 
In chapter four I take up silence as a discourse system in Charlotte Brontë’s novel 
Villette. Silence clearly connects to gender through issues of voice. Feminist readings of 
literature often attempt recuperate the lost voices of oppressed populations and thus 
reveal alternative versions of history through their stories. While this work has been 
invaluable, the focus on recuperating voice has meant the neglect of silence as a viable 
means of communication, identity formation, and strategy of resistance; in short, all of 
those things we attribute to voice and speech. Cheryl Glenn sets out in her book 
Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence to explore the various ways silence is used as a 
discourse. She describes the silence of “imbalance, of weakness, impotence, fear, and 
subordination in the face of dominance,” normally inscribed upon women and the silence 
that “enacts strength and power” inscribed upon men (31). While she admits this has long 
been the understood perception of silence, Glenn challenges such perceptions by 
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exploring the possibility for silence as empowering (even for women) when it is a chosen 
rhetorical strategy.  
My analysis of silence builds from the important connection Glenn makes 
between silence, voice, and social relations. The context I use to explore silence, within a 
written form, can be a particularly tricky endeavor when one begins to ask how silences 
appear in a text. Silence within a discourse system can facilitate this sort of examination; 
I can look at the ways silence operates as a communicative act between characters, as a 
rhetorical technique used by the narrator (often manifested as withholding), and as a 
narrative technique used by the author (often manifested as gaps in the text). When seen 
at the level of system and strategy, silence becomes more than just a lack of response, or 
even more than a response; silence offers an alternative way to perform identity as 
unknowable and thus transforms notions of sympathy that require a knowable other.  
Villette, of all the novels I explore in this dissertation, asks for the most radical 
form of sympathy, because silence positions Lucy’s identity as unknowable. Ethical 
sympathy in this novel becomes that which can be extended without any possibility of 
identification. While Eliot’s novel still posits a certain amount of identification through 
the inclusion of the other’s story in communal narratives, Brontë’s novel resists any point 
of connection between Lucy and the characters and readers. Lucy’s silence does not, 
however, signify her desire for seclusion; as both character and narrator she projects her 
aspiration for intimate relationships founded on sympathy. This chapter also offers the 
most extensive critique of reading by thwarting readers’ desire to know and their impulse 
to complete Lucy’s narrative for her rather than leave the ending open.  
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In chapter five I turn to the limits of sympathy, revealed through my discussion of 
the discourse system of laughter in George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda and William 
Thackeray’s Vanity Fair. While there have been many systematic studies of humor, 
comedy, and jokes, few critics explore the phenomenon of laughter itself. In her book 
Breaking Up at Totality: a Rhetoric of Laughter, Diane Davis focuses on laughter as a 
systematic way of breaking apart categories that we cling to so insistently in order to 
make meaning out of our experiences. This systematic analysis establishes laughter as, 
for Davis, a way to move outside binaries of language. Laughter becomes a critique of 
language itself, or at least of our belief in the stability of language. Davis argues that 
focusing on laughter as a system that works outside the binary categories of language will 
allow us to “think the unthinkable, to engage in a radical redescription of the world in 
terms of heterogeneity and multiplicity; and to do this without regret or falling again into 
nostalgia for a solid ground” (166). Jacqueline Bussie also looks at laughter as a way to 
disrupt systems. Oppressed populations can use laughter as a system to subvert other, 
often more powerful, systems of oppression: “my reconsideration of laughter argues that 
laughter interrupts the system and state of oppression, and creatively attests to hope, 
resistance, and protest in the face of the shattering of language and traditional 
frameworks of thought and belief” (4). The above examples illustrate a systematic 
approach to laughter in that they recognize the ways in which laughter intersects with 
other social ideologies, both being formed by social convention and re-forming social 
conventions.  
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My own systematic analysis of laughter is located within literature where one 
often finds examples that uphold the assumption that feminine laughter should be 
confined to polite smiles. Representations of laughing women tend to fall in one of 
several categories: their laughter is disciplined and controlled by the end of the novel, 
they are given masculine traits so that they cannot be seen as positive pictures of 
femininity, or they are given traces of madness or hysteria. Charlotte Brontë’s character, 
Bertha Mason, is one of the most famous examples of the mad woman who laughs. In 
Villette, Mdm. Beck can laugh because Lucy masculinizes her through descriptions of her 
physical and intellectual traits. Evelina’s growth in Burney’s eighteenth-century novel is 
associated with the taming of her laughter. Contrary to these examples that employ 
laughter in the service of upholding stereotypes (mainly of women), laughter in Daniel 
Deronda and Vanity Fair exposes the way institutions and social norms unethically 
constrain social relations. I examine the laughter of Gwendolen and Becky for the ways 
in which each attempts to use laughter as a rhetorical strategy to construct an identity and 
a place within society. I argue that the laughter of incongruity, more than other forms of 
laughter, best facilitates ethical encounters by insisting, first, on a distance between self 
and other that maintains difference, and then recognizing the validity of the other’s world 
view instead of trying to insist on the preeminence of one’s own world view.  
This chapter comes last in my dissertation because it also exposes the limits of 
sympathy. Although both Eliot and Thackeray attempt to use the unconventional laughter 
of their heroines to revise unethical notions of sympathy, neither can find the right 
balance of laughter and sympathy. Either the distance established by laughter creates 
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insurmountable differences, or, once laughter is abandoned, sympathy absorbs the 
distinction between self and other.  I will also consider the influence of form in this 
chapter, comparing Eliot’s realist mode with Thackeray’s satirical mode for the ways in 
which this complicates their presentation of sympathy. I continue to take up this issue of 
form in my conclusion. I will return to a discussion of how reading can transform social 
ideologies through the theory of horizons as articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Hans Robert Jauss. Suffice it to say for now that my claim rests on the ethical 
possibilities inherent in gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter, made apparent when read as 
discourse systems, to transform horizons of understanding as a vital step in learning to 
engage difference in the other. 
The following chapters are grounded on the belief that narrative is transformative, 
and thus that narrative is both rhetorical and ethical.32 I build my own analysis from the 
work of Wayne Booth and Kenneth Burke who connect narrative to rhetoric, James 
Phelan who describes narrative as a rhetorical endeavor, and Martha Nussbaum and J. 
Hillis Miller who argue for narrative’s ethical implications.33
                                                        
32 In claiming rhetorical power for texts (in that they produce effects on readers) I am not positing the text 
as autonomous. The social and political factors surrounding both the text’s production and reception hugely 
influence what kind of effect the text will have. 
 My view that novels are 
transformative means that not only are texts influenced by social contexts, but also that 
 
33Phelan’s notion of narrative as rhetorically purposeful leads him to discuss the ethics of narration, for he 
argues that wherever there is rhetorical purpose there is an ethics of telling (11).  For other critics who also 
take the position that narrative is ethical see Davis and Womack’s collection of essays. For a study locating 
narrative ethics in the nineteenth century see Larson. 
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they have constitutive power to change those contexts.34
                                                        
34Childers considers the novel one kind of institutionalized discourse that has an interpretive community 
that reinforces and reexamines the rules governing the ideologies produced in those novels. This view, he 
argues, gives novels constitutive status.  
 Reading novels can transform 
more than just reading practices; it also can transform social practices. My analysis of the 
novels rests on this assumption; I would also argue that the writers themselves believed in 
the transformative power of their work, evidenced by narrative voice, the treatment of 
characters, and the construction of sympathy as a factor that readily influences social 
practices. The following chapters look for how these novels evoke new ways of engaging 
with the other out of the historical connection between sympathy and reading. 
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CHAPTER II 
NARRATING A SPACE FOR SYMPATHY: THE TRANSFORMATIVE ETHIC OF 
GOSSIP  
 
You're nobody until you're talked about.  ~ Tagline for hit T.V. show "Gossip 
Girl" 
 
you must expect some set-off against…being among a small number of people, 
who are always busy looking into one another’s small concerns.  ~ Deerbrook 39 
 
she knew, and we knew, and she knew that we knew, and we knew that she knew 
that we knew. ~ Cranford 7  
 
 Gossip – a discourse consumed with talking about others – is perhaps itself one of 
the most talked about discourses in American culture. Most of us take a moral stance 
against gossip, yet we cannot resist engaging in this desire to “kiss and tell.” The 
popularity of first the Gossip Girl books and then the T.V. series spin off demonstrates 
our obsession with gossip despite its consignment to the sphere of frivolous, illegitimate 
talk. Even though we may trivialize gossip, still we must account for its powerful allure. 
Contrary to popular ways of talking about gossip, I argue that gossip, both its use as 
everyday talk and its place within the novel, promotes ethical encounters by transforming 
the boundary between self and other through an expansion of horizons of understanding. 
The transformative ethic of gossip deploys sympathy through a particular form of telling, 
one that relies on narrative and speculation, encouraging the conflation of boundaries 
such as private/public or male/female. However, in keeping with the definition of ethical 
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sympathy set forth in the introduction, gossip resists assimilating the other into a category 
of the same because it works to dismantle those categories altogether.  
For many Victorians, gossip flourished in the context of new understandings 
about transport systems, such as trains, and speculative endeavors, such as land purchases 
in America, that people both embraced and feared. Among the rampant historical changes 
associated with the nineteenth century, circulation and speculation serve as the contextual 
focus of this chapter. These two ideas embody the changing concepts of self and other 
that most directly relate to gossip. As I will show below, any discussion of gossip in this 
period easily becomes conflated with changing ideas about how knowledge circulated 
and how people speculated. I do not spend a great deal of time discussing how Victorians 
viewed gossip. I am working from the understanding that gossip can be both negative and 
positive; some people use gossip to re-stabilize old forms of social relations through 
disciplinary gossip and, conversely, some people embrace gossip as a way of 
transforming their own identity by altering the terms of social definitions of self and 
other. The focus of this chapter will be on the use of gossip within another form of 
telling: the novel.  
I explore Victorian manifestations of gossip’s power to transform relational ethics 
in two novels, Deerbrook and Cranford.  Critics have struggled to find a place for these 
texts in the body of work produced by Harriet Martineau and Elizabeth Gaskell, a task 
made more difficult by efforts to categorize their novels as either political or domestic 
works rather than acknowledging the presence of both.  The prevalence of gossip in these 
texts often give critics pause over the feminist politics of these authors and to ultimately 
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construe the novels as a didactic warning against small-minded women (Deerbrook) or as 
merely a utopian vision of a female community (Cranford). Martineau’s novel (1839) 
and Gaskell’s novel (serially from 1851-53) are important interventions during the radical 
social changes emerging in the 1830s and 1840s, and need to be recognized as such. Both 
women are well known for their political and social prowess, Martineau through her 
journalism and Gaskell through her obvious concern with the industrial working classes 
in her fiction. Deerbrook and Cranford thus make interesting studies as both texts prove 
to be anomalies in these writers’ careers.  For that reason, they make a good case for what 
fiction categorized as “domestic,” “realist,” and “personal” has to do with important 
social and political concerns of the day. Although both novels were well received by 
contemporary critics, today they are generally not part of the canon of Victorian realist 
literature.  My reading of gossip in these novels thus provides another way of 
understanding how these texts do indeed perform important political critiques of social 
relationships during a period of concentrated change to class and institutional structures 
from the 1830s to the 1850s.  
Using the discourse system of gossip, I trace these novels’ critique of social 
relationships formulated along strict binary lines of self and other. I look first at how 
characters use gossip within the story to negotiate relationships with other characters in 
both positive and negative ways. Second, I focus on how the third-person and first-person 
narrators in these novels engage with gossip as a rhetorical technique, using it to position 
the reader as both insider and outsider, thereby establishing the proper distance to enable 
the reader to ethically sympathize with the characters. Third, I demonstrate how Gaskell 
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and Martineau’s use of gossip as narrative technique accomplishes more than just moving 
the plot along; it calls attention to the problematic ethics of encountering the other only 
through the unethical boundaries constructed to divide self and other. At the same time 
that gossip depends on insiders and outsiders for its narrative content and means of 
circulation, it also reveals these boundaries to be socially constructed, not natural and 
certainly not always desirable. This paradox is precisely what Martineau and Gaskell 
point to through their use of gossip as it permeates the rather porous boundaries 
artificially constructed between private/public and male/female. More than just reveal 
that such boundaries are artificial, however, these women writers expose the deeper 
boundaries created within a community between any person who becomes othered when 
she does not fit neatly into binary categories. Gossip provides a space for questioning 
how we are to engage with the other, a question about how to live an ethical life. And 
this, as Susan Johnston suggests, is a political question worked out in the domestic space 
of the household “since the question of the good life is bound up with what it means to be 
a citizen, in political space, and what it means to be an individual, in private life” (5).1
 
 
Before turning to the novels themselves, I lay out a definition and theory of gossip that 
explains gossip’s power to transform social relations in terms of its narrative and 
speculative qualities.   
 
                                                 
1 Building from foundational works like Poovey’s Uneven Developments and Armstrong’s Desire and 
Domestic Fiction that argue for the presence of the political in the domestic, more recent works like  
Johnston’s go further and argue that the household itself is seen as the place of production for the liberal 
polity. Johnston’s work merges these two spheres more finely than Poovey and Armstrong by implicating 
both spheres together in a process of producing the individual.  
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Gossip (gäś əp) n.  1. Narrative speculation  
Gossip: 1. One who has contracted spiritual affinity with another by acting as a sponsor at 
a baptism.  a. In relation to the person baptized: A godfather or godmother; a sponsor.  2. 
A familiar acquaintance, friend, chum.  3. A person, mostly a woman, of light and trifling 
character, esp. one who delights in idle talk; a newsmonger, a tattler. (OED) 
 
 Earlier definitions of gossip easily reveal that this word is rooted in relationships, 
both positive and negative. Focusing on the relational aspect of gossip helps balance the 
negative connotations associated with it. In her study of gossip, Patricia Meyer Spacks 
makes the argument for positive, or what she calls “serious,” gossip. 2
                                                 
2 From a sociological perspective, De Sousa also suggests gossip has positive elements, mainly because he 
views the oppressed as the primary users of gossip. This assumption, I argue, only furthers gossip as a 
marginal discourse, ignoring the way those with power can also employ this form of talk. Additionally, his 
view of gossip as a democratic discourse, one interested in relational matters, not instrumental or goal 
oriented, can ignore gossip used in instrumental ways. De Sousa’s article is important, then, for thinking 
about gossip in more positive ways. However, I would add that we must always keep in mind gossip’s 
complex and various uses in order to position it as a powerful and central form of discourse.  
  Gossip’s 
complexity lies in its power to influence relationships in both positive and negative ways. 
Since we are accustomed to viewing gossip as a negative force, Spacks spends most of 
her time exploring how gossip might be construed in more positive ways, arguing “the 
value of gossip at its highest level involves its capacity to create and intensify human 
connection and to enlarge self-knowledge predicated more on emotion than on thought” 
(19). Spacks refutes negative evaluations of gossip by broadly defining it as talk about an 
absent party. Her definition of positive gossip, then, is intimate conversation that exists 
within an open and trusting relationship. She supports this view by tracing a historical 
tendency, from Immanuel Kant to Hannah Arendt to Carol Gilligan, to define the 
propensity to talk about others and the world around us as a humanizing and essentially 
moral force (43).  
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Spacks tends to focus on gossip as a mode of power that undermines the boundary 
between private and public and provides a type of agency for women. These are gossip’s 
subversive qualities, which Spacks traces convincingly through various genres like 
letters, biography, drama, and the novel. When Spacks turns from other genres to look at 
gossip in novels, she primarily focuses on how it elucidates a subversive reading that 
exists within the more overtly conservative story line. Spacks argues that ultimately 
gossip “exemplifies the subversive resources of the novel as genre” (170). She uses 
gossip as an interpretive metaphor for the narrator-reader relationship and to explain the 
functions of detail in fiction, or, put more broadly, she uses gossip to elucidate the formal 
strategies of the novel.  
Spacks’s study is important for demonstrating the complexity often ignored in 
gossip, a complexity that exists because of its positive potential for enhancing human 
connections as well as its subversive agency for oppressed populations. Spacks’s 
continuum of gossip with “gossip as malice” at one end and “gossip as intimacy” at the 
other is an important intervention in the conversation of cultural studies and sociological 
explorations of gossip that attempt to develop a system for categorizing the types of 
gossip and to explain what needs gossip satisfies (such as the need for intimacy or the 
need for belonging). Though studies devoted to gossip help confer a level of importance 
on this discourse, they still managed to trivialize it by using descriptors such as 
“relaxing” (like games), “easygoing,” and “talk for the sake of talking” (Goodman 13). 
Furthermore, the studies that try to categorize gossip as trivial or subversive, good or bad 
tend to miss gossip’s transformative potential. My work begins, then, from this 
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understanding of gossip’s positive power to influence human relations. I extend Spacks’s 
use of gossip as a reading lens to understand the formal strategies of novels, to my focus 
on how gossip is the medium through which these novels revise social relations in the 
nineteenth century. I am interested in highlighting the moments where gossip actually 
reveals how the boundaries created to fortify the distance between self and other falsely 
represent the other’s differences. Gossip can transform those boundaries because of the 
narrative and speculative components that give it the power to make meaning. In this 
light, gossip can increase sympathy, in particular the kind of sympathy willing to cross 
socially constructed limits. 
The transformative power of gossip rests in the relationship between gossip and 
narrative. Because narrative often functions as a meaning-making activity, narrative itself 
contains the function of redefining how one views the world. The narratives exchanged in 
gossip can open up new ways of being in the world by transforming individuals’ capacity 
for sympathy. This sympathy lies at the core of ethical gossip. In contrast to self-serving 
gossip that only works to affirm one’s prejudices, gossip told or heard out of sympathy 
contains the possibility of extending one’s horizon of understanding. As a form of 
narrative, gossip discursively situates identities within larger communal stories, or grand 
narratives. Ethical gossip, then, is talk that presents the possibility for a fusion of 
horizons through sympathetic exchange among the teller, listener, and subject. Gossip is 
not contained by categories constructed to delineate boundaries of difference; the stories 
exchanged through gossip, then, connect self and other by crossing those boundaries.  
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Gossip’s power emanates from the ability to construct, and thus potentially 
transform, social conventions and identities. It thus presents the ethical situation in which 
we must make choices about how to engage with others in the ways we handle their 
stories.  The narrative element of gossip explains how this form of telling creates 
meaning and contributes to the formation of both social codes and identities. The nature 
of narrative to define larger institutional values, what we refer to as grand narratives, 
endows gossip with the power of structuring how we view the world and others in it. As a 
verbal form of narrative, gossip also carries with it discursively signifying acts of telling. 
To underscore its constitutive aspect, I define gossip as a type of discourse and not 
simply language or conversation. Patricia Bizzell defines discourse as most simply the 
general use of language in everyday encounters.  She goes on, however, to describe the 
communal role in shaping discourse through “shared conventions of language use among 
all members” of a community (192). Bizzell’s definition is useful for underscoring 
discourse as language plus its context; gossip is always intimately connected to the social 
conventions of a community. The signifying effect of gossip as a discourse means, then, 
that it has great power to influence the social conventions conveyed through language.  
 In addition to influencing social conventions, gossip’s narrative qualities mean 
that it also participates in constructions of identity, and this gives those who gossip an 
ethical responsibility. In the tradition of Jacques Derrida, R.S. Perinbanayagam explains 
how the self is a text constructed from the signifying acts we use to present the self for 
others to interpret. This rhetorical performance, Perinbanayagam claims, requires careful 
consideration for what signs to present so that audiences will most accurately read the 
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self and not misinterpret this “text” (15). Gossip falls under Perinbanayagam’s 
description of discursive acts, for although it is not usually thought of as a discourse 
about the self, the act of gossip presents a certain aspect of self. Those who gossip use the 
dramatic moment in the story when some social convention or norm is broken to “create 
a dialogic moment by displaying a sharing of the emotions and the values explicated by 
the anecdote” (185). Gossip is a discursive act that constructs identity as those involved 
in the act engage in presentations and interpretations of selves. 
 The gendering of gossip as a female form of talk contributes to the assumption 
that gossip only influences the domestic realm and is therefore a less meaningful and 
powerful discursive mode. Both of the novels I examine challenge the restriction of 
gossip to one area of life. Although Martineau constructs gossip in the community of 
Deerbrook as a feminine mode of talk, she makes a point throughout the novel not to 
limit the discursive power of gossip to the private or domestic sphere. In Cranford, 
Gaskell does not challenge the representation of female talk consumed with knowledge of 
trivial facts and particulars of ordinary life. Instead, she shows how women characters 
use this kind of knowledge to endow themselves with the power of authorship, the 
particularly titillating power of authoring another’s life.  As Alison Case articulates in her 
book, Plotting Women, women were not permitted to construct stories because “plotting 
is an act of authority and agency: the narrator poses as the one to assign the shape, and 
hence the meaning, we are to derive from the story” (13). Even more radically than 
plotting their own story, those who gossip plot other people’s stories, shaping their 
identity and making meaning out of someone else’s life.   
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The power that comes from plotting stories about other people can best be 
understood in the context of identity theories that stress the importance of the other in 
constructing one’s own identity. Numerous critics, including Mikhail Bakhtin, Judith 
Butler, and Adriana Cavarero, have argued this position. Bakhtin claims that all of our 
utterances include the discourse of others, a phenomenon he calls “double-voiced 
discourse” (185). Constructing the self becomes a question of voice, then, because we 
situate the voice of our discursive self among other voices before we ever utter a word. 
Butler states this principle of the situated self as an “I” that can never be separated from 
the social context of its existence:  “the ‘I’ has no story of its own that is not also the 
story of a relation – or set of relations – to a set of norms” (8).  If social norms are what 
determine the constitution of a subject, gossip’s power to influence social norms means 
that gossip can also influence identity. Social norms are articulated through the 
relationship between self and other, thus creating a certain dependence on the other for 
determining how one names and constructs the self. Cavarero emphasizes this 
dependence on the other in the way we need someone to listen to our stories and then 
reflect an image of our self so we come to recognize that self. This kind of dependence 
creates an ethical obligation to listen to another’s story, an obligation that requires 
sympathy, as I will show in my discussion of Cranford. The power and ethics of gossip 
are connected through the condition of identity formation that relies on social norms and 
the other. 
 As much as gossip relies on principles of narrative for the power to transform 
social relations, gossip does operate differently than narrative. We tend to recognize 
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narrative by its wholeness, by the closure it achieves through a sense of an ending. 
Gossip, by contrast, thrives on the gaps that interrupt narrative. When these gaps are 
understood as necessary moments of disrupting normative, containing narratives, one can 
then conceive of gossip as an ethical endeavor. Gaps cause one to question the social 
norms limiting the ability to recognize difference, what Butler defines as “normative 
horizon,” allowing the other to exceed definitions that might assimilate the other into 
sameness (24). We would never come to recognize the other if not for these disruptions in 
narrative, which, after all, create the impulse to gossip. Butler’s notion of transforming 
normative horizons through encountering the unrecognizable other helps explain how the 
gaps in narrative – which gossip works to fill – confer the powerful potential for 
changing the social norms gossip relies on. Rather than confirming the other as outsider, 
ethical gossip will alter social norms to make the other, in Butler’s terms, 
“recognizable.”3
The potential to turn gaps into a site for creating ethical relationships comes from 
the speculative nature of gossip, a quality central to its transformative power. In stories 
circulated through gossip, these gaps exist because the story is the other’s and not one’s 
own. These gaps, then, are literally moments of narrative uncertainty; they also represent 
our uncertainty about the other and the importance of that knowledge remaining 
incomplete. Thus, gaps present gossip with an ethical role in transforming how people 
with differences relate to one another. Gossip can illuminate the violence committed 
   
                                                 
3 It is important to note that in Butler’s definition of making the other recognizable, it is not just the other 
that changes. That would simply be assimilation. Rather, Butler points out that it is the “I” who changes: “I 
am invariably changed by the encounters I undergo; recognition becomes the process by which I become 
other than what I was and so cease to be able to return to what I was…the ‘I’ is transformed through the act 
of recognition” (27-28).  
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against the other when an individual identity is assimilated into a communal script, an 
essentializing tendency that results from efforts to create wholeness in narrative.  Gossip, 
more overtly than other forms of talk, reveals that often in the effort to make sense of 
fragmented stories we assimilate the other into a position of sameness or consign the 
other forever to a status of the unapproachable capital “O” other.  The speculative nature 
of gossip uses gaps to raise awareness, by making more overt what happens to the other’s 
identity when we narratively and speculatively fill in those gaps. Thus, amidst all the 
moral injunctions against this idle form of talk, it turns out gossip can illuminate the 
unethical ways we use “legitimate” modes of talk to forge connections with the other.  
This speculative quality unfortunately contributes to gossip’s reputation as an 
unreliable and, therefore, an illegitimate form of knowledge. However, gossip is 
grounded precisely because of the relationship between narrative gaps and social 
networks. In George Eliot’s Middlemarch, for example, a marriage between two 
characters materializes through gossip. When Lydgate and Miss Vincy are seen together 
around town, the way they act in each other’s company makes people assume they are 
engaged. Mrs. Plymdale confirms her knowledge of their engagement to Mrs. Bulstrode 
on the grounds of the couple’s behavior: “Well, people have different ways, but I 
understand that nobody can see Miss Vincy and Mr. Lydgate together without taking 
them to be engaged” (286). In this example, gossip carries out its more traditional role as 
a disciplinary force by scripting the couple into society’s norms: after spending time 
alone in each other’s company they must marry or be constructed as immoral individuals.  
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Gossip has another kind of power evident in this example as well: it can become a 
legitimate source of fact retroactively, an ability connected to social norms that can apply 
enough pressure to conform situations to the truth gossip posits, however prematurely. 
Untrue when initially circulated, Lydgate and Miss Vincy must become engaged to avoid 
scandal. The gossip was easy for people to believe because it fit squarely in their horizon 
of social behavior and therefore adopts the valence of truth: “truth is only accepted when 
it is consistent with one’s frame of reference. Information is processed in light of the 
assumptions one holds about the nature of the world, for knowledge is culturally 
determined” (Rosnow 18). This is gossip’s power to legitimate itself by conforming 
situations to the narrative circulated. While I do not intend to focus this chapter on a 
defense of gossip as a reliable form of fact, we must first recognize gossip as a legitimate 
type of knowledge before we can become more aware of its role in social relationships. If 
we discard gossip as unreliable, we may miss the transformative aspects of gossip that 
make it such a powerful form of telling.  
Even more important then recognizing gossip as a legitimate form of knowledge, 
I underscore the ethical component of gossip in the way it can transform social relations.  
Susan Philips makes this important distinction between focusing on gossip’s 
transformative power and its subversive power. The latter, she argues, consigns gossip to 
the sphere of marginal discourse and ignores how it structures dominant practices (6).4
                                                 
4 I take Philips approach as instructive, but I understand the transforming power of gossip’s form and 
content differently as it applies to the nineteenth century. My concern about the form of gossip relates to 
how it infiltrates the realist novel and what it means for our evaluation of this genre. I am also concerned to 
show gossip as a form of telling that provides a social critique embedded within these novels. This critique 
is aimed at the role sympathy plays in one’s approach to the other and the negotiation of identity that takes 
place in relational encounters.   
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While Philips concentrates on how gossip transforms institutional practices, such as 
confession in the medieval period, I look at how gossip transforms the social practice of 
encountering difference in the other. This transforming power comes from gossip’s 
reliance on constantly evolving social norms that keep identity in a fluid, impressionable 
state, thus allowing gossip to construct and re-constructing unstable identities.  The 
identities circulated by gossip are always in flux precisely because they are dependent on 
constructed social norms that change. Gossip that deviates from socially prescribed 
scripts creates a new way of engaging the other by formulating new individual and 
communal identities.  
Such transformation begins with the ethical choices made when deciding how to 
fill the gaps in someone else’s story. In the act of telling, the speaker rhetorically 
constructs both her own identity and the other’s identity.  She can choose to reformulate 
those identities by altering the narrative sustaining social conventions that define the 
edges of identity. In Deerbrook, Mrs. Rowland damages Dr. Hope’s identity and builds 
her own popularity, thus shifting her place and Dr. Hope’s in the community’s middle-
class hierarchy. In Cranford, Miss Pole alters her identity and that of the entire 
community by reconstituting the terms of insiders/outsiders. These two novels model the 
ethical and unethical ways gossip can be used to construct identity, venerating the ethical 
gossip that works to dismantle boundaries of difference.   
Gossip as a way of critiquing and then transforming social relations seems rooted 
in this period where new ideas about circulation and speculation formed a changing 
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conception of identity and social norms. From the 1830s to the 1850s, Victorian’s 
experienced an explosion in information technology. Railways and the telegraph made 
news more immediate with the speed at which news could be circulated. Legislation, like 
the Penny Post Act, the 1844 Railway Act, and the repeal of Taxes on Knowledge, 
conceptualized information as a commodity and made it available to mass audiences in 
ways it had not before.5
The increasingly social and physical mobility of the Victorian period continued to 
build on the Enlightenment heritage of identity as an individualistic notion. One’s family 
name still held great sway in the nineteenth century of course, but the shifting frame of 
legitimacy from heredity to individual merit created an important space for gossip to 
circulate with more authority. In his book Gossip and Subversion in Nineteenth-Century 
British Fiction, Jan B. Gordon discusses the suspicion of gossip emerging from its lack of 
parentage, source, and authorship in a British society dependent on these legitimizing 
forces. Gossip represents, however, the shifting ground of establishing one’s position in 
society; social connections are replacing heredity as the mark of identity. As Pam Morris 
notes, The Reform Bill of 1832 marks a symbolic acknowledgment that power could not 
 Novels themselves became more easily disseminated with 
cheaper printing technologies, railway bookstalls, and circulating libraries. The 
importance of gossip within mid-nineteenth-century novels develops alongside the 
institutional changes contributing to conceptions of knowledge and identity as 
commodities to be circulated and exchanged.  
                                                 
5 Running from about 1712 to 1853, also known as the Stamp Duty, but generally involved taxing print 
forms including advertisements in magazines, etc. The 1840’s saw a drastic reduction in this tax after much 
lobbying, but the actual repeal did not occur until the 1850’s. See Plunkett’s and King’s collection of 
primary sources from this period.  
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always reside exclusively with birthright (4). The Chartist movement and Corn Law 
Crisis continued the work of the French Revolution in challenging traditional sources of 
authority and the role of individuals within social hierarchies. As notions of selfhood 
changed, so too did notions of the other. This is not only a metaphysical change, but a 
material one as well. Urbanization increased the encounters between strangers as crowds 
on the streets, concert halls, railway stations, and stores became a way of life in 
modernized cities (Morris 25).  The rapid pace of social change in this period created an 
atmosphere for gossip to transform social relationships as it reconstituted the terms of 
identity formation.  
Certainly gossip often stabilized fluid identity by using conventional social 
norms, something many Victorians longed for as they tried to keep up with their 
changing world. The gossip I am interested in, however, kept boundaries between self 
and other fluid by altering the terms of sympathetic identification, radically shifting the 
divide between self and other. In her analysis of Gaskell’s novels Cranford and Ruth, 
Jaffe argues that these texts show “the alternative to masculine rule is not feminine rule 
but rather a more profound destabilization of categories” (57). Such destabilization, I 
argue, is most evident when seen through the work of gossip. More than just draw 
attention to the subversion of categories, gossip prevents categories from stagnating by 
always presenting other ways of organizing the world. Although Victorian writers used 
many techniques to encourage sympathetic engagement from their readers, gossip makes 
an especially interesting case as a technique because it is a form of communication that 
itself crosses divides between legitimate/illegitimate, male/female, private/public, among 
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others. Ethically engaging the other in Gaskell and Martineau’s novels becomes a matter 
of using sympathy stirred through gossip to negotiate the boundary between self and 
other.  
I turn now to the novels themselves where I explore what cultural work the 
discourse system of gossip accomplishes as it gets translated into a communicative act, 
rhetorical technique, and narrative technique. I show how characters use gossip to 
negotiate the identity of individuals and communities and the tensions that inevitably 
arise between them. I also look at how the narrator’s use of gossip challenges how the 
reader applies sympathy to the task of judging characters within the novel. Gossip as a 
rhetorical technique moves the reader between insider and outsider positions so that 
readers become more aware of constructed borders. As a narrative technique, gossip 
critiques those boundaries as impediments to ethical relationships. These boundaries, 
whether between insider/outsider (Cranford) or private/public and political/domestic 
(Deerbrook), are problematic ways of knowing the other, and both novels deploy gossip 
to create an alternative way of perceiving the world.  
 
Beyond Boundaries: Dismantling Divisive Categories Through Gossip in Harriet 
Martineau’s Deerbrook 
 
Deerbrook was a necessary experiment, after which Martineau returned to the 
genres and topics that were clearly better suited to her literary and reformist 
inclinations. ~ Deborah Logan The Hour and the Woman 
 
Martineau was “at her weakest when she wrote fiction.  
~ Valerie Pichanick  The Woman and her Work 
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The critical interest in Martineau revolves mainly around either her Illustrations 
of Political Economy or her Autobiography, and most critical opinion casts her novel as 
ultimately a failure in comparison to her other modes of writing – albeit an interesting 
failure. Deidre David is full of praise for Martineau as a person, intellectual, and woman 
but highly critical of her attempt at a novel. Deborah Logan entirely omits Deerbrook 
from her biography of Martineau, explaining in one small footnote that she excludes the 
novel because it contains “uniformly conventional” women characters without 
“demonstrating feminist qualities or issues” (295).6
Without close attention to gossip as a discourse system in this novel, we will most 
likely see her novel in terms described by critics like David. Martineau values male traits 
(rational, intellectual) over female ones in her novel, so David’s argument goes, and thus 
rather than doing away with gender binaries Martineau merely wanted women to develop 
masculine traits.
  It is opinions such as these that I 
wish to challenge by offering gossip as the important narrative technique used by 
Martineau to subvert conventional categories of epistemology perceived more readily by 
critics in her non-fiction or journalism.  
7
                                                 
6 Logan disagrees with critics like Valerie Pichanick who find fault with Martineau’s conventional 
characters, arguing instead that through those characters Martineau provides critiques of the gender 
ideologies, institutions, and laws that hinder women (122). However, it would seem that Logan does not 
identify characters in Deerbrook as capable of providing such critiques.  
  On the surface, gossip actually seems to support this kind of reading. 
 
7 Sanders is one critic who seems frustrated that Martineau does not maintain a “consistent level of protest” 
and usually has her characters fatalistically accept their lots: “The book is unsatisfying because of its 
refusal to follow through the implications of its many statements about love, self-repression, marriage, and 
women’s career prospects” (70). Peterson argues that Martineau held a genderless ideal for writing, evident 
in all her books: she tends to eschew the ‘feminine’ (intuition, emotion, passion, fiction) and to assert the 
ability of women writers – or at least herself – to produce ‘masculine’ prose (orderly thought, logic, reason, 
nonfiction)” (174). Once she proved she could write like a man, Martineau’s goal, Peterson argues, was to 
then dislodge the belief that there were distinctions between what men and women could accomplish. 
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The figure of Mrs. Rowland could be interpreted as a strong didactic message 
demonstrating to (women) readers what may happen if they engage in this feminized 
form of talk. The very fact that the novel seems so stereotypically feminine suggests, 
however, a subversive reading. Surely the woman who wrote Illustrations and 
Autobiography was aware of how the mode in which one wrote would influence how 
one’s intellect would be judged. I am not suggesting that Martineau is without naiveté or 
conservative views. I do argue, however, that Martineau’s use of gossip in this novel 
restructures social categories in progressive ways, moving beyond just issues of gender to 
engage with the broader issue of ethically engaging the other.  
Without suggesting that these critics are entirely wrong in their estimations of 
Martineau’s novel, I would like to offer the discourse system of gossip as a way to revise 
how we evaluate the novel’s style as well as its contribution to social and political 
debates. I suspect, however, this technique contributes more often to the disparagement 
of Martineau’s work. Valerie Sanders, one of the few critics to note gossip as 
“Deerbrook’s most urgent concern,” demonizes and belittles this form of talk in one 
breath when she attempts to resolve the view of gossip in the novel with Martineau’s own 
prevalent use of gossip in her letters, suggesting “her virulent opposition to it throughout 
the novel was at a subconscious level a recognition of her own weakness” (xvii). 
Interpreting Martineau’s personal use of gossip as a weakness suggests she has no control 
over this “vice,” a construction aligned with the nineteenth century correlation between 
gossip and weak-minded women.  This negative interpretation of gossip precludes notice 
of how gossip encourages ethical social relations. By reconfiguring gossip as an ethical 
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discourse, I offer another way of reading Martineau that brings to light her use of gossip 
as an important tool for social critique.  
An early passage in the novel illustrates how Martineau’s literary accomplishment 
could be judged differently if her primary narrative technique, gossip, were reconstituted 
in different terms. I quote a small portion of the longer passage: 
 
When young people first meet, the possibility of their falling in love should occur 
to all the minds present . . . Probably the sisters wondered whether Mr. Hope was 
married, whether he was engaged, whether he was meant for Sophia, in the 
prospect of her growing old soon enough. Probably each speculated for half a 
moment, unconsciously, for her sister, and Sophia both. Probably Mr. Grey might 
reflect that when young people are in the way of meeting frequently in country 
excursions, a love affair is no very unnatural result. (18) 
 
David criticizes this very passage for its verbosity and pointless overuse of words like 
“probably.” A different reading emerges, however, if one recognizes in repeating this 
word Martineau emphasizes one of the main themes of her novel: the speculative nature 
of the knowledge we have about others’ lives. David argues that the repetition of the 
adverb “probably” has “no incremental, significant effect” (79), but I suggest that the 
pointed effect in fact draws a connection between gossip and speculative knowledge 
based on social expectations, an important distinction for Martineau to make when 
connecting this discourse to relational ways of reading the world (and, perhaps, of 
reading her novel).   
 Martineau’s use of gossip as the foundational discourse in her novel should not 
seem at all strange in light of her interests in economy and issues of speculation. The 
economy of gossip requires the circulation of a community’s social values, as it uses 
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those values to speculatively fill in the gap of fragmented stories. Gossip’s dependence 
on social norms contributes to its gendered label as a female form of talk. Women are 
especially savvy consumers of social norms because, as a subordinate class, their very 
survival depends on understanding and embodying these norms. I would posit that at 
times gossip allows women to be more than just consumers of these norms; it can also 
grant female characters the power to define social norms. Gossip provides this power by 
initiating a way of knowing that clashes with empirical knowledge. One of the patriarchs 
in the novel voices the standard judgment against gossip as “dangerous” early in the 
novel, warning his wife away from letting the “young people get a glimpse of your 
speculation” (19). Mr. Grey labels the rumors about a marriage engagement as 
speculation because he operates with a different notion of evidence. He did not hear 
anything directly from the people involved in the gossip, so for him there is no basis of 
fact. Mrs. Grey’s speculations about a love intrigue are based on what she knows of 
social norms – doctors need wives and young, handsome girls need husbands. Her 
attention to minute details, social expectations, and the inner, private lives of people 
proves to be a very different way of reading the world than through the lens of knowledge 
categorized as rational, male, and properly institutionalized. In other words, had there 
been a formal engagement announcement or a marriage ceremony, Mr. Grey would more 
readily accept his wife’s pronouncement of an attachment between the lovers.  
The emphasis in this early scene on making meaning through an intimate 
knowledge of communal values introduces the reader to another way of constructing 
events that runs counter to legitimized forms of empirical knowledge and meaning-
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making activity, namely that which is purported to be masculine, public, and political. 
Gossip questions standard cultural narratives through the use of alternative forms of 
knowing and telling. Linda Peterson identifies just such an alternative form of discourse 
in Martineau’s Autobiography, labeling it “a form of feminine gossip that seeks the truth 
of experience rather than of abstract analysis” (183). Although she discusses gossip in a 
different text, Peterson identifies the same strategy I am looking at here; that is, the way 
in which gossip “turns the masculine/feminine dichotomy on its head: it shows the 
irrational that underlies the masculine, the reasonable truth that emerges from the 
feminine” (186). Martineau also overturns dichotomies in Deerbrook through the 
discourse system of gossip. As characters exchange ethical gossip, this communicative 
act disrupts categories of difference. Although the narrator’s distanced presence makes 
the use of gossip as a rhetorical technique harder to detect, when the narrator does intrude 
she pushes the reader to critique the ethics of social encounters, not gossip itself. Lastly, 
Martineau’s use of gossip as a narrative technique creates ethical relationships that rely 
on neither feminine nor masculine ways of knowing. Gossip suggests a better way of 
relating to the other by dismantling the false boundaries between ways of knowing and 
interacting. 
 
A Tale of Two Gossips 
Martineau’s negative portrayal of gossip, what usually earns the novel its 
description as “didactic,” is in fact performing a larger critique of the hierarchical 
structure of the village and the emphasis on empirical forms of knowledge. The conflict 
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of the novel revolves around the issue of status as the arrival of two strangers disturbs the 
social stratum of Deerbrook’s middle class families. At least it is a disturbance to one 
woman in particular, Mrs. Rowland, who feels herself in a constant status competition 
with the Grey family and becomes the figure for malicious gossip. The strangers are in 
fact two nieces, Hester and Margaret, of the Grey family who have come for a lengthy 
visit. Status in this small town gets marked by attention and visitors, and the Grey family 
enjoys extra attention and afternoon visits by the locals as they come to satisfy their 
curiosity about the newest additions to their community. Mrs. Rowland circulates her 
most malicious gossip when a marriage between Hester and the very popular town 
doctor, Hope, threatens to give the Grey family additional status markers above the 
Rowland family. 
Although Mrs. Rowland uses gossip in unethical ways, she demonstrates how this 
form of telling blurs the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate discourses. 
Because Hope is well liked and respected within the community, it would seem a difficult 
task for Mrs. Rowland to dislodge him from his position in the village. His profession as 
a doctor, however, provides her the opportunity to exploit the fears and suspicions of 
doctors that emerged from the climate of the Anatomy Act of 1832.8
                                                 
8 This act caused panic specifically among the poor, and helps to explain why these rumors could create 
such heightened frenzy as illustrated in the mob scene later in the novel. The Act itself was inspired by the 
notorious murders by Burke and Hare who sold their victim’s bodies to doctors interested in studying the 
human body through dissection. In an effort to remove the incentive for bodysnatching, the Anatomy Act 
allowed doctors legal access to unclaimed bodies from hospitals and poorhouses. For more information, see 
Rothfield. 
 Mrs. Rowland 
spreads rumors that Hope digs up bodies from the graveyard to study them and pulls 
perfectly good teeth to sell them. These rumors effectively destroy Hope’s reputation by 
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transforming his identity into an untrustworthy doctor. The Deerbrook community had 
not experienced this medical malfeasance directly; everyone who had personal contact 
with Hope in fact respected him very much. These personal constructions of Hope are 
altered, however, by Mrs. Rowland’s public gossip and the support it receives from the 
political judgment of doctors under the Anatomy Act. This gossip, though untruthful, 
remains powerful because of its basis in the relationship between doctors and patients as 
they were socially constructed in the 1830’s. Because law is recognized as a legitimate 
construction of society and individuals within it, laws discursively structure social 
relationships. Furthermore, they can often make these relationships seem self-evident. 
Gossip usually does not have this same power because it has not been bestowed with the 
same legitimacy as legal discourse. In this example, however, we see how gossip acts in 
tandem with law and the line between political and domestic discourses begins to fade. 
Mrs. Rowland’s gossip, fortified by the truth of social beliefs and norms, gives her 
discursive control over Hope’s identity, transforming him from a trustworthy doctor into 
a malpracticing apothecary. Gossip, in this case, acts as the primary discourse to 
construct Hope’s identity. 
As this “frivolous” rumor becomes dangerously political, Sir William must step in 
to regain control of a rioting community. The presence of a public figure like Sir William 
only further blurs the boundary between private and public spheres. The rumors spread to 
such a heightened frenzy a mob scene breaks out at the Hope’s home. Sir William does 
nothing to quell the riot, signaling his tacit approval when the mob sets fire to Hope’s 
home and office. Though the villagers are angry for personal reasons, Sir William’s 
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motivations are clearly political as he seeks revenge on Hope for voting for the wrong 
man in the county elections directly against Sir William’s wishes. Gossip does not 
distinguish between personal or political motivations (perhaps because these are in fact 
always inseparable); the presence of both Sir William and the villagers furthers the 
creation of Hope’s new identity begun by Mrs. Rowland’s rumors. Sir William did as 
much as Mrs. Rowland in creating this danger for the Hopes, and yet the villagers place 
responsibility on Mrs. Rowland for causing such a disturbance in Deerbrook. Thus, while 
Sir William has political authority and may have been part of circulating the rumors, the 
characters in the novel attribute the greatest share of responsibility to Mrs. Rowland, in 
effect giving gossip the power in creating the situation.  
Because this violent scene emphasizes the consequences of malicious gossip, it 
can obscure the power of gossip to reconstitute the identity of a community and the 
individuals within it. Identity, in this novel, becomes transformed as gossip’s narrative 
interweaves the private and the public, the personal and the political, establishing an 
agency that gains power by circulating in and between formerly separated spheres. 
Gossip moves so fluidly between separate domains, using information without bias from 
each, that the distinctions between the dichotomies used to construct subjects become 
ineffectual. In the scene just described, the new “knowledge” of Hope restructured 
communal ties in Deerbrook. This knowledge came from private (gossip) and political 
(legislation) as well as domestic (Mrs. Rowland) and public (Sir William) sources. At the 
height of its power, gossip used knowledge forms usually consigned to separate spheres 
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and traversed across those dichotomies. The representation of gossip here extends beyond 
a group of women gabbing around a kitchen table.  
Mrs. Rowland uses gossip as a rhetorical mode to establish her status and 
authority in the community as the one who knows. She will maintain this position until 
her gossip plots begin to unravel, dislodging her regime of falsehoods. Indeed, Mrs. 
Rowland’s punishment will emerge from the plague that sweeps the village. This 
epidemic restores Hope’s reputation while at the same time destroying Mrs. Rowland by 
taking the life of her child. Because of the rather blatant analogy between the spreading 
of gossip and the spreading of the plague, many could see this as a fitting punishment.9
If Martineau had only provided Mrs. Rowland to represent the discourse of gossip 
within the novel, perhaps the single apparent meaning behind her use of this narrative 
technique would have been as both plot device and didactic warning. Martineau also 
gives us Maria, however, the governess in the novel who adds complexity to gossip’s 
work. Building from Spacks’s suggestion to look also at gossip’s positive potential, I 
argue that Maria’s role in Deerbrook is to highlight the most important work of gossip: 
transforming relationships by fostering sympathetic encounters between self and other. 
 
Instead of just interpreting Mrs. Rowland as a character who illustrates the negative 
consequences of gossip, however, I argue she also needs to be read as a character who 
illustrates how labels like man/woman, reason/emotion, rational/irrational, break down as 
gossip circulates. 
                                                 
9 Sanders is one critic who makes this analogy, describing the plague as a metaphor for gossip in the novel, 
functioning as a “poisonous miasma in the village” (xxix). With the prevalence of miasmatic theory of 
disease contagion still prevalent in the 1830’s, this reading would also be plausible to a nineteenth-century 
audience.  
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Maria watches others closely, but her powers of observation are motivated differently 
than Mrs. Rowland’s spying eyes. Maria feels it may be her “business to keep an intent 
eye upon the possible events of other people’s lives” so she can “stand clear-sighted 
ready to help,” something she distinguishes from “meddling” (47). Maria’s watchful eye 
enables her to reflect the images of each person’s identity, enacting Cavarero’s 
description of the “necessary other” who helps a person construct her identity by telling 
her story from a new perspective. Maria avoids assimilating her construction of others’ 
identity into her own likeness by getting to know intimately those she observes through 
her conversations with them. In other words, as she gossips intimately with her friends 
she alters her speculations according to her friends’ interpretations. These conversations 
highlight the important role of gossip, and talk in general, to negotiate meaning through 
the dialectic of horizons that emerge from people’s variant viewpoints.  
The more positive spin on Maria’s act of watching also carries over into her act of 
sharing these observations in the form of gossip. Maria and Margaret’s conversations 
suggest the gossip of intimacy described by Spacks at the opposite end of the continuum 
from the gossip of malice. The distinction Spacks draws between these two negative and 
positive forms of gossip rests on the metaphor of exchange. Destructive gossip seeks 
information for its own prized status as information, for the power of having secret 
knowledge, and for the malicious intent of furthering one’s interests. Gossip of intimacy 
seeks to cultivate deep relationships because it values particulars and recognizes the 
importance of the inner lives of people (4-5).  The distinction lies in the difference 
between the exchange of a commodity (knowledge) and the exchange itself (the 
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relationship).  The former involves only transformations of power while the latter 
embraces transformations of people. These are the defining qualities, according to 
Spacks, of a gossip of intimacy where the participants are less concerned with influencing 
the world than with changing themselves.  
Maria illustrates the gossip of intimacy when she shares a rumor with Margaret 
about the possible engagement between Philip Enderby (whom Margaret loves) and “a 
young lady at Rome.” When Margaret asks Maria to tell her what she knows of the 
gossip, Maria answers bluntly that she has heard enough confirmation to “leave no doubt 
in my mind the report can be true” and she is sorrowed over the wrong done to Margaret. 
Margaret is at first irritated with Maria’s condemnation of Enderby, but when she 
remembers her relationship to Maria her anger fades: “She felt that Maria understood her 
better than she did herself, and was justified in the words she had used” (261). Although 
gossip is almost always defined as idle or malicious talk, here it is neither. Maria’s 
knowledge stems from rumors that are loosely supported by speculation, like Mrs. 
Rowland’s rumors. The difference between Maria’s and Mrs. Rowland’s gossip rests in 
what motivates each to tell. Maria only tells what she knows when asked directly by 
Margaret, and she expresses her view out of sympathy for her friend. Maria’s knowledge 
of the rumors is important, not so much for the information, but for what she shows 
Margaret about herself. Maria’s gossip will turn out to be incorrect, but her ability to 
aptly reflect Margaret’s feelings on the matter marks an intimacy that stems from these 
moments of sharing gossip in their friendship. Through their gossip, these two friends 
reach a better understanding of themselves and create solidarity in their relationship. 
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Maria’s final contribution to a positive construction of gossip appears in the 
closing scene of the novel. Martineau’s novel ends mostly in conventional Victorian 
fashion – with everyone happily married. Except for, that is, the one woman who has 
been an anomaly through the whole novel and remains an awkward appendage to the tidy 
ending.  Or perhaps, rather than an appendage, Maria’s place in the final scene is quite 
central to the discourse of the novel as a whole. When everyone begins leaving 
Deerbrook to start new lives as married couples, Maria imagines out loud to Margaret a 
time when they will return and sit as “a knot of gray-headed friends, and hear over again 
about those good old days of ours” listening to how the new generation will retell the 
stories of their parents’ time during the plague that swept Deerbrook (600). Maria’s 
image of talk elides gossip and storytelling. She looks forward to people “telling their 
little ones all about the pestilence that swept the place” and her own inclusion in this 
gossip. For gossip it will be, as fragments of information told about others. In this scene, 
gossip sounds more like stories only because Maria ascribes a positive meaning to it. 
Often, then, the difference between gossip and stories is not the content or structure but 
the positive and negative valence we interpret from its outcomes.   
Talk about others thus shifts at the end of the novel from “injurious gossip to 
constructive storytelling” as Jennifer Yates points out (375). Such an ending, I argue, 
must cause us to reconsider the presentation of gossip throughout the novel in light of this 
reclamation at the end. Yates contrasts the formerly “eager children” in their “noisy play” 
with “silenced and subdued” children of “privation and dreariness,” arguing that 
Deerbrook is a didactic tale to “expose the volatile nature of the nineteenth-century 
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woman’s public voice” and to present gossip as “precariously balanced between a 
valuable means of conveying information and an uncontrollable, and therefore potentially 
destructive, political force” (371).  Such an argument leaves dichotomies of knowledge 
and gender firmly in tact with gossip as a marginalized discourse whose purpose is to 
occasionally challenge and subvert social norms. I suggest a different reading that 
emphasizes gossip’s role in identity transformation, as both individual and communal 
identities must be reshaped in relation to each other through the act of gossip.  This 
interpretation positions gossip as an integral part of relating to the other. In particular, it 
challenges the boundaries artificially constructed between self and other and it challenges 
the dichotomies of knowledge that ignore the value of what has been called “private” 
knowledge. Gossip has a central place in this novel, confirmed by the ending where 
boundaries are blurred and the community reorganized according to the effects of gossip. 
Gossip even structures the future, the as-not-yet-told story that Maria looks forward to.  
 
 “Deerbrook in Sunshine:” Narrating the Reader into Community  
Thus far I have examined how gossip in Deerbrook functions as a form of telling 
endowed with the power to construct individual and communal identities. When 
motivated by sympathy, ethical gossip can transform social relationships into more 
ethical encounters between self and other by utilizing its narrative and speculative 
qualities to fill gaps in such a way as to dismantle the boundaries that formerly prevented 
ethical engagement with an other.  Within the structure of the novel, gossip also 
negotiates the reader’s relationship to the narrator and to the characters. Although the 
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narrator of Deerbrook does not maintain a dominant presence throughout the story, 
gossip still functions as a rhetorical technique the narrator uses to position the reader into 
adopting an appropriate distance to the characters. This distance allows readers to 
observe the larger network of social relationships in the novel. In one of the longer, more 
philosophical intrusions of the heterodiegetic narrator, we are told, “there is something so 
striking in this perpetual contrast between the external uniformity and internal variety of 
the procedure of existence” (415). Gossip reveals this internal variety, either in a 
disciplinary mode to bring it into concordance with external uniformity, or as a way to 
escape that uniformity and claim individual space within a community. Within the 
context of the whole passage, the narrator’s comment seems to glorify the domestic scene 
at the Hopes’ establishment. In their sorrow and poverty, caused by Mrs. Rowland, they 
find bliss (the “internal variety” of existence), and marvel at the way the community 
continues in despair from the plague (the “external uniformity” of existence). In this 
instance, then, the individual feelings of the Hopes represent the internal variety that 
operates contrary to the external community. It is important to read this passage as an 
illustration of the tension between individuals and their community, not a commentary on 
nineteenth-century separate spheres ideology as some critics emphasize.10
                                                 
10 For example, Hobart argues that Martineau presents the domestic sphere as a liability to women’s 
involvement in the (more important) political realm, because women are too absorbed by the “minutiae of 
daily life” (227).  Hobart’s contention, then, that Martineau’s fiction participates in a “devaluation of a 
daily experience conventionally, indeed normatively, associated with women” (228) seems to miss the 
power of gossip to blur the boundaries between domestic and public spheres, not by subsuming the 
domestic into the public, but by emphasizing the power of each. Even more importantly, by diminishing the 
kind of knowledge gossip trades in (“minutiae of daily life”), Hobart must necessarily figure gossip as 
solely a negative force in the novel. Hobart’s overall focus on Martineau’s presentation of the 
public/private split, then, misses the novel’s commentary about relational ethics revealed through the 
discourse system of gossip. 
 Mrs. 
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Rowland’s gossip represents more than just a disruption of domestic harmony; it disrupts 
the core of ethical relations, the interaction between self and other. In order to see this 
critique, one must understand the narrator’s reference to internal and external states as a 
picture of the relationship between an individual and a community, the very relationship 
transformed by gossip.  
The narrator attempts to balance the reader’s distanced perspective by 
circumscribing the reader within this community as well. As a rhetorical tool of the 
narrator, gossip constructs the characters as sentient beings that require a response from 
the reader. Most of the narrator’s longer intrusions are spent in explaining the inner 
feelings of a specific character and making sure the reader can sympathize with those 
feelings. For example, when the narrator explains what Margaret was feeling on the day 
she expects her sister to return from her wedding journey, the narrator switches from a 
third person pronoun to “our” and “we”:  
 
We look forward with a kind of timidity to meeting, and fear there may be some 
restraint in it…Is there a girl, whose heart is with her brother at college, who does 
not feel this regularly as the vacation comes round? Is there a parent, whose child 
is reaping honours in the field of life…who is not conscious of the misgiving and 
the reassurance, as often as the absence and the reunion occur? (197)  
 
This is just one example of the narrator’s many attempts to ensure we feel sympathy with 
various characters, from the selfish, naïve Hester, to the generous but single governess 
Maria, to Mr. Rowland caught between the divisions of his private and public life. The 
narrator’s form of telling attempts to close the distance between self and other by 
providing a truly accurate picture of what someone else thinks and feels. And yet, the 
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difficulty of really doing that becomes evident in just how hard the narrator must work to 
condition readers to identify with characters’ emotions. In effect, this narration models 
the movement of gossip as a form of telling: gaps in the other’s story are filled by 
attempts to identify with another’s feelings through potentially common social scenarios. 
The narrator uses gossip to erase the distance between reader and character that may 
prevent the needed deployment of sympathy. 
At the same time this gossipy narration tends to erase distance, it also creates a 
gap between character and reader that aligns the reader with the narrator in making 
judgments of characters. The narrator helps the reader look beyond gossip itself as the 
problem and see instead the deeper rift created from what the narrator labels an 
“unamiable nature.” Any judgments placed specifically against that act of gossiping are 
expressed through the characters’ voices and not by the narrator. Margaret might call 
gossip Mrs. Rowland’s vice, but the narrator points to a deeper issue, her unamiable 
approach to others. The narrator most clearly articulates this judgment in a passage 
describing the chaos created in a community by those who are ill natured. The amiable 
are “friendly and pleasant to be with” or “characterized by friendly feelings,” descriptions 
emphasizing how a person relates to another. In contrast, the narrator describes people 
who do not know how to be in community with others, characterized as “evil ones” that 
“heaped wrong upon wrong” and are “awfully self-deluded” (244-45). In passages like 
this one, the narrator encourages readers to identify negative gossip as systematic of a 
larger problem, namely an unethical way of engaging with others.  
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The ending of the novel focuses readers’ attention on how the relationships have 
transformed through ethical gossip by figuring such transformations prominently in the 
concluding pages. Although some mention is made of all the marriages that take place, 
the last scene is devoted to a conversation between Margaret and Maria. This ending is no 
more an appendage to the whole novel as Maria, still unmarried, herself could be; they 
both offer central insights for reading gossip as a critique of social relationships in the 
novel. Gossip, transformed into storytelling, offers the community of Deerbrook a chance 
to rescue an identity from the broken and divided community the plague created.  The 
communal identity is resuscitated out of the “aged man’s” story of the deer that came 
down through the forest to drink at the brook, a story that gives value and history to the 
community rather than Mrs. Rowland’s divisive gossip. This bit of gossip, this story, also 
gives the village its name, pointing to the important connection between identity and 
gossip. Martineau chooses to offer her readers a hopeful picture of gossip at the end of 
her novel, legitimizing its constructive power to provide an identity for individuals that 
brings them into greater community with one another by dissolving the boundaries of 
private/public and legitimate/illegitimate meaning-making processes.    
 
Gossip as Sympathetic Engagement in Elizabeth Gaskell’s Cranford 
In the first place, Cranford is in possession of the Amazons; all the holders of the 
houses, above a certain rent, are women.  ~ Cranford 5 
 
The picture we are left with at the end of Deerbrook focuses on sympathy among 
friends, revising the notion of the nuclear family as the primary production site of 
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sympathy.11
The exclusion of men, established from the beginning of the story, has led critics 
to interpret the novel as a utopian female community, a feminist manifesto, and a 
simplistic tale of a life no longer imaginable. Despite early feminist criticism’s applause 
of Gaskell’s focus on female community, later criticism instead saw Cranford as a 
testimony to the narrow and delusional lives women were forced to live, extending rather 
than revising nineteenth century separate spheres ideology (Matus 49). Some critics 
interpret this work as nothing more than a nostalgic tale that allowed Gaskell to escape 
the social conditions she wrestled with in Mary Barton. Other critics view this work as a 
political intervention in important social issues of the time. These two contrasting 
perspectives demonstrate how critics tend to evaluate Cranford based on whether they 
 Deerbrook thus opens with two traditional families acting spitefully toward 
each other, but concludes with sympathy exchanged between Maria and Margaret. Such 
an image, I suggest, expands the potential of sympathy to extend outside the family unit. 
Indeed, throughout the novel sympathy emanates from this pairing and remains absent 
from the more traditional representations of family relationships. If Deerbrook slowly 
works its way into affirming the production of sympathy outside the family, Cranford 
begins by adamantly declaring the absence of the traditional family altogether. In the 
opening line of the novel, quoted above, Gaskell immediately emphasizes the femaleness 
of the community. This emphasis also suggests the exclusiveness of the community and 
points to what will become the barrier to sympathetic engagement.  
                                                 
11 Rai looks at how the family became the “preeminent workspace for the functioning of sympathy.” The 
family acted as a model for social relations of sympathy that began operating on a larger scale in class-
society and empire. He also claims that the family became a place of counter-discourses to challenge and 
critique capitalist norms and colonial hegemony (35). 
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situate Gaskell as a writer of social problem novels or as a writer of provincial life (Matus 
178).12 By focusing on gossip as a discourse system in Cranford, I am revising the place 
critical evaluation has given this novel (or series of vignettes as some condescended to 
call it). Rather than choosing to focus on Gaskell as a domestic realist writer or social 
problem novelist, I suggest instead that we view her body of work as continuous rather 
than divided, as focused on the same issue of ethically engaging the other through 
sympathy, whether that engagement occurs between workers and factory owners or 
spinsters in a small village.13
Gaskell’s use of gossip as a narrative technique forms a critique of the social rules 
that create the boundaries of this community.  It is because of these boundaries that the 
homodiegetic narrator, Mary, dons her ironic stance toward the ladies and encourages us 
to laugh at them, gently, along with her. We also laugh because the women seem to 
display an inordinate amount of concern over small issues, like cows being too cold or 
what hat to wear at the next tea party, and often neglect issues that would normally garner 
more attention. Indeed, national issues all but disappear in this book, except for the 
intrusion of the bank failure, which is treated as a matter of personal concern to Miss 
Matty. As readers witness the way gossip circulates these “trivial” issues and becomes 
the powerful means by which this community transforms social relationships, issues 
  
                                                 
12 Not all critics follow this dichotomy, of course. Lansbury includes all of Gaskell’s works under her 
manuscript’s subtitle “The Novel of Social Crisis.” However, the social crisis she focuses on in Cranford is 
that of old age, while I find the novel more interested in social crisis on a larger scale, that of the 
relationship between self and other. I find it fascinating that Lansbury criticizes the repetitiveness of 
Cranford which “grates on the reader” as Martineau’s repetitiveness was also criticized (93). It would seem 
that unless gossip, which depends on a certain amount of repetition in order to circulate and legitimate its 
narratives, is seen as a deliberate technique then narrative styles which employ gossip will not measure up 
to aesthetic standards. 
 
13 For another critic who follows a similar line of inquiry into Gaskell’s work see Stoneman. 
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formerly deemed frivolous (i.e. domestic and feminine) become more central to 
redefining social relationships in Cranford and by de facto social relationships in the 
British Nation.14 Any critique implied by Mary’s irony is aimed, I would argue, not at the 
women or the activity of gossiping, but at the practice of clearly delineating insiders and 
outsiders via social rank and behavior. As Mary narrates the gossip-driven action in the 
novel (in effect, passing on the village’s gossip to the reader and implicating us in the 
gossip circle) she carefully guides the reader to judge the social rules that restrict 
possibilities for ethically relating to the other.  Gossip becomes the space for 
transforming both unethical social norms and the unethical encounters they elicit.15
Mary resides in a liminal position, like the reader, as both insider and outsider. 
She can therefore narrate as someone who offers greater insights about events in 
Cranford than the women who have never left the village. She also narrates, however, 
from a position of intimacy living during her frequent visits with one of the village’s 
beloved women, Miss Matty. Mary’s tone alternates between comic irony and sincere 
affection for the ladies and events in Cranford. Because of Mary’s distanced yet intimate 
relationship with these women, we are able to respond to what Mary tells us with critical 
   
                                                 
14 In her introduction to Cranford, Ingham suggests that Gaskell is most concerned with the relationships 
possible in a community of women devoid of any masculine influence. This concern engages with a 
contemporary debate in the mid-nineteenth century about what women could do in the face of separate 
spheres ideology. I agree with Ingham about Gaskell’s focus on the relationships between the women, but I 
also see these relationships acting as models for other social relationships; thus, importantly, Gaskell does 
not preclude all male characters, including the negotiation of relationships between the women and men 
(who also represent that aberrant Other). 
 
15 Henry is another critic who situates sympathy at the heart of the possibility for social transformation for 
Gaskell. However, Henry does not provide any sustained analysis of Cranford, nor does she suggest how 
such sympathy was aroused beyond Gaskell’s own comments about imagining the other’s plight. Thus, 
while she looks at fiction in general as a mode Gaskell believes will effect change, I am suggesting that it is 
the specific narrative technique of gossip that accomplishes transformation by arousing sympathy in 
characters and readers alike.  
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distance ourselves, and yet our judgments are made out of the sympathy through which 
Mary insists on presenting even the most outrageously speculative gossip. Here we notice 
less the power of gossip to dismantle the larger boundaries prescribing ways of 
perceiving and knowing, which we saw so clearly in Martineau’s novel, and instead our 
awareness is drawn to the negotiation of boundaries defining individual identity within a 
community.  
As single women living on finite incomes, the Amazons’ class and gender 
restricts agency over their own lives. Gossip becomes all the more important, then, as a 
discourse that bestows the agency of meaning making, allowing the Cranford ladies to 
control the narrative about their community. These women take the partial narratives that 
circulate into town from the outside world and use gossip’s speculative quality to fashion 
the gaps into a desirable identity for their community.  The gaps will determine what 
meaning emerges from the narrative. This discursive power is the promise of 
transformative potential. More often than not, the women choose to fill these gaps 
according to already prescribed social norms, maintaining the status quo. In a few 
important scenes, however, gossip offers the women an alternative way to construct the 
narrative identity of their community and consequently of themselves. In this novel, 
gossip transforms social relationships by distinguishing those boundaries that are needful 
and those that prevent ethical encounters between self and other. In an analysis of several 
key moments in the text, I will show how characters use the discourse of gossip to 
construct identity, both at the level of personal identity and at the level of communal 
identity. I also examine the critique Mary provides by using gossip as a rhetorical 
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technique to challenge the relational ethics in this community of Amazons and the 
reader’s reactions to it. 
The robbery episode most clearly illustrates how these women rely on gossip’s 
speculative nature to generate identity by defining categories of the self in relation to the 
other.  This episode begins, not with any actual robberies in Cranford, but with “all sorts 
of uncomfortable rumours” about some “real bonâ fide” robberies that happened in 
another town (107). Mary at first implicates herself within “The Panic” (as the chapter is 
called) when she describes following Miss Matty “armed with the poker” to make their 
“regular expedition all round the kitchens and cellars every night” (107). Her actions 
make her complicit with the village narrative that confirms these rumors must indeed be 
true. Miss Pole, the foremost gossiper in the village, is “the principle person to collect 
and arrange these reports, so as to make them assume their most fearful aspect” (107). 
Mary recognizes the power Miss Pole has to shape the meaning of these events into “their 
most fearful aspect.”  So while we see Mary submitting with the other women to this 
construction, her distanced perspective separates her interpretation of Miss Pole’s gossip 
from those of the other Cranford women: “and we (at least I) had my doubts as to 
whether [Miss Pole] really would enjoy the little adventure of having her house broken 
into” (107). Through the parenthetical clarification of pronouns, as well as her description 
of a potential robbery as a “little adventure,” Mary shows she sees through Miss Pole’s 
outward display of bravado. Miss Pole “who affected great bravery herself” wants to 
shape the rumors of robbery so that she can situate her own identity within the 
community as the courageous one.  Mary’s narrative asides help point the reader to what 
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is more important than the gossip itself – the negotiation of Miss Pole’s identity within 
the community and the women’s understanding of themselves as a community that will 
pull together and defend itself. The actual existence of the robberies no longer matters; 
they only exist as an impetus for the gossip that will open a space for constructing 
identity.  
Although the robberies are exposed as nothing more than a few stolen apples and 
missing eggs on market day, Mary does not critique Miss Pole’s exaggerated gossip. 
Instead, she critiques how the women constructed the imagined robbers as outsiders in 
order to feel better about the Cranford community. The possibility that robberies could be 
committed in Cranford unsettled the women’s narrative of their town as “being an honest 
and moral town…too genteel and well-bred to be otherwise” (108). Once the 
community’s identity is called into question, the women feel their own genteel and well-
bred identities are suspect. They restore this identity by assuming the robbers could not 
be any Cranford person, but must be an outsider. Their gossip, in this example, maintains 
the boundary between self and other. Mrs. Forrester illustrates this prejudice by 
theorizing it must be a French spy, for as Mary narrates to us “if strangers, why not 
foreigners? – if foreigners, who so likely as the French” (108). Mary’s assuming air here 
is ironic as she points to Mrs. Forrester’s theory based in stereotypes and small-minded 
associations. The women create this boundary of us/them in an attempt to continue an 
elevated opinion of themselves:  
 
But we comforted ourselves with the assurance which we gave to each other, that 
 the robberies could never have been committed by any Cranford person; it must 
 have been a stranger or strangers, who brought this disgrace upon the town, and 
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 occasioned as many precautions as if we were living among the Red Indians or 
 the French. (108)  
 
By projecting the robberies onto a stranger, the women are able to assure themselves of 
the sophisticated identity they have worked so hard to construct. Although Mary took 
pains earlier to separate her own opinion from the wild rumors circulating, here she 
includes herself in the “we” comforted by demonizing the other. I suggest this move also 
instructs the reader not to create our own high-minded judgment of these women who 
unethically use the other as a scapegoat, but instead to recognize our own tendencies to 
define self against the other.  
One additional moment in this robbery incident further shows Mary’s critique is 
not aimed at the gossip itself but rather at the women’s attitude toward the other. Miss 
Pole hears rumors that the surgeon, Mr. Hoggins, has been robbed at his office. She goes 
directly to his house to get the report first hand, but returns to the ladies outraged at his 
denial of any robbery. Miss Pole absolutely cannot believe, according to the fragments 
she has already heard, that there was no such robbery and she is appalled that Mr. 
Hoggins declines to tell.16
                                                 
16 As this makes the second appearance of a doctor-figure in this chapter, I would like to mention here more 
generally the position of doctors in the Victorian period. While lawyers and clergyman were often 
categorized as gentlemen, doctors were often situated in a more liminal class position. In fact, because 
medicine was still associated with manual labor, it would not really be considered a career until later in the 
century, with the help of the 1858 Medical Act that created a unified and regulated educational curriculum 
for doctors. Medicine soon infiltrated the fields of ethics, reform, and policing. For example, the 
Contagious Disease Acts of 1864 policed women’s sexuality and tried to reform prostitutes and the cholera 
epidemic of 1831 shifted reform efforts to the poor as the site of moral degradation and filth that created 
unsanitary conditions. In a strange way, then, doctors were both unpopular in the collective imagination 
while they also served as moral guide, especially in small towns. Just as Hope’s position as the town doctor 
bestowed on him the wisdom of morality, Mr. Hoggins’s refusal to participate in the robbery rumors was a 
moral blow that delegitimized the women’s story.  
  We have already seen how the women put together whole 
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stories of robberies out of fragments (footsteps in the flower beds and strangers walking 
past the house more than once) and the women obviously expect Mr. Hoggins to do the 
same. Miss Pole focuses her criticism of Mr. Hoggins on his concern over status; she 
claims he won’t admit to the robberies because “he feels that such a thing won’t raise him 
in the eyes of Cranford society” (115). Mr. Hoggins’s refusal to tell is set in contrast to 
the women who immediately begin to share their own stories of robberies and join 
together in chastising Mr. Hoggins. They retell old stories of danger they overcame 
together, reinforcing the communal identity of strong women united, the very same 
identity affirmed by the robbery gossip. Mary uses her insider status here to interpret for 
the reader the women’s motive for sharing these stories. It is not, she claims, to establish 
intimacy, but to establish their superiority to men by proving their greater candor. The 
ethic implied in connotations of candor (openness) suggests that Mr. Hoggins missed this 
ethical moment.  
These women are not looking for adherence to the facts of a case but a 
willingness to listen with interest to the other and contribute to the communal identity 
under negotiation. Ned Schantz, in his attempt to recuperate positive aspects of gossip, 
describes “critically effective gossip” as talk that develops “a generous and linking 
attention where it is most needed. It is quite simply a cultural politics of interest” (19). 
Schantz’s call to become more ethical readers by being better gossips requires that we 
read with a “linking attention,” part of a politics of interest that values loose ends as the 
means for considering multiple interpretive possibilities (32-33). Mr. Hoggins thus fails 
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ethically because he is not willing to entertain the women’s perspective or their need for a 
communally negotiated identity.  
Scantz’s connection between reading and gossiping reveals an implicit critique of 
Cranford’s readers who, like Mr. Hoggins, may not be interested in the value of 
interpretive possibilities in the Cranford ladies’ gossip. Miss Pole “was very much 
inclined to install herself as a heroine” and Mr. Hoggins prevents this by withholding a 
key piece of “evidence” that the robberies are a real threat. While the narrative tone takes 
on the gentle comic irony often used when the Amazons get ruffled, Mary still includes 
herself as a “we” in this moment and targets her critique at the women’s efforts to 
demonize the other, not at their gossip.  She models the extension of sympathy toward 
these women that the reader should emulate. Mary’s narrative commentary about the 
disagreement between Mr. Hoggins and Miss Pole attempts to align readers’ sympathies 
with her point of view and not Mr. Hoggins’s. There are thus two critiques that emerge 
from the robbery episode: one aimed at the women’s gossip that demonizes the other and 
the second critique aimed at Mr. Hoggins’s lack of interest in the communal activity of 
identity formation.  
Miss Pole’s ability to criticize Mr. Hoggins for placing too much emphasis on 
status marks her growth as someone who also used to place great importance on position 
(and, to some degree, still does). This growth occurs, I argue, because of gossip. A 
newcomer to town, Mrs. Fitz-Adam, becomes the contested topic in a disagreement over 
whether Miss Barker should invite Mrs. Fitz-Adam to tea, a rather exclusive event in this 
community. This episode at first seems to confirm the women’s status addiction and their 
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exclusivity.  Miss Pole’s final word on the matter, though, is for inclusion. She says, “as 
most of the ladies of good family in Cranford were elderly spinsters, or widows without 
children, if we did not relax a little, and become less exclusive, by-and-by we should 
have no society at all” (78). Mary attributes this attempt to loosen an exclusive policy to 
“dear Miss Jenkyns’s” death, which took with her also some “of the clear knowledge of 
the strict code of gentility” (78). The resulting gap in the “strict code” softens through the 
gossip about whom Miss Barker should invite. The gossip creates new boundaries 
between insiders and outsiders by extending the all-important tea invitations to someone 
who is not considered a member of the community. The hierarchy of class and member 
rank will remain important to these women, but Mary narrates a moment here where 
gossip begins the negotiation of making the Cranford community more inclusive. This 
moment of gossip confirms a new priority for extending the boundaries of the community 
through sympathy for the other.  
Like the example of positive gossip Maritneau provides through the figure of 
Maria, Gaskell also shows gossip’s ethical potential when infused with sympathy. Most 
subjects that consume the Cranford ladies’ gossip, tea parties, invitations, dress fashions, 
engagements, etc., may perhaps seem trivial to an outsider. When rumors of a bank 
failure reach Cranford, one would think this is surely worth much gossip. However, the 
ladies are more selective than usual with who they share this information. Perhaps the 
two most surprising people excluded from their gossip are Miss Matty and the reader. We 
first hear the news of the bank failure when Miss Matty sees someone try to purchase 
some cloth with a note from that bank only to have it rejected by the storeowner because 
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of rumors the bank is failing. This is the only event relayed to the reader through action 
and not through gossip. The reader is never told how the rest of Miss Matty’s friends 
come to find out about the bank failure because we never actually see them talking about 
it.  This narrative gap reinforces the reader’s position as outsider, a status usually 
ameliorated by Mary’s gossip with us. If we feel like outsiders excluded from the gossip, 
Miss Matty’s exclusion marks her also as an outsider. As one of the most popular 
members of the Cranford society, however, it does not make sense that the other women 
would place her outside the circle of intimacy. We must look to another motivation for 
the ladies’ exclusion of Miss Matty. 
Sympathy motivates the bank failure gossip; the Cranford ladies talk about it in 
order to help Miss Matty, whose life savings are in this bank. They exclude Miss Matty to 
preserve her identity, and thus their own identities within their community of “delicate 
independence.” Perhaps because the women feel like they are doing important work 
through this gossip, their talk resembles a more official and serious type of discourse. 
When they want to bring Mary into the gossip, for example, they call her to a private 
council meeting at Miss Pole’s house where they are all seated around a table. Miss Pole 
uses notes on a card to give a little speech once Mary confirmed that the “sad report” 
about the bank was true (160). The formal setting reveals just how seriously the Amazons 
feel about gossip’s role in saving Miss Matty. They desire to help, but “in consideration 
of the feelings of delicate independence existing in the mind of every refined female,” 
they want to keep their donations a secret (161). Although it may seem they are othering 
Matty by not including her in their gossip, they are actually solidifying her insider status 
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by keeping up the appearance of her financially stable household. If Miss Matty knew 
that the other women had found out about her financial trouble, she would have felt like 
an outsider and probably excluded herself from the group out of shame. The women’s 
sympathetic kindness, circulated amongst themselves through gossip and extended 
toward Miss Matty through secret bank deposits, creates a greater intimacy among the 
group. Gaskell here ascribes a positive motive and outcome to gossip, demonstrating the 
complexity of this seemingly frivolous form of discourse.  
 The women do not always gossip with such positive motives, of course. Woven 
into the bank failure episode, Mary narrates another incident that rouses the women to 
malicious talk.  Such is the fluidity of gossip that these women have several narratives to 
talk about at once, and they do so with different purposes and ends in mind. When rumors 
of an engagement between Lady Glenmire and Mr. Hoggins circulate through the village, 
the Amazons are completely shocked and outraged. If the French represent one kind of 
other for the Cranford ladies, then men encompass another representation of otherness in 
this novel. In fact, the male gender is firmly established throughout the text as the abject 
other. The incidents that do involve men usually exoticize them (for example Signor 
Brunoni), so that even when the women act kindly, the men are clearly set apart as a 
different species altogether. The village women consign marriage to this other world and 
make singleness an important indicator of insider status in their community.  Although 
labeled a private matter, marriage in reality is a political and domestic, private and public 
issue. In this case particularly, the woman in question holds a title, merging private 
feelings with political alliances. The decision about including or excluding Lady 
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Glenmire from the community is not a trivial matter, then, nor is the discourse that will 
circulate about this decision. Gossip holds public and political weight. Even when gossip 
begins with malicious intent, it still contains the power to create an alternative narrative 
for constructing the boundaries of “us versus them” appearing here in the form of 
“unmarried versus married.” 
 Those who gossip, as the example of Lady Glenmire’s engagement demonstrates, 
have a greater purpose than just the accumulation of information; more importantly they 
use gossip to negotiate what is and is not proper behavior. Because manners indicate 
one’s status and thus one’s identity, the women are essentially negotiating the terms of 
identity by discussing Lady Glenmire’s behavior. Both Mary and Miss Matty respond to 
Miss Pole’s news with the appropriate shock, everyone repeating the word “marry” 
followed by exclamation points. The women cannot decide how they should feel about 
this breach of conduct until Mrs. Jamieson returns to the neighborhood. As a widow and 
woman of higher class, Mrs. Jamieson has become the person everyone depends on to 
interpret behaviors according to the collective understanding about their society’s rules 
and norms. The following speculative gossip is almost as consumed with how they think 
Mrs. Jamieson will take the news as with how the engagement came about.  The 
exchange is worth quoting in full: 
 
What would Mrs. Jamieson say? We looked into the darkness of futurity as a 
child gazes after a rocket up in the cloudy sky, full of wondering expectation of 
the rattle, the discharge, and the brilliant shower of sparks and light. Then we 
brought ourselves down to earth and the present time, by questioning each other 
(being all equally ignorant, and all equally without the slightest data to build any 
conclusions upon) as to when IT would take place? (137). 
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As she narrates here, Mary moves from sweeping, lofty diction to pragmatic questions. 
Wedged in between this movement is one of her typical parenthetical phrases that draw 
our attention to her awareness of the ungrounded information, the “darkness of futurity,” 
with which they formulated their conclusions. While Mrs. Jamieson’s reactions seem to 
be admittedly imagined, Mary also recognizes that though the women feel more 
grounded in discussing when the marriage would take place, in many ways these 
predictions are just as speculative. Despite its speculative nature, the connection between 
manners, status, and identity means the women’s gossip carries the weight of identity 
construction and negotiation. 
Presumably, the women could make predictions about the wedding details based 
on their knowledge of marriage customs, but their predictions about Mrs. Jamieson’s 
reactions would rely on speculations about her views on proper social decorum. Customs 
governing an institutionalized event like marriage are much easier to predict than 
someone’s personal response; though the situational response may be governed by social 
rules, Mrs. Jamieson could decide not to adhere to social codes. This is similar to Mary’s 
decision to scoop peas off her plate at a dinner party hosted by Mr. Holbrook. Here again, 
the intrusion of the masculine other provides a gap in the social narrative of properly 
eating peas with a fork. Mary watches Mr. Holbrook shovel the peas into his mouth from 
knife to plate: “I saw, I imitated, I survived!” (43). Mary’s “precedent” offers a new 
narrative of convenience over decorum. It is not one the ladies choose to follow at this 
point, but neither do they cast Mary as an outsider for following this alternative narrative. 
These two incidents demonstrate the most fluid of gossip’s gaps come not from 
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institutional norms but from personal norms. The gaps within gossip’s narrative, then, 
often come from the unpredictability of how an individual might respond in relation to 
communal dictates. Gossip is a form of “grassroots” change, if you will, beginning first 
with personal ethics that begin to alter social relationships on a larger scale.  
These gaps represent possibilities for challenging an individual’s circumscription 
within social rules. When individuals choose to diverge from socially scripted behavior, 
they transform their relationship to a community. With this individual transformation 
arises the possibility that the community itself could transform to accommodate the 
individual. Lady Glenmire’s engagement appears contrary to how the women value their 
status as single. Her action, then, compels the Cranford ladies to reevaluate their narrative 
about marriage. Despite how their leader, Mrs. Jamieson, continues to reject Lady 
Glenmire, the other women decide to visit her. Especially when she opts to drop her title 
and simply become Mrs. Hoggins, the women do not exclude her from their circle, 
though the “Jamieson and Hoggins feud still raged” (174).  
Mrs. Jamieson still held power over the other Cranford ladies, however, and if 
Mrs. Jamieson was at a party they did not invite the Hogginses. It is finally a man, the 
quintessential other in Cranford, that will heal the rift between the two women. When 
Peter, Miss Matty’s long lost brother, returns to Cranford he brings excitement to the 
whole village with his stories and exuberant personality. Miss Pole even allows him to sit 
cross-legged at the dinner table, though Mary reminisces to the reader “how we had all 
followed [Mrs. Jamieson’s] lead in condemning Mr. Hoggins for vulgarity because he 
simply crossed his legs as he sate still on his chair” (181). Here again we have evidence 
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of Miss Pole’s changing relational ethics; she is more interested in hearing Peter’s story 
than she is in requiring him to hold strictly to social etiquette.  
Gossip, largely responsible in many cases for transforming the community’s 
ethical approach to otherness, becomes linked with Peter himself as the incitement to 
transformation. It was gossip about Miss Matty’s lost brother that caused Mary to engage 
in a diligent search until she found him. Gossip, as an illegitimate form of talk, and Peter, 
as a male, are also connected in their otherness. Peter represents additional layers of 
otherness as well when he brings traces of the colonial other with him from his travels to 
India. Gaskell broadens the scope of her novel from provincial life to national issues with 
this undercurrent of imperialism. Her critique of the unethical boundaries the Cranford 
ladies construct extends, then, to the unethical imperialist practices of Britain. Peter’s 
presence in the novel signifies the potential benefit of including the other’s perspective as 
he brings healing to the community.   
Peter’s primary role at the end of the novel, I argue, is to show the transformation 
of Cranford’s tendency toward othering and exclusion. Peter accomplishes this feat by 
throwing a great party, asking Mrs. Jamieson’s permission to use her name as the 
patroness. With this flattery, Mrs. Jamieson hardly notices the presence of the Hogginses 
at this same party. Before the night ends Peter claims he will “enter the Assembly Room 
tonight with Mrs. Jamieson on one side and my lady Mrs. Hoggins on the other,” and 
Mary tells us “somehow or another he did” (187). This scene illustrates just how 
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completely Cranfordian social norms have been transformed.17
Martineau and Gaskell end their novels with a similar picture of a peaceful 
community. These novels make an interesting pairing because of the critical debate 
surrounding the place each should have in the authors’ oeuvres. Reading both novels with 
attention to gossip’s transformative potential, rather than limiting it to a superfluous or 
illegitimate discourse, illuminates the significant contributions these novels make to 
social issues in the period. Gossip’s power to transform emerges, I have argued, through 
its very form as it relies on narrative and speculation. When the speculation moves 
beyond social scripts and explores alternative ways to relate to the other, then gossip 
transforms social relations. In these two novels, that transformation transpired by first 
 The differences between 
class, gender, and nation are deemphasized as everyone engages with the other in a 
generous, joyful party atmosphere. With each intrusion of the other and the consequent 
gaps in the communal identity, the Amazons must revise their narrative. Mary chooses to 
leave the reader with the image of Peter attempting to shock the ladies as often as he can 
with his stories of foreign places. He intends these disruptions to get “everybody to be 
friends” by encouraging them into conversation despite their ongoing rifts. Closure is 
achieved in this novel, like in Deerbrook, when the community is no longer interested in 
excluding the other but desires to hear her story instead.  
                                                 
17 Certainly this scene could be read as the need for a masculine figure to solve petty problems the women 
could not handle themselves.  However, I believe that the text focuses on masculine as “other” so that the 
importance of Peter is not his status as male but his status as other. Indeed, in the context of the fifties, 
Peter’s imperial background may be even more relevant to his status as other than his gender. Also, 
whenever there is ample opportunity for a male figure to rescue the women, it is always the women who 
help themselves. For example, in the instance of the bank failure Mary’s father advises Miss Matty what to 
do. However, Mary does not attribute this advice to saving Miss Matty. She credits instead the Cranford 
ladies’ secret deposits of money. Thus, the text does not support a reading that the women need saving by a 
male figure.  
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dissolving unethical categories and then proposing more fluid boundaries and a more 
inclusive community. In Deerbrook, Maria demonstrates the importance of listening with 
the intent to help construct the other’s story based on their own lives rather than 
assimilate the other’s story into her own script (as Mrs. Rowland aimed to do). In 
Cranford, Mary guides the reader to critique competitive hierarchy and to recognize the 
likeness that does exist between self and other, a likeness often founded in seemingly 
insignificant events and concerns. By the end of the novel, the Cranfordians’ acceptance 
of others like Mrs. Fitz-Adams and Peter represents the kind of flexible sympathy gossip 
fosters. Each novel traces how a community no longer insists on strict practices of 
othering and imagines instead how sympathy circulated through gossip crosses 
boundaries to form a more ethical relationship between self and other. Arguments can 
always be made about whether gossip is good or bad, and of course we should readily 
admit that it is both. This is not all that gossip can be, however. I am suggesting, instead, 
that we read these novels through the discourse system of gossip in order to witness the 
complex ways gossip exposes and revises the exclusionary politics of othering.   
In these novels, the unethical act of othering occurs not so much because of 
irreconcilable differences but because of the effort to create hierarchy and establish one’s 
identity against the other. To transform social relations in these communities, then, each 
novel calls for the kind of sympathy that transfers focus from maintaining status to a 
genuine interest in another person. Especially in Deerbrook, the other is not the 
colonized, exotic figure that will emerge later in the century. Nor is there even a 
dichotomy between city and country. Aside from the class difference between the 
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villagers and the poor, the main conflict takes place between solidly middle class families 
who closely resemble one another.  Even in Cranford the most radical form of altarity 
exists in the figure of an English male. Thus, while in Eliot’s and Brontë’s novels 
sympathy will be called to negotiate much more explicit cases of otherness, in these two 
novels sympathy must simply cross boundaries between an other who is not really so 
different. Boundaries built for the purpose of maintaining hierarchies of inclusiveness, 
then, really create a false sense of difference. Through the transformative potential of 
gossip, Martineau and Gaskell suggest, we can fuse the horizons of difference in telling a 
story that circumscribes self and other in a more inclusive community. 
As the epigraph from Deerbrook shows, Martineau’s activity in writing a novel 
belonging to the realist tradition models the same activity of the inhabitants in the town: 
both were “busy looking into one another’s small concerns.” What both Martineau and 
Gaskell demonstrate, however, is that no relational encounter is a “small concern,” for the 
foundation of nations are built upon the individual engagements of its citizens.  David 
feels that the failures of Martineau’s novel can be explained by the lack of any pressing 
theory or public injustice that drives her other writings. Martineau herself said, however, 
that authorship for her was not “a matter of choice;” she wrote because “things were 
pressing to be said” (Autobiography 1:189-90). Deerbrook engages with the most 
pressing need of all – the ethics of how one encounters difference, and even more 
specifically how those differences materialize in the first place. Martineau and Gaskell 
choose to engage with this issue, remarkably, through a form of telling that earns 
immediate disparagement. These novels suggest a needed revision of readers’ 
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interpretative lens in three areas: 1) understanding the ethical possibilities in gossip, 2) 
resisting the construction of irrelevant boundaries between self and other, and 3) seeing 
the primary concern of realist texts as focused on the relationship between self and other 
rather than the relationship between representation and reality. In the next chapter, 
George Eliot also suggests needed revisions in each of these areas, though she uses 
different strategies to challenge traditional ways of relating to the other and traditional 
ways of reading realism. 
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CHAPTER III 
GAZING THROUGH DIFFERENCE: BECOMING SYMPATHETIC WITNESSES TO 
THE OTHER’S STORY 
 
The visual embrace of a stare is a validation of our being, the relational 
registering that we matter to another, even if it perhaps exposes our deepest 
vulnerabilities. ~ Garland-Thomson, Staring 59 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the way gossip transforms social relationships 
by destabilizing us/them categories and thus rearranging the way one organizes the self 
and other within a community. Listening and telling are necessary components of 
gossips, signaling the willingness of participants to extend sympathy to the other. The 
activities of listening and telling are also a vital aspect of gazing.  This chapter defines 
gazing as a specific stance one takes when responding to the other. I employ the term 
witnessing to describe the process of gazing with sympathy; a potentially optimistic role 
for gazing that argues gazing can confer subjectivity instead of the objectification 
associated with “the gaze.” I explore this more positive configuration in George Eliot’s 
novel, Silas Marner. This novel models ethical gazing as a relational discourse that 
negotiates the particular balance between maintaining the other’s difference while still 
sympathizing with the other. Gazing between characters is not just a harmful power 
struggle; it becomes a moment for witnessing the other’s story. Ethical gazing also 
operates as a distancing technique that directs the reader to recognize the other as a  
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subject vastly different from the self and to willingly identify across this difference.  
Gazing is a rhetorical strategy that can be used ethically or unethically to 
construct and negotiate the relationship between self and other. Current conceptions of 
the gaze are largely articulated through the ideas of Michel Foucault and Laura Mulvey. 
Foucault’s notion of the “unimpeded empire of the gaze” (from The Birth of the Clinic) 
critiques the scopic regime focused on “the disciplining and normalizing effect of being 
the object of the gaze” (416). Mulvey’s work in film studies exposes the binary 
opposition of women as the object of men’s gaze. Most gaze theory thus focuses on the 
harmful effects of the gaze as an unethical practice. I am highlighting a different concept 
of this visual relationship, illustrated in Eliot’s novel and theorized through Kelly 
Oliver’s conception of “witnessing.” One important point I emphasize throughout this 
chapter, then, is that my notion of gazing departs altogether from theories of the gaze; the 
visual relationship with the other does not have to be mired in domination or assimilation.  
To begin conceptualizing the act of gazing as an ethical endeavor, we must first 
recognize two important aspects of gazing: the visual component, comprised of space and 
stance, and the storytelling component, comprised of the embodied presence of a teller 
and a listener. The visual component underscores the physicality involved in this mode of 
relating to others. By stance I mean both a mental attitude (the mental process one goes 
through when approaching the other) and a physical presence (how the presence of literal 
bodies influences the encounter). Unethical gazing occurs when stance and space are 
used to create hostile distance that reinforces power structures or refuses to acknowledge 
the other. Ethical gazing, by contrast, includes the crucial aspect of witnessing, an action 
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that encourages multiple perspectives to cohabitate, turning the potentially hostile 
distance between self and other into a fluid playground of engagement. For example, 
Marner’s doorway acts as an unethical space when he uses it to frame his glaring eyes 
that keep neighbors away, but it becomes an ethical space when he welcomes Eppie 
through an open door.  
The storytelling component of gazing emphasizes the need to tell stories and the 
need to listen to stories as an integral part of the way we interact with the other. Unethical 
gazing involves stories told that are not authored by the subject. Rather than the “I” 
telling the story, the other has control over the identity constructed through story, such as 
the villagers’ attempt to construct a story about how he acquires the skill to heal people 
with herbs, without asking Marner himself.  The aspect of witnessing in ethical gazing 
ensures that the subject of the story is the one authoring the story. When Marner tells his 
story at the Rainbow Inn, he is gazing at the villagers and they are gazing at him. This 
mutual exchange, as I will show, creates sympathy while allowing Marner to establish the 
distinctiveness of his story. I explore both kinds of gazing in this novel, analyzing first 
the unethical gazing that occurs in several scenes in the first half of the novel where 
Marner gazes fiercely at his neighbors and they in turn perpetuate his alienation by 
circulating stories of his strangeness. I then turn to scenes of ethical gazing, such as the 
pivotal scene in the Rainbow Inn, where both Marner and the villagers are transformed. 
The examples of characters gazing demonstrate the capacity for ethical gazing to create a 
space where sympathy and difference can co-exist. The reader is also gazing at Marner 
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via the narrator; by controlling the distance between characters and the reader, the 
narrator is largely responsible for directing the reader toward ethical gazing. 
This chapter adds to George Eliot scholarship by exploring the themes of 
storytelling and visuality that have been part of the critical discussion about her work for 
some time now, but exploring these themes in one of her more neglected texts, Silas 
Marner. I find it all the more pressing to examine the social relations in this novel that 
not only displays the drama of otherness within its pages, but also gains the label of 
“other” in its status as a text examined by critics.1
Placing gazing in a discourse system helps account for the frequent occurrences of 
gazing. The accumulated effect of gazing enhances the role of sympathy; indeed, I 
 George Eliot predicted no one would 
be interested in this tale, and to some degree critical evaluation has proven her right. 
Even in Eliot’s own time, critics pointed to the strangeness of Marner.  One 
contemporary critic from the Times said he thought Silas “a singularly unaccountable 
being” and a “most unsuitable hero” (qtd in Carroll 16-17). Although a few critics today 
have discussed otherness in Silas Marner, they have not connected the emphasis on 
gazing with this theme. I find the numerous and explicit references to eyes, looks, stares, 
and faces make gazing a central motif in this novel and an important strategy to add to 
Eliot’s repertoire of sympathetic devices.   
                                                 
1 In a book focusing on the rhetoric of sympathy in Eliot, Doyle surprisingly leaves out Silas Marner. 
Doyle’s attention to sympathy as not only a part of the content of Eliot’s writing but also a rhetorical tool 
deployed through distancing techniques is an important addition to studies on sympathy in Eliot’s texts. 
However, Doyle’s concern that Eliot does not uphold artistic standards of the Victorian novel seems to take 
away from the ways in which these texts grapple with sympathy in important ways. Thus, Doyle’s analysis 
is at times more about Eliot and realism than Eliot and sympathy. This is why Doyle does not include Silas 
Marner in her analysis, something I consider a curious absence considering how much sympathy grounds 
the rhetorical influence of this novel. 
  105 
suggest that without using the discourse system of gazing as an interpretative lens we can 
miss what Eliot proposes as a revised version of sympathetic identification. Within this 
discourse system, characters use gazing to communicate; very often the message sent via 
gazing consists of either an invitation to continue the relational encounter or a rejection of 
further engagement. Thus, Marner’s ferocious stare early in the novel, or his head-in-
hands posture when visited by neighbors after his tragedy, communicates his desire to be 
left alone. In contrast, Dolly’s rapt attention gazing at Marner as he tells her about his 
history indicates that Dolly wishes for Marner to continue sharing his story with her. 
Consequently, because gazing operates as discourse that communicates, it is also a 
rhetorical mode when used intentionally to construct one’s stance toward the other. Thus, 
the villagers no longer exchange only work-related conversation when Marner comes to 
their door, but they invite him in, a rhetorical gesture of hospitality suggesting their desire 
to be in his presence and thus gaze upon him as they witness his new life with Eppie. It is 
ultimately the narrator, however, who most often uses gazing as a rhetorical strategy. The 
narrator fosters a sympathetic stance toward Marner, specifically giving the reader 
different information than the villagers, in order to condition the reader to engage in 
ethical gazing. As a narrative technique, then, Eliot can use gazing as an important 
component of her efforts to create people “better able to imagine and to feel the pains and 
the joys of those who differ from themselves” (Letters 3:111).  
I will explore the connection between sympathy and ethical and unethical gazing 
in this chapter by first historically situating the emphasis on sight in this novel within the 
rampant changes to technologies of sight in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as 
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nineteenth-century views of gazing. I then introduce a more recent notion of “witnessing” 
as a way of understanding and giving definition to the kind of sympathy Eliot proposes 
through ethical gazing. This theoretical section is followed by examples from the text, 
beginning first with the relationship between the narrator and the reader, and then moving 
to examples of unethical gazing and ethical gazing between characters, and finally ending 
with the narrator/reader relationship once again. I bookend the close reading aspect of 
this chapter with a focus on how the reader should engage in ethical gazing because this 
was Eliot’s clearly stated goal – that her writing should produce real effects in the world 
beyond her novel. I examine closely the expectations place on the reader by the narrator’s 
control of distance and thus our sympathetic response.  
 
Historical and Theoretical Contexts for Gazing 
The attention to sight in Silas Marner must be understood alongside the many 
changes in the nineteenth century – urbanization, industrialization, railroad travel, 
advances in studies of the body and technologies of light and communication – that 
influenced the discourse surrounding visual culture by the time of the novel’s publication 
in 1861. The Great Exhibition of 1851, traveling circus troupes, “moving panoramas,” 
and the rise of museums and galleries are just a few examples of how looking became 
coterminous with objectification as Victorians were encouraged to look and specifically 
to enjoy spectacles.2
                                                 
2 For more on this spectacle society see Marsh.  
 The prominence of the visual also grew through an explosion of 
technological inventions like the kaleidoscope (1815), improvements to telescopes and 
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microscopes (1820s), the photograph (1835), and the stereoscope (1849). Advancements 
continued on into the century with X-rays (1875), streetlights (1879), and cinema 
(1895).3 Such numerous advances in visual technologies could only result in what 
Jonathan Crary has called a “radical abstraction and reconstruction of optical experience” 
that had the far-reaching effects of a “massive reorganization of knowledge and social 
practices” (3, 9).4
While some writers, such as Eliot, grapple with this ambivalence in their novels, 
many literary representations of the act of gazing upheld simple binaries. At the opening 
of Thomas Hardy’s Far From the Madding Crowd, Bathsheba stares unabashedly at 
 Crary couches the rise of visual culture in the nineteenth century in 
terms of power: the proliferation of signs led to the instability of those signs, and this 
instability led to less aristocratic control over the meaning of those signs (12). He 
connects this new understanding of signs with a new understanding of the subject (17). 
Thus, visual culture in the nineteenth century did not solely produce an unquestioning 
faith in the reliability of visual representation; there emerged also an awareness of the 
constructed nature of perception, creating ambivalence about the role of the visual in 
pursuits of knowledge, including how one comes to know the other.  
                                                 
3 Like the nineteenth century’s explosion of technology directly related to sight, the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries witnessed the advent of television, the Internet, webcams, the Kindle, and medical advances 
such as lasik surgery. Jay traces twentieth-century thought that takes us to the present-day notions of 
visuality. He encapsulates the major players in this history including “Sartre’s depiction of the 
sadomasochism of the ‘look,’ Merleau-Ponty’s diminished faith in a new ontology of vision, Lacan’s 
disparagement of the ego produced by the mirror stage, Althusser’s appropriation of Lacan for a Marxist 
theory of ideology, Debord’s critique of the society of the spectacle, Irigaray’s outrage at the privileging of 
the visual in patriarchy, and Lyotard’s identification of postmodernism with the sublime foreclosure of the 
visual ” (588). 
 
4 See Postlethwaite for a brief overview of Eliot’s experience with science, such as her acquaintance with 
George Combe, her familiarity with Comte’s, William Heinrich Reihl’s, and Goethe’s work, and of course 
her relationship with George Henry Lewes, an avid philosopher of science in his own right.  
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herself in a hand mirror, which produces a smile at her own reflection. The heterodiegetic 
narrator immediately castigates this self-confident approval of her image:  
 
There was no necessity whatever for her looking in the glass. She did not adjust 
her hat, or pat her hair, or press a dimple into shape, or do one thing to signify that 
any such intention had been her motive in taking up the glass. She simply 
observed herself as a fair product of Nature in the feminine kind. (11)  
 
Gabriel Oak, the guiding moral character of the novel, also passes judgment on this act 
that reveals her greatest fault to be “Vanity” (12). What bothers both the narrator and 
Gabriel most about the scene of Bathsheba’s gazing seems to be the lack of practical 
purpose for her looking. The notion of a woman gazing at herself, or anyone else, purely 
for the pleasure of looking immediately calls her moral character into question. This is a 
more typical use of gazing in Victorian novels, to illustrate the immoral, in this case 
misogynist, nature of a female character.  
Nineteenth-century literature usually associates gazing with sexuality or power, 
thus excluding the “proper” woman from this activity. Like Bathsheba, Lucy Snowe is 
reprimanded for gazing in Villette. She is accosted by M. Paul in a museum where she 
sits observing a painting of Cleopatra that emphasizes the sensuality of the female body. 
M. Paul accuses her of “astounding insular audacity” for staring with “the self-possession 
of a garçon” (225). Like Bathesheba’s self-possessed act of looking at herself with 
pleasure, Lucy’s claims the position of a subject who gazes rather than the object of the 
gaze. M. Paul’s comments, “insular” and “self-possessed,” also represent gazing as an 
activity that opposes a sense of community, placing the individual in a potentially 
antagonistic relationship with the other. These negative representations of gazing make 
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Eliot’s suggestion that gazing can be an ethical way of encountering the other seem all 
the more radical. Eliot also engages with the gendered side of this debate by overturning 
the usual model of the masculine subject objectifying the female through his gaze. Just as 
Lucy subverts this hierarchy by resisting the common trope of women-as-object, so too 
does Eliot by positioning a male character as the object of the reader’s gaze.  She also 
revises the fetishizing and objectifying masculine gaze most prominent in nineteenth-
century literature (and, I would argue, today) by transforming Marner’s own gaze into a 
more ethical practice.  
These models from literature and theorists create a powerful account of the 
harmful practice of assimilation and domination that often result from the gaze. The 
lasing influence of these views diminishes, however, the possibility for gazing to be 
anything other than perverse. Whether this was their intended purpose or not, the gaze 
has become inherently negative through these models. In our conversations about the 
gaze, I argue we need to consider both its harmful and healing properties. Gazing is 
concerned with how we relate to one another and is therefore fundamentally ethical. I use 
the term gazing to distinguish it from the negative connotations of the gaze and thus 
begin to re-conceptualize this act as an ethical way to engage the other. Although 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson uses the term “staring,” her definition encapsulates the way 
I am using gazing as “an intense visual exchange that makes meaning.” She defines 
gazing as an oppressive activity; we gaze at what we desire, we stare at what we 
astonishes us (Garland-Thomson 13). Garland-Thomson’s effort to separate the stare 
from the gaze is well articulated. However, rather than dismiss the term gaze altogether, I 
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want to redefine its potential to mean more than a struggle for domination. Therefore, I 
use the term gazing to focus on the ethical stance of acknowledging the other as a subject 
by witnessing their story, an act that requires distance to preserve difference but still 
requires the extension of sympathy. My focus, then, remains with the positive potential 
for gazing as an active exchange of information that establishes a two-way process rather 
than creating a subject and an object. Through its dialectical nature, gazing involves 
purposeful rhetorical choices that can be aimed in various ways, from positioning oneself 
in a hierarchy to positioning oneself within a community.  
 
Witnessing: An Ethical Approach to Gazing 
The rhetorical effect of ethical gazing extends horizons of sympathy by 
repositioning the mental and physical stance one takes toward the other. Gazing creates 
this transformation by first disrupting our horizon of understanding; as Garland argues, 
the discomfort created by staring can be productive: “Triggered by the sight of someone 
who seems unlike us, staring can begin an exploratory expedition into ourselves and 
outward into new worlds” (6). The attitude of openness Garland describes here clears the 
way for more ethical relationships because it pushes on the boundaries of self, boundaries 
created to separate what is known and accepted from the other. Within this dynamic 
relationship we learn to respond ethically to the other: “We become ethical starers by 
being conscious in the presence of something that compels our intense attention. What 
gives such attractions power in these formulations is their capacity to vivify human 
empathy through bearing visual witness…that can be transformative” (188). In order to 
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“vivify human empathy” we must have something that “compels our intense attention,” 
and this is the embodied presence of faces that I emphasize with ethical gazing. This kind 
of ethical encounter requires a visual component, a stance and an embodied space, in 
conjunction with a moment of telling, a moment that signals the stance of openness 
through both the teller’s revelation of self in story and the audience’s willingness to bear 
witness.  
In the first scene where Marner and the Raveloe villagers respond ethically to one 
another, the narrator emphasizes faces and the act of looking. “This strangely novel 
situation of opening his trouble to his Raveloe neighbours, of sitting in the warmth of a 
hearth not his own, and feeling the presence of faces and voices which were his nearest 
promise of help, had doubtless its influence on Marner” (italics mine 54). The encounters 
that follow from this moment of witnessing and shared sympathy shows a radical 
transformation from the frightful way Marner glares at little boys who come spying at his 
door: “he would descend from his loom, and, opening the door, would fix on them a gaze 
that was always enough to make them take to their legs in terror” (2).  The unethical 
relationship between Marner and the community in this early scene in the novel is 
signaled by the space of Marner’s door, filled only with the stern glare of his gaze. His 
stance toward the boys is unwelcoming, thus the space of his doorway, though literally 
open, signals an uninviting, closed door. The process of transforming Marner’s 
relationship with his community occurs through the transformation of this space and 
stance. In the Rainbow Inn example above, Marner sits on a stool in the center of the 
room with the villagers’ faces turned toward him. This ethical moment of gazing 
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incorporates both space and stance through the crucial element of witnessing. Now that 
Marner occupies a welcoming space, the place of the storyteller in this village, his stance 
necessarily changes toward the villagers as he opens himself to them. Additionally, the 
villagers also change their stance by turning listening faces to bear witness to his story. 
The first condition for transformation, then, is a turning toward the other, an internal 
attitude signified outwardly by gazing. 
The notion of gazing that I am constructing here is based on the ethical space 
opened through storytelling. Thus, gazing and story become a moment of witnessing, a 
term Kelly Oliver develops to mean “beyond recognition” and therefore beyond any 
dominating sense of the gaze. Oliver employs this notion of witnessing as an alternative 
to current notions of identity predicated on a contestatory relationship of defining self 
against the other. She agrees that one cannot conceive of the self without difference, but 
she disagrees with the way most identity theories presuppose that the distance of 
difference is a disaffecting space that must be surmounted by understanding or 
recognizing the other. Identity that requires recognition will always lead to the 
assimilation of difference into sameness (9). Oliver writes: “one of the main reasons that 
recognition always either returns us to the recognition of sameness or becomes 
misrecognition that leads to hostility is that recognition seems to depend on a particular 
notion of vision” (10-11). The problem begins with, Oliver argues, vision’s role in 
overcoming the gap between self and other through an objectifying gaze. Because she 
grounds her idea of witnessing in vision, she wants to suggest a new concept for how we 
gaze at the other. Oliver rejects theories that ultimately define vision as alienating 
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because they are predicated on a separation of subjects from objects, replacing “the 
interrelational dependent subject with an autonomous isolated subject…control and 
mastery are bought at the price of relationships” (172).  Oliver wants a concept of gazing 
that remains ingrained in the relational, so that ultimately to gaze means to be in 
relationship with the other. 
Rather than abandon the notion of vision as part of forming subjectivity, Oliver 
reformulates what it means to see. This begins with understanding the space between self 
and other not as an adverse void but as a space of connection where systems of sensation 
bond us to others (12). The separation created by this space, filled with affective energies 
or social energies, connects us; this conception of space allows Oliver to reconstruct 
vision as a positive tool for connecting rather than an oppressive or alienating process. 
She focuses her critique on theorists who conceive of recognition as a requirement for an 
ethical response:  
 
If recognition is necessary to subjectivity, it isn’t the kind of recognition 
identified by Taylor through which we recognize others only when we have 
understood them and passed judgment on them. It is more than Honneth’s 
conferring respect on others. And it can’t begin from Butler or Kristeva’s logic of 
exclusion or repudiation. To recognize others requires acknowledging that their 
experiences are real even though they may be incomprehensible to us…we are 
obligated to respond to what is beyond our comprehension, beyond recognition, 
because ethics is possible only beyond recognition. (106) 
 
Oliver revises identity theories by claiming we must move past the dependence on 
recognition by reformulating the distance between self and other. This distance does not 
signal hostile differences that must be overcome. Rather, the space connects us, a way of 
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envisioning the difference of otherness, Oliver argues, once we learn to respond beyond 
recognition.   
Oliver’s notion of witnessing is important for the connection I am drawing 
between gazing and storytelling. The term witnessing as a new way of understanding 
subjectivity integrates the notion of story and the notion of gazing as crucial components 
for creating a sense of self. Oliver argues that bearing witness means the subject is not 
created from the content of the testimony but from the act of telling oneself to an other: 
“I construct and reconstruct my experiences for another, even if I don’t ever actually tell 
them the narrative that I have prepared for them. It is the bearing witness to the other 
itself, spoken or not, that gives birth to the I” (206-07). What becomes important, then, is 
not what is being told or what happens at either end of the gaze; rather, the focus shifts to 
the interaction itself, on the space between. This revelation of self through the other 
witnessing my story is the kind of encounter Eliot constructs in her novel. This happens 
most clearly in the Rainbow Inn scene, the first occurrence of ethical gazing where 
Marner suspends his prejudices long enough to go to the community gathering place, sit 
in the center of the Rainbow, and tell his story to a listening crowd.  
 
Gazing as Readers  
If witnessing presupposes a productive space between self and other as Oliver 
contends, then I propose it is sympathy that prevents this necessary distance from 
becoming alienating and antagonistic. Sympathy can expand a person’s capacity to see 
and bear witness to what is strange and unfamiliar instead of turning away from the other. 
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This is the kind of sympathy the narrator calls for from the reader; it does not depend on 
the ability to understand Marner or his experiences.5
The narrator begins the novel by creating distance between the reader and the 
characters, making it clear that the reader will have difficulty recognizing or 
understanding the “hero” of the story. The description found on the opening page of the 
novel clearly establishes the image of otherness. First, Eliot sets her tale in a period that 
seems foreign to modern England because it is a “far-off time” when “superstition clung 
easily round every person or thing that was at all unwonted” (5). The British affinity for 
reason and science creates distance between the nineteenth-century reader and the 
superstitious villagers. Eliot also includes within this world certain people who are 
othered by the community. The effect of this introduction makes it difficult for the reader 
to sympathize with either the narrow-minded villagers or the wandering weavers who are 
not described as a type of person one might easily identify with. Silas Marner is singled 
out from this group of weavers as especially unlikeable when the narrator reveals his 
terrifying gaze directed toward the village boys. Thus, from the superstitious and close-
minded villagers to the foreign and hostile weaver, in the opening pages there is no one 
with whom the reader is clearly supposed to align herself with.  
 Like the characters in the story 
world, readers can respond ethically only through bearing witness to Marner’s story.  
                                                 
5 Nestor, after tracing the development of Eliot’s theory about sympathy through her earlier works, says 
that in Silas Marner Eliot moves away from sympathy based in recognition or likeness and instead suggests 
an ethical challenge “to embrace what is not like or known, and that embrace requires more than empathy 
or imagination contemplated in earlier novels” (13). What ethics requires then is an openness and a 
“movement beyond cognition – an extra-rational leap of affective faith through which the embrace of the 
other becomes an acceptance of the unknown and unknowable” (13). While Nestor points to how Eliot tests 
the limits of sympathy by creating a main character that seem unknowable, there is an additional step 
between cognition and a “leap of affective faith” presented in this novel as the moment of staring and 
storytelling.  
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 We might, at this point, ask how the narrator expects the reader to respond to 
Marner. Although the heterodiegetic narrator does not attempt to make Marner’s story 
seem better or more appealing to us, the story of his past is clearly told that we might 
have a fuller picture of the motives shaping Marner’s actions in Raveloe.6
                                                 
6 The component of ethical gazing that requires the story be authored by the subject of the story is here 
satisfied through the narrator, who relays Marner’s history like one who has heard the story from Marner 
himself and merely passes it along to others. Thus, the narrator tells Marner’s story in much the same way 
as the villagers will talk about Marner’s story at the end of the novel, once they have encountered the story 
first through Marner himself. This kind of storytelling is unlike the first time the villagers circulate stories 
about him when he heals Sally Oates, before they have engaged with him personally.  
 Does the 
narrator’s retelling of Marner’s past obligate the reader to feel beyond what the villagers 
feel toward this strange “other”?  Eliot herself seems to excuse the reader when she 
writes to Blackwood acknowledging that the strange tale might be hard for her readers to 
relate to: “I should not have believed that any one would have been interested in it but 
myself” (Letters 3:382). Yet the narrator seems determined to appeal to our sympathy as 
readers, as witnesses to Marner’s story. Unlike the villagers at this point in the novel, we 
know about Marner’s past and we know him outside his role as weaver; we have seen 
him in love and we have seen him betrayed. After we have heard the whole story of how 
much the Lantern Yard community meant to Marner, and how much he loved both Sarah, 
his fiancé, and William Dane, his best friend, we are outraged at the betrayal we witness 
when Dane falsely accuses Marner of stealing.  As we inhabit the imaginative space of 
revisiting Marner’s former life, the narrator decreases the distance between the reader and 
Marner by allowing us to feel the indignation for him that we would feel if our best 
friend or lover treated us this way.  
 
  117 
The narrator immediately withdraws this space of common ground, however, 
when he shares the way Marner responds to these wrongdoings. When he is rejected by 
all of the town and his best friend, Marner numbly states “She will cast me off too,” 
feeling certain he will lose Sarah as well.  Instead of defending himself, he “for a whole 
day sat alone, stunned by despair, without any impulse to go to Sarah and attempt to win 
her belief in his innocence” (11).  This response risks creating more distance between 
Marner and the reader because we cannot understand why he does not tell Sarah his side 
of the story and stand up for himself. The narrator anticipates this, however, and asks us 
to ethically gaze at Marner by adopting a stance that is open to witnessing his story 
without understanding it:  
 
To people accustomed to reason about the forms in which their religious feeling 
has incorporated itself, it is difficult to enter into that simple, untaught state of 
mind in which the form and feeling have never been severed by an act of 
reflection.  We are apt to think it inevitable that a man in Marner’s position should 
have begun to question the validity of an appeal to the divine judgment by 
drawing lots; but to him this would have been an effort of independent thought 
such as he had never known. (11) 
 
The readers are the “people accustomed to reason” who are being asked to consider the 
difference between Marner’s position and their own.  What we are “apt to think,” the 
narrator points out, reflects our own worldview more than Marner’s. The reader knows 
more about Marner’s history than the villagers (thus the obligation to feel for him seems 
greater), and yet what the narrator reveals about his past underscores his strangeness. 
Knowing more, then, may actually increase one’s antipathy toward the other. This call to 
respond ethically does not depend on sympathy felt because the reader understands 
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Marner’s story. The narrator asks for sympathy shared with Marner because the reader 
witnesses his story.  
The more the narrator reveals from Marner’s past, the harder it becomes for 
readers to assimilate his experience into their own. The narrator asserts readers cannot 
really understand the depth of Marner’s loss: 
 
Minds that have been unhinged from their old faith and love have perhaps sought 
this Lethean influence of exile in which the past becomes dreamy because its 
symbols have all vanished, and the present too is dreamy because it is linked with 
no memories.  But even their experience may hardly enable them thoroughly to 
imagine what was the effect on a simple weaver like Silas Marner, when he left 
his own country and people and came to settle in Raveloe. (12) 
 
The narrator creates more sympathy by actually increasing the distance between Marner 
and the reader, a distance that can only be labeled positively if defined within the act of 
witnessing I have been describing. Readers simply cannot understand his situation 
because it is so terrible and heartbreaking. But this is precisely why we should have even 
greater sympathy for Marner. Witnessing the other’s story is different than understanding 
the other’s story. Knowing Marner’s history, his story, allows us to re-read his fierce gaze 
directed toward his neighbors.  The narrator has shown us that even though Marner may 
still seem strange and unknown to us, an “other,” we can sympathize with the fact of his 
loss, reading his history of pain into the unwelcome gaze he fixes upon the village that 
could not be “more unlike his native town” (12).  Responding ethically to the other 
sometimes means we stop trying to understand; we should not interpret Marner’s actions 
differently from what they are just so we can understand them.  The distance maintained 
between Marner and the reader at this point in the novel can be an ethical space of 
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distance if embodied by a stance that suggests an openness to listening and sympathizing 
with Marner, whether we can relate to him or not.  We, as readers, have witnessed 
Marner’s story, and the narrator expects us to extend Marner more sympathy than the 
villagers of Raveloe.7
  
  
Unethical Gazing in Silas Marner  
The act of gazing implied in the relationship between the reader and Marner 
becomes much more explicit between characters. The initial encounters between Marner 
and the villagers consist only of unethical gazing. The first example illustrates the 
necessary combination of the visual and telling components of ethical gazing. As the 
villagers discuss Marner’s strange ability to heal Sally Oates, they take liberties with his 
story and misrepresent him. The villagers have not fulfilled the first component of ethical 
gazing, inhabiting a stance of openness by being fully present as the other tells his/her 
story. When the villagers try to tell Marner’s story without first engaging in the 
witnessing aspect of sympathetic space, the story only objectifies Marner. Likewise, 
when Marner and the villagers share the space of their doorways for business purposes, 
the looks and stares establish an impervious distance that is not alleviated by any attempt 
to share one’s story. This negative example thus emphasizes the need for telling and 
visual components to occur together, in an act of witnessing, in order for ethical relations 
between self and other to emerge. 
                                                 
7 Allen argues that we don’t accept Marner until all of Raveloe does (88).  However, as I have suggested 
here, the narrator makes pointed comments to the reader that attempt to increase the reader’s sympathy 
beyond what Raveloe feels for Marner at this point.  Also, some time is spent in the narrative telling us the 
story of Marner’s history, a differentiation between the reader and the village that places the reader under 
greater obligation to respond sympathetically. 
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Unethical encounters abound in the novel so long as Marner remains alienated 
from the community by refusing to inhabit the spaces of his neighbors, such as the 
Rainbow Inn and their own homes. His solitary life begins to erode his ability to relate to 
others, something Eliot represents by focusing on visible changes to Marner’s face 
resembling “a handle or a crooked tube” (18). Marner’s mechanical features are 
indicative of his isolation and his attempt to live without community.  The narrator 
indicates that his life is “narrowing and hardening itself more and more into a mere 
pulsation of desire and satisfaction that had no relation to any other being” (italics mine 
18). Marner’s life narrows and hardens because he is missing the sense of what it is to 
live well, which involves “developing an identity, enmeshed in larger, collective 
narratives but not exhausted by them…it involves, equally, a sense of belonging, of being 
situated within a larger narrative or narratives” (Appiah 231).  Marner’s purely work-
related encounters do not include an exchange of stories that would help him gain a sense 
of self through a blending of his unique story within the larger narrative of Raveloe.  
Prior to these descriptions of how alienated Marner has become from human 
relations, he does make an attempt to help a neighbor. This incident that could have 
opened a “possibility of some friendship with his neighbours,” does not, however, 
because Marner never truly opens himself to his neighbors and in turn the villagers only 
misrepresent and misunderstand him (15). Marner employs his skills with herbs to help 
heal Sally Oates, and this healing became a “matter of general discourse” (15).  Although 
Marner’s story circulates throughout the town, it does not emanate from ethical gazing.  
First, Marner did not author this story; there was no face-to-face encounter for the 
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villagers to witness Marner’s own rendition of how he acquired the knowledge to heal 
Sally.  Secondly, because the villagers do not have Marner’s personal context, the story 
they circulate can only focus on what he has done; it says nothing about who Marner 
really is. In fact, the villagers assume they know who Marner is by comparing him to The 
Wise Woman, another figure already othered by the community because of her strange 
charms and muttering words.  Marner is placed into this same category because he is 
“comical looking,” came from “nobody knew where,” and worked wonders with his 
strange “stuff” (16).   
The villagers seems ready to incorporate Marner into their discourse, into their 
community, but only in a very misunderstood category that focuses on Marner’s what and 
not his who. The what, Adriana Cavarero explains, are the qualities and roles of the self; 
the who is comprised of that which makes us unique, the part of our self that can only be 
discovered through narration (73).  Levinas says that to ask what prevents a true 
encounter with the other: “When we understand man on the basis of his works he is more 
surprised than understood.  His life and his labor mask him” (178). Marner’s face has 
literally become masked into mechanical features because he is only understood in 
relation to his work. 
The blame for unethical gazing in the Sally Oates incident cannot reside solely 
with the villagers. Marner has also prevented his neighbors from understanding who he is 
by refusing to relate to anyone other than through his work. Early in the novel we read 
that Marner “invited no comer to step across his doorsill, and he never strolled into the 
village to drink a pint at the Rainbow, or to gossip at the wheelwright’s” (4).  Not only 
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does Marner establish his doorway as an unwelcoming, hostile space, but also he never 
makes appearances at the Rainbow Inn, a central place of community building for this 
town.  Further, he “sought no man or woman, save for the purposes of his calling, or in 
order to supply himself with necessaries” (4).  Marner’s interactions are strictly business 
dealings, spawned from necessity and not from any desire of listening to his neighbors’ 
stories.  If he makes no effort to become further acquainted with his neighbors, how can 
they be expected to relate to him beyond the masked face of the weaver he offers?   
When Marner finds his house flooded with visitors after the Sally Oats incident, 
he turns them away with unwelcoming gestures, casting “irritated glances” at them. The 
villager’s behavior remains unethical as well because they are only visiting Marner out of 
the selfish desire to see if he can heal them. In the same way that Marner seeks out his 
neighbors only when he needs something, so too do people interested in how he can serve 
their needs suddenly visit his home. This encounter does not turn into an ethical relation 
resulting in community, but rather “heightened the repulsion between him and his 
neighbours, and made his isolation more complete” (16).  The encounters between 
Marner and Raveloe do not foster ethical relationships because the very foundation of 
ethical gazing through the stance of a welcoming face-to-face encounter does not exist, as 
shown by Marner’s faceless story, told and circulated by others who have not witnessed 
his story. As this example shows, unethical gazing does indeed result in furthering the 
distance between self and other by objectifying the other, the kind of gazing referred to 
by twentieth-century concepts of “the gaze.” This unethical encounter thus demonstrates 
what is crucial about ethical gazing: adopting an attentive stance toward the other, 
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inhabiting a space embodied by the presence of the other, and witnessing the context of 
the other’s story. For it is that personalized aspect of the other’s story, which can only be 
translated by the subject of the story, that enables one to sympathize with the other 
precisely because they are a subject with a context, a life that has created the uniqueness 
of otherness. In ethical gazing, the other remains unique because I recognize their story is 
not my story. However, and this is crucial, by focusing on the exchange of stories, I can 
extend sympathy across distance created by differences between those stories. In other 
words, ethical gazing imparts sympathy based on the sharing of stories, not the similarity 
of stories. 
 
Ethical Gazing in Silas Marner  
Critics have been puzzled by, and thus often simply ignored, chapter six of Silas 
Marner. This chapter interrupts the action of the plot; Silas has just discovered the theft 
of his gold and runs to the Rainbow Inn to report it. Right as he is about to burst through 
the door, however, this chapter ends and thus begins chapter six, a rather long-winded 
episode of storytelling and general community bonding over drinks. The sudden shift in 
focus from the fast-moving action of the robbery to the meandering exchange of stories in 
the Rainbow Inn seems like a strange and unnecessary interruption to the main plot. This 
scene, I argue, has a crucial role in preparing the reader for the moment in the following 
chapter when Marner’s story begins to blend with the villager’s stories. Eliot continually 
struggles with the tension between community and selfhood, but in this chapter she 
suggests that communal stories can actual uphold one’s individuality. The obligation to 
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be in relation to the other, the necessary condition of being in community, cannot mean 
the loss of the important uniqueness of different selves. The Rainbow Inn chapter thus 
forms a necessary interruption to prepare the reader for Marner’s inclusion in the 
community. The reader must see it, not as an erasure of Marner’s otherness, but as an 
acceptance of his strange story within the larger narrative of the Raveloe community.  
The exchange of stories in chapter six are also important for demonstrating the 
most crucial concept of ethical gazing – witnessing – as an ethical way of sympathizing 
with the other by maintaining the distance of difference. As both Suzy Anger and David 
Carroll point out, the content of the stories themselves focus on hermeneutics and the 
issue of interpretation or point of view. The story of the confused wedding vows, Anger 
suggests, shows Eliot’s emphasis on how context should influence interpretation. This is 
why storytelling is so important – it provides the context needed to move us from 
universal assumptions to witnessing particularities. Storytelling emphasizes how one’s 
identity depends on the other, while gazing maintains distance by differentiating self 
from the other. Oliver conceives of distance as necessary gaps that actually create 
connection because “we find wonder at the gap between us, the distance that enables us 
to relate to each other” (200). In other words, there has to be some distance in order to 
distinguish between self and other, thus recognizing that relationships are formed out of 
two distinct subjectivities.  
For the most part, all of the villagers have been presented as one entity to the 
reader in the name of Raveloe. By listening to this storytelling exchange at the Rainbow 
Inn, we become aware of distinct characters within this village. We meet the prideful and 
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confident Mr. Macey, the cautious and suspicious Mr. Tookey, the jovial and pleasant 
landlord, and the pessimistic Mr. Dowlas.  Through their participation in this storytelling 
event, they emerge as individuals. At the same time, we clearly see their positions within 
the community. Cavarero explains that individuality is not lost in the community; it 
depends on community:   
 
The expositive and the relational character of identity are thus indistinguishable.  
One always appears to someone.  One cannot appear if there is no one else 
there…existing consists in disclosing oneself within a scene of plurality where 
everyone, by appearing to one another, is shown to be unique. (20) 
 
Thus, our desire for a unique identity, which we come to know by displaying this identity 
to others, is intimately tied to the relational character of our nature: we must exist within 
a community to display our identity at all.  Cavarero further asserts the affirmation, not 
the loss of, the individual in the community; a life-story is unique “precisely because it is 
constitutively interwoven with many others” in a way that no other story can be (71). 
Macey’s wedding vow story is both a public performance of his own identity and a 
confirmation of his relationship to the Raveloe community. Thus, storytelling has the 
peculiar characteristic of establishing one’s individuality while also establishing one’s 
place within the community. When witnessing the other’s story, then, we witness their 
uniqueness and sympathize with them for their uniqueness. Once we acknowledge 
someone’s subjectivity we acknowledge his or her unique position within a community, a 
uniqueness that, though I may not comprehend it, forms the basis for my 
acknowledgment of the other’s subjectivity. Ethical gazing, I am arguing, is a way of 
engaging with the other that preserves uniqueness and difference by bearing witness to 
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the story told without trying to comprehend it or make meaning out of; the meaning 
emerges from the event itself, from the act of telling.   
 The detailed description of Macey telling this story forces the reader to focus on 
how the story is told rather than its content. The other villagers have heard this story so 
many times that they too attend to the ritual of telling and listening more than the story 
itself:  
 
Everyone of Mr. Macey’s audience had heard this story many times, but it was 
listened to as if it had been a favourite tune, and at certain points the puffing of 
the pipes was momentarily suspended, that the listeners might give their whole 
minds to the expected words. (50) 
 
If this story has been heard so many times, why does it still hold such importance for the 
listeners that they “give their whole minds” to it? Barbara Hardy argues for the ritual 
status of storytelling, mentioning both the “response and chorus” style of narration and 
the repetition of having told the same story in the same way many times before (134-
135). Because Macey has repeatedly told this story, the audience bears witness to how the 
telling of the story affirms Macey’s unique identity as parish-clerk, tailor, and historian in 
the community. Hardy alludes to how, in choosing to tell the stories he does, Mr. Macey 
actually tells his own story.  The wedding tale is important to him as the parish-clerk of 
Raveloe, and the ghost story of Cliff’s Holiday holds special interest for his occupation as 
a tailor. Macey is demonstrating, I argue, how individuals use stories to affirm their own 
place in a community.  In his deliberation over the confused wedding vows, Macey 
describes himself as “allays uncommon for turning things over and seeing all round ’em” 
(49). The response from different members of the Rainbow further affirms these 
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characteristics in Macey. The butcher interjects at one point, “But you knew what was 
going on well enough, didn’t you, Mr. Macey?  You were live enough, eh?” and the 
landlord also comments, “But you held in for all that, didn’t you, Mr. Macey?” (49). Both 
men confirm the observant and persistent nature Macey reveals about himself by 
engaging in this storytelling ritual.  These examples all demonstrate how Macey reveals 
his own identity through the act of narrating a story that is, essentially, his own story as a 
member of the Raveloe community.  This encounter is ethical because the audience 
recognizes Macey’s subjectivity by bearing witness to his story, gazing at him with their 
“whole minds.”  
 If Eliot uses chapter six to promote membership in community as necessary for a 
sense of self-identity, then we must look at her earlier negative presentation of the 
Lantern Yard community.8
 
  The description of Lantern Yard depicts a close-knit 
community of which Silas is an integral member: 
His life, before he came to Raveloe had been filled with the movement, the mental 
activity, and the close fellowship which, in that day as in this, marked the life of 
an artisan early incorporated in a narrow religious sect, where the poorest layman 
has the chance of distinguishing himself by gifts of speech and has at the very 
least the weight of a silent voter in the government of his community.  Marner 
was highly thought of in that little hidden world, known to itself as the church 
assembling in Lantern Yard. (6) 
 
                                                 
8 Susan Graver’s argument about Eliot’s attitude toward community looks more at the importance of 
history and custom in a community that is moving toward a more progressive, complex society, of which 
Eliot is an advocate.  Graver does not include Silas Marner in the novels that critique custom, but I think 
we have to address this critique in the novel because of the Lantern Yard episode.  Additionally, I argue the 
importance of telling stories actually addresses the tensions between individual and community that Graver 
sees throughout Eliot’s novels.  Storytelling in this novel is both an important unifying ritual and an 
opportunity for individuals to assert “self.” 
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At first appearance, Lantern Yard seems to be an exemplary community.  The only 
indication in this passage that it might be otherwise is the adjective “narrow.”  
Throughout the following narration describing Marner’s betrayal by his good friend 
William Dane and the wrongful accusations of murder, the narrator defines just what 
“narrow” means.  Marner cannot defend himself against the accusations because to do so 
would require “independent thought such as he had never known” (11).  The 
congregation offers a picture of what a community would look like if it did not 
acknowledge individual difference.   
 Lantern Yard provides a contrast to Raveloe, the former clings to negative 
customs that ignore individual thought and the latter allows individuality to thrive within 
communal customs. When Marner begins to doubt his fiancée’s love for him, she will not 
agree to break off the marriage because she can “render no reason that would be 
sanctioned by the feeling of the community” (8).  She offers no opinion independent of 
the community, but bases her decision only on the congregation’s views of marriage. 
Lantern Yard offers an important clarification to indiscriminate praise of community and 
tradition. Unlike Raveloe, in Lantern Yard the individual is completely subsumed by the 
community.  Raveloe also has some very set rituals and customs, but as we have seen in 
the ritual of storytelling, individuality can be affirmed through these traditions.  Each 
member at the Rainbow has a certain place in the town based on his own unique identity 
in relation to everyone else.  Even Mr. Dowlas, who is “the negative spirit in the 
company,” is quite “proud of his position” because it is uniquely his own (51).   
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The Rainbow Inn chapter, when read as a thematic treatise on some of the 
important theories of sympathy Eliot is working through, prepares us for Marner’s first 
ethical encounter with the villagers. Indeed, the chapter dramatically interrupts and 
forestalls his entrance until we have participated in the enactment of how gazing and 
storytelling constitute selves and ethical relationships. Only now is the reader prepared to 
understand why this important exchange between Marner and the villagers in the 
Rainbow Inn will be the first ethical encounter in the novel. When Marner bursts into the 
Inn to tell his neighbors the story of his lost gold, for the moment he is just like anyone 
else from the previous chapter who has related a story to his neighbors. And yet, he is not 
like them because he does not know the proper way to tell a story.  He begins by making 
demands for the Justice and accusing Jem Rodney of stealing his gold.  The landlord 
finally gets Marner to calm down and tells him “if you’ve got any information to lay, 
speak it out sensible, and show as you’re in your right mind, if you expect anybody to 
listen to you” (54). Marner must perform the role of storyteller for the villagers to feel 
any obligation to listen to him.  Marner takes his seat in the center of the company, a 
typical position for the teller that the villagers recognize. Finally, “all faces were turned 
to Silas” as he begins his story (55).  
This encounter is so different from his usual experience with anyone in Raveloe 
that it has quite an effect on Marner: “This strangely novel situation of opening his 
trouble to his Raveloe neighbours, of sitting in the warmth of a hearth not his own, and 
feeling the presence of faces and voices which were his nearest promise of help, had 
doubtless its influence on Marner” (italics mine 54).  He is heavily affected by the 
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“presence of faces,” gazes quite different from those exchanged earlier in the novel 
between Marner and the spying boys. Those who hear his story in the Rainbow Inn begin 
to feel for him as a fellow sufferer: “The repulsion Marner had always created in his 
neighbours was partly dissipated by the new light in which this misfortune had shown 
him” (76). The sympathy they extended through bearing witness to Marner’s story 
presents him in this new light; importantly it does not indicate that they fully understand 
Marner, but rather that they now recognize him as a subject who suffers. Sharing stories, 
according to Nel Noddings, “can penetrate cultural barriers, discover the power of the 
self and the integrity of the other, and deepen [our] understanding of [our] respective 
histories and possibilities” (qtd. in Arnett 252).  There are certainly cultural barriers 
between Marner and Raveloe that have kept each thinking the other is strange and 
incomprehensible. Marner’s indifference to attending church makes the villagers doubt 
his integrity, and Marner does not understand why things like baptism are important. 
When Marner tells his story of being robbed, each begins to see beyond the mere cultural 
differences to how they can have a conversation based on shared experiences of being 
human and living in such close proximity to each other: “cultural and personal stories 
reveal the nature of self-in-relation and uncover possibilities for ethical action” (Arnett 
246). It will be the continued sharing of stories that enables Marner and the villagers to 
interact despite their differences. 
Although the transformation in how Marner and the villagers relate more ethically 
to one another can be marked at the Rainbow Inn scene, the resulting change nevertheless 
proceeds slowly. The slow progress results from both the depth of Marner’s alienation 
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and also to the limits of sympathy. As the narrator describes how the villagers attempt to 
show their sympathy by delivering food to Marner and engaging him in conversation on 
the street and in his home, the narrator also points out the flawed nature of sympathetic 
words: “I suppose one reason why we are seldom able to comfort our neighbors with our 
words is that our goodwill gets adulterated . . . We can send black puddings and pettitoes 
without giving them a flavour of our own egoism; but language is a stream that is almost 
sure to smack of a mingled soil” (78). Thus, the sympathy in Raveloe is of a “beery and 
bungling sort,” flawed because the villagers cannot help showing themselves superior 
while giving help in the form of advice. The villagers, then, have not yet learned how to 
show sympathy without attempting to make the other more familiar by imposing their 
own doctrines. Even Dolly, who will later become the most ethical listener, attempts to 
convince Marner that he must start attending church. The villagers and Marner finally 
embody a space filled with conversation, and yet the villagers try to fill that space with 
their own telling instead of offering to listen. The attempt at conversation marks the 
beginning of the villagers’ transformation, but attempts to change Marner into a good 
Raveloe citizen shows their flawed sympathy.  
Marner’s transformation is marked by not turning away his neighbors when they 
drop in to check on him at his home: “when he did come to the door he showed no 
impatience, as he would once have done, at a visit that had been unasked for and 
unexpected” (81).  We have seen what Marner “would once have done” when he turned 
people away with a scowl after the Sally Oates incident.  The change in Marner that 
allows him to turn a welcoming gaze on his neighbors emerges from his new sense of 
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dependence on others. The narrator describes his heart before the theft as a “locked 
casket with its treasure inside” (81). The theft of Marner’s gold results in an empty heart 
on which “the lock was broken,” a metaphor that now suggests Marner has a more open 
heart waiting to be filled. This open-hearted stance leads Marner to an awareness that “if 
any help came to him it must come from without” (81). Marner now has a “faint 
consciousness of dependence on their good will,” a feeling that necessarily makes Marner 
approach his neighbors with a more ethical stance and a willingness to inhabit a space of 
face-to-face relationships with the villagers.  
Marner’s changing attitude, however, is slow and bungling like the villagers’ first 
offers of sympathy. Though Marner welcomes his neighbors into his home, at this point 
he still responds sullenly, often sitting “leaning his elbows on his knees, and pressing his 
hands against his head” in silence (78).  His responds this way, in part, because of the 
flawed sympathy described above; his neighbors still come to talk with the ulterior 
motive of making him more like themselves. But Marner is also not ready yet to receive 
sympathy; the narrator makes this especially clear through the encounter between Dolly 
and Marner. Although Marner does not understand much of what Dolly tries to describe 
about church, the narrator focuses on her implied motive: “there was no possibility of 
misunderstanding the desire to give comfort that made itself heard in her quiet tones” 
(82). This conversation remains a one-way discussion, as the “fountains of human love 
and of faith in a divine love had not yet been unlocked” in Marner, and he remains unable 
to respond to Dolly. In order for Marner to grow in his ability to respond more ethically 
to his neighbors, he must be drawn further outside of his narrow horizon of self. It is at 
  133 
this point that Eppie’s entrance into the narrative becomes necessary.   
 
Eppie’s Influence 
 Eppie will finally enable Marner to engage in ethical gazing by shifting Marner’s 
inward focus in a more outward direction: “The gold had kept his thoughts in an ever-
repeated circle, leading to nothing beyond itself; but Eppie was an object compacted of 
changes and hopes that forced his thoughts onward” (128).  Eppie helps Marner establish 
the outward stance required to approach the other ethically. An inward focus sees the 
other only as an extension of the self, such as we see when Marner’s obsession with his 
gold causes his gaze to turn Eppie into an extension of that gold. In one of the most 
dramatic scenes in the novel, Eliot creates a stark contrast between the holiday party at 
the Cass household and Eppie’s mother, Godfrey’s unacknowledged wife, drudging 
through the snow towards the house to have her vengeance on Godfrey. She never makes 
it, however, and falls to the ground in a dying stupor. Eppie crawls off, her attention 
caught by a light that emanates from Marner’s open door. The narrator tells us Marner 
“had contracted the habit of opening his door and looking out from time to time, as if he 
thought that his money might be somehow coming back to him…listening and gazing, 
not with hope, but with mere yearning and unrest” (109). Marner’s doorway offers a 
welcoming haven for Eppie as she crawls through it, though at this point his open door is 
a mere accident, a result of his obsession with looking for his gold and not a welcoming 
gesture toward other humans.  
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The way this scene is constructed foreshadows, however, the transformation of 
Marner’s doorway and his own ethical growth. The narrator attributes one of Marner’s 
cataleptic fits to his inability to see Eppie as she crawls through his door while he holds it 
open with “wide but sightless eyes” (110). Marner’s eyes trace his transformation and 
here we see that instead of glaring eyes they are wide open but remain sightless. The 
cataleptic fit and his “sightless” eyes thus represent Marner’s inward focus, his inability 
to sympathize beyond his own feelings and his own life. When Marner finally closes the 
door and turns toward the hearth where Eppie has fallen asleep, his “blurred vision” 
makes him see Eppie’s golden hair as his “own gold – brought back to him as 
mysteriously as it had been taken away!” (110). When he touches the softness of her 
curls, his “agitated gaze” then thought she must be his little sister come back to him, “his 
little sister who he had carried about in his arms for a year before she died” (110-111). 
Within just a few moments, Marner’s efforts to understand who or what Eppie is 
becomes quickly assimilate according to his own horizons of experience, focusing first 
on his most recent tragedy of losing his gold and then turning to the tragedy of losing his 
beloved sister when he just a boy. In other words, Marner does not really “see” yet; he is 
not ethically gazing at Eppie because he immediately tries to fit her into a life story that 
he calls his own. 
The moment Eppie awakens, however, begins the fast-forming attachment that 
draws the inward, selfish gazing of Marner’s unseeing eyes in an outward direction and 
teaches him to recognize Eppie as an entirely different entity distinct from his own 
objectifying visions. Eppie’s displays of affection toward Marner in those first few days 
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cause him to often tremble “with an emotion mysterious to himself, at something 
unknown dawning on his life” (122). Marner’s interest in something other than his gold 
widens his self-centered horizon of sympathy to include Eppie. Furthermore, his decision 
to keep the child who appears in his doorway on Christmas night creates “more active 
sympathy, especially amongst the women” (122). The villagers’ horizon also widens to 
include Marner in genuine conversation with him when he makes the rounds to deliver 
linen: “now Silas met with open smiling faces and cheerful questioning, as a person 
whose satisfactions and difficulties could be understood.  Everywhere he must sit a little 
and talk about the child, and words of interest were always ready for him” (133). The 
“open smiling faces” indicates the more ethical stance of the villagers, their willingness 
to witness what Marner experiences with Eppie.  
This moment also suggests the limits of sympathy, a tension Eliot continually 
returns to. It would seem the villagers’ ability to understand Marner’s “satisfactions and 
difficulties” produces their willingness to engage with him; understanding precedes 
sympathy. Yet, Marner’s difference is highlighted in this scene in the way he occupies 
the mother-role as a male, undercutting the model English family. Nancy Lammeter, in 
her refusal to adopt a child and create even a slightly unconventional family structure, 
only highlights Marner’s singleness and maleness as a subversion of the typical family 
configuration. I do not want to ignore the problematic connection between the villagers’ 
sympathy and their ability to relate to Marner through the similar experience of raising a 
child. However, even here Eliot preserves Marner’s strangeness by feminizing him. 
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Additionally, British readers were accustomed to extending sympathy toward females. 
Here, Eliot creates a male figure who needs the reader’s sympathy.  
The villagers’ sympathy may be limited to what they can relate to, but they still 
engage in ethical gazing because they witness Marner’s stories about Eppie without 
attempting to change his identity, as they did earlier when they wanted to make him a 
church-goer. What a difference from the strictly work-related talk between Marner and 
his customers! Now he is invited into the homes of his neighbor and engages in a kind of 
“story time,” telling them all the latest happenings with Eppie.  Just as his loss had placed 
him in a more sympathetic light, his attachment to Eppie provides Marner with the 
substance of a story and an experience that his neighbors can bear witness to.   
It is through Eppie, more a symbol and tool of Marner’s recovery than a character 
herself, that his sensibilities are reawakened and we get a sense of actual shared 
sympathy between Marner and Raveloe. With a deeper understanding of his need for the 
other, Marner begins to take on the customs of the village he has lived in for 15 years but 
never truly been included.  He goes to church on Sundays with Eppie, he participates in 
conversation beyond business transactions, and he continues to depend on people like 
Dolly for help and advice. Importantly, his participation does not signal his assimilation, 
as we will see in the final scenes of the novel, partly because it is his choice to engage in 
these events and partly because his background is too different to ever be completely 
subsumed by the villagers. Raveloe comes to accept both Marner’s unknowable origins 
and his unusual role as bachelor-mother. In turn, Marner signals his willingness to bear 
witness to the village customs by attending more community rituals, without ever really 
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understanding or believing in those rituals.  Thus, the space of difference between Marner 
and Raveloe is filled with a sympathy based on witnessing rather than understanding and 
knowability.  
  
Witnessing as Readers 
Once Marner begins to engage more with his neighbors, the narrator focuses 
primarily on the relationship between Marner and Dolly. This relationship forms a model, 
I suggest, for how the reader should bear witness to the other’s story. Earlier in the novel, 
the narrator guided reader reactions to Marner more overtly. Here, however, the narrator 
uses gazing as a rhetorical technique by showing the effects of Dolly and Marner’s 
engaging attention to one another and their willingness to witness the other’s story. As 
Marner grows to trust Dolly more, he is able to “open his mind” to her, until he 
“gradually communicated to her all he could describe of his early life” (143). The 
description of how Marner tells his story to Dolly is worth quoting in full: 
 
The communication was necessarily a slow and difficult process, for Silas’s 
meager power of explanation was not aided by any readiness of interpretation in 
Dolly, whose narrow outward experience gave her no key to strange customs, and 
made every novelty a source of wonder that arrested them at every step of the 
narrative.  It was only by fragments, and at intervals which left Dolly time to 
revolve what she had heard till it acquired some familiarity for her, that Silas at 
last arrived at the climax of the sad story – the drawing of lots, and its false 
testimony concerning him; and this had to be repeated in several interviews, under 
new questions on her part as to the nature of this plan for detecting the guilty and 
clearing the innocent. (143) 
 
The first sentence describes this encounter clearly as an example of people with “narrow 
outward experience” who are “others” to one another because of their “strange customs.”  
  138 
Despite these differences, both Marner and Dolly engage in ethical gazing, Marner by 
sharing his story with the other and Dolly by embodying an open and generous stance 
toward the other. The narrator details carefully what this ethical space and stance look 
like, focusing on how Marner tells his story and on how Dolly responds.  Because Marner 
has only a “meager power of explanation,” he tells his story in fragments that allow Dolly 
to familiarize herself with the strange customs he describes.  Marner only “at last arrived 
at the climax of the sad story” after he gives Dolly time to ask questions. Dolly is a model 
listener for the rapt attention she gives to Marner’s story; even during the pauses she 
spends time pondering “what she had heard till it acquired some familiarity for her.”  
This is the most ethical encounter in the novel so far because both are willing to engage 
with an open stance toward the other.  
Dolly’s “listening face” illustrates the act of witnessing for the reader (180). The 
fragmented and interrupted nature of the story Marner narrates to Dolly closely resembles 
the way Silas Marner has been narrated to the reader.  The Cass family story forms 
another part of the novel that constantly interrupts the telling of Marner’s story, similar to 
how the Rainbow Inn chapter interrupts the plot climax of Marner’s stolen gold.  Perhaps 
these gaps are to give the reader “time to revolve” all that has been said, as Dolly does 
here.  To be ethical listeners (or readers) of this story, rather than passive listeners, we 
should follow Dolly’s example and ask questions of the narrative.  Though Marner seems 
like a strange character that we would not normally relate to, Dolly models how Marner’s 
“otherness” should not keep us from bearing witness to his story.  Even if we cannot fully 
understand his story, as the narrator predicts we will not, we can still respond ethically by 
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simply letting Marner tell it.  As twenty-first century readers, this means giving our 
attention for a length of time to the novel.  It also means that when we walk away from 
the novel, we should continue pondering the story as Dolly did.  If Eliot writes to create 
moral change within her readers, then responding ethically to this novel means allowing 
for the transformative possibility of the reading experience. In one of her essays Eliot 
lays out what the reader owes the author: “The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, 
whether painter, poet, or novelist is the extension of our sympathies” (Pinney 270). No 
truly ethical encounter with the “other” will leave our horizon of sympathy unchanged. 
  
Conclusion 
Eliot clearly saw her writing as a moral project intended to improve the ethics of 
relating to the other; thus she declares the whole aim in her art is to enable sympathy in 
people: “The only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings, is that those who read 
them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains and the joys of those who 
differ from themselves” (Letters 3:111). Perhaps one of the most important contexts for 
understanding Eliot’s conception of sympathy is her revision of nineteenth century 
hermeneutics.9
                                                 
9 Eliot’s theory of sympathy has been explored on a more technical level by several critics who focus on 
specific narrative and rhetorical techniques that model sympathy or control how and when it is produced in 
readers. Doyle looks at distancing techniques, particularly as they are used to control how much we see of a 
character and the relations characters have to one another (14). Marshall focuses on narrative voice as a 
technique to control readers’ sympathetic responses. The technique I am focusing on, gazing, draws 
attention to the reader’s act of looking and the interpretative, and therefore ethical, considerations that go 
into this act.  
 There is a strain in Eliot’s conception of sympathy, influenced by 
Schleiermacher, favoring a more subjective approach, in contrast to the more common 
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methodological approach carried over from eighteenth-century philosophers like Hume.10 
Eliot’s more subjective method to hermeneutical understanding leads her to a sympathy 
that emphasizes individual experience: “my writing is simply a set of experiments in 
life…[but I refuse] to adopt any formula which does not get itself clothed for me in some 
human figure and individual experience” (Letters 6:216-17). Suzy Anger aptly labels 
Eliot’s novelistic manifestation of hermeneutics as a “hermeneutics of sympathy” (96). 
Eliot’s hermeneutics of sympathy attempts to understand the other while maintaining an 
important degree of distance and difference by insisting on the uniqueness of each 
person. Thus, Eliot must struggle to situate her characters within a community without 
erasing their differences. She wants to “help my readers in getting a clearer conception 
and a more active admiration of those vital elements which bind men together” (Letters 
4:472). This is why in Silas Marner, Marner’s return of self-awareness is predicated on 
his growing recognition of the “vital elements” binding him to Raveloe. Sympathy 
requires a balance between eradicating the self and eradicating the other, and it is this 
tension that Eliot continually returns to her in her novels.11
Eliot recognizes that it is not enough to sympathize with people who bear 
resemblance to our own values and beliefs; such an act of sympathy will not push on the 
  
                                                 
10 For a description of Hume’s theory of sympathy see Mercer. 
 
11 Ablow is one critic who points out how sympathetic relations break down continually in Eliot’s novels 
(70). She suggests that Eliot’s sympathy concentrates on “how to eradicate selfishness while maintaining 
the self-consciousness necessary for ethical relationships” (71). For example, Ablow looks at The Mill on 
the Floss as highlighting the problem of how exclusive marital love can become. Total absorption is both 
pleasurable and very dangerous. Lane’s exploration of hate in Eliot’s novels further reveals her complexity, 
though ultimately Lane argues her novels still strive to represent the ethical as intertwined with the exercise 
of sympathy. However, Eliot’s view of sympathy is never as a simple answer and Lane emphasizes how her 
novels present “social conflict as insoluble and participation in communities as sometimes irreparably 
damaging to individuals” (116).  
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horizon of our understanding and will not encourage growth. Eliot is clear, then, that she 
wants her readers to feel for unsympathetic characters rather than idyllic ones: “We want 
to be taught to feel not for the heroic artisan or the sentimental peasant, but for the 
peasant in all his coarse apathy, and the artisan in all his suspicious selfishness” (Pinney 
269-71). There should be no doubt why Eliot created the strange hero in Silas Marner. 
This novel pushes the limits of readers’ sympathy; we are called upon to respond to 
Marner, a space inhabited by our imagination where we act out possible responses, 
hopefully learning to choose the more ethical form of gazing that leaves the differences 
between self and other in tact while still engendering sympathy in the distance that 
separates each person’s uniqueness. As I will show in the next chapter, however, reading 
is not enough to turn someone into a moral person, a challenge Brontë extends in her 
novel Villette. In creating an unknowable heroine, Brontë shows readers they cannot call 
themselves sympathetic people just because they are able to feel for characters in novels; 
we cannot be witnesses only by sharing in the lives of fictional characters. Eliot extends a 
stronger faith than Brontë in the power of fiction to transform the sympathetic horizons of 
her reader. Certainly Eliot does not see the sympathetic response to a fictional character 
as the end result. As she stated in the letter quoted above, she expects her novels to 
expand her readers’ horizon of sympathy so that they can become “better able to imagine 
and to feel the pains and the joys” of those who act as “others” in their lives beyond the 
fiction. Eliot is clear about her effort as a writer to influence, not just reading practices, 
but actual relationships in people’s lives. The sympathy produced through the intersection 
of gazing and storytelling is a solution she proposes, but it is not without its failings.  
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The danger implicit in sympathy is the total absorption and conflation of the self 
and the other. It is important, then, that the ending of this novel illustrates the extension 
of sympathy without assimilation. Though the story ends with the marriage of Eppie, I 
argue this is not the resolution of the novel.  The conclusion does not focus on the details 
of Eppie’s wedding, instead the focus turns to various relationships between members of 
the community, from the Lammeter’s own family dynamics to their connection with 
Marner, to Mr. Macey sitting on his porch and Dolly’s recognition that “he’ll be hurt if 
we pass him and say nothing” (182). These little glances into the various relationships of 
the community remind us of the individuals we have met throughout the narrative and, as 
always, situates them within the Raveloe community. Perhaps the most important detail 
in this ending is the description of how the villagers had “leisure to talk of Silas Marner’s 
strange history” (182). Importantly, this shows that although Marner is considered part of 
the community, his story is still “strange.” As Garland’s epigraph to this chapter 
indicates, the moment of witnessing – gazing and storytelling – validates a sense of self. 
His inclusion within the community in this final scene does not erase the differences 
between Marner and the villagers. Rather, it demonstrates the presence of ethical 
relationships as the villagers and Marner willingly identify across their differences, 
allowing sympathy to dwell in the gap between self and other.  
I have argued for a more optimistic role for the gaze by using the term gazing to 
focus attention on the negotiation of social relationships in Silas Marner. An ethical 
encounter is predicated on maintaining distance between self and other, but ensuring that 
sympathy dwells in that gap. To have sympathy that does not require understanding, and 
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thus does not assimilate the other, means there must be a moment of witnessing. 
Witnessing allows the other to tell her story and gain an ethical response from listeners 
indicated by gazing, an open stance toward receiving the other’s story and bearing 
witness to the other’s position as a subject with a story to tell.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SILENCE AND THE ETHICS OF UNKNOWABILITY  
IN CHARLOTE BRONTË’S VILLETTE 
 
Silence is of different kinds, and breathes different meanings. ~ Villette 385 
 
There is a perverse mood of the mind which is rather soothed than irritated by 
misconstruction; and in quarters where we can never be rightly known, we take 
pleasure, I think, in being consummately ignored.  What honest man on being 
casually taken for a housebreaker, does not feel rather tickled than vexed at the 
mistake? ~ Villette 109 
 
 
In the prior chapter, Eliot presented a form of sympathetic engagement I called 
ethical gazing. As illustrated by the exchange of sympathy between Marner and the 
Raveloe villagers, sharing one’s story can help bridge the distance of difference. Unlike 
Eliot, Charlotte Brontë does not offer a strategy for overcoming difference, insisting 
instead on the merits of unknowability. In this chapter, I explore silence, another 
marginalized form of telling like gossip, looking specifically at how its rhetorical effect 
in Brontë’s novel Villette produces a critique of the way British readers and citizens 
assumed all too easily they could know the other. In a period when other narrators and 
characters seem bent on telling, Lucy Snowe as both narrator and character insists, 
instead, on silence and withholding. Understanding Lucy’s silence as an ethical and 
rhetorical choice redefines how critics have formerly characterized Lucy as a detached, 
paranoid, reticent, and unreliable narrator. Such descriptions misread Lucy’s silence as an 
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unethical construction of her own identity, and an unethical stance toward the other. In 
essence, the rhetorical positioning of Lucy’s identity as unknowable, an effect produced 
by her strategic use of silence, illustrates an alternative conception of approaching the 
other. The kind of sympathy necessitated by Lucy does not rely on assimilative moves to 
turn the other into a likeness with which one can sympathize. Instead, silence in this 
novel calls for a sympathy in, and through, difference that leaves identity fluid, rather 
than consigning the other to artificial and restricting categories. Lucy’s non-response, 
where a response is expected, strategically constructs fluidity between identity categories. 
Silence enacts an unknowable self that resists fixed categories and assimilation by 
resisting the cultural norms covering over difference. 
 If readers cannot attach to Lucy as they would expect, then they must learn to 
sympathize with a heroine that remains essentially unknowable, perhaps even unlikable. 
Lucy’s silences transform both reading practices and social relationships by disrupting 
two sets of expectations: Lucy’s moments of silence position her identity as one that 
disrupts Victorian categories of womanhood, and Brontë’s use of silence counter to 
typical nineteenth-century narrative techniques disrupts the reading process. Of course, 
this transformation only happens if Lucy’s silence is understood as a choice that can 
create agency. Her silence must be recognized as rhetorical in the sense that it is a chosen 
action intended to influence her audience to interpret her identity in certain ways.1
                                                 
1 Ramage connects identity and rhetoric through acts of interpretation: “It is this interdependence between 
identity and language – our capacity to use language as a means of representing our identity to others and in 
turn to interpret others’ representations of themselves – that makes rhetoric such a powerful tool for 
understanding, forming, and preserving identity” (34). Ramage defines interpretation as the means by 
which we allay uncertainty; in wrestling with the meaning of the symbolic act that gave rise to the 
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 Lucy’s unknowability suggests a needed revision of how sympathy was employed 
in the nineteenth century. In effect, her silence critiques overly simplified versions of 
sympathy whereby the sympathizer assumes he/she can comprehend the other. Whereas 
the use of language often clarifies identity by providing more details and knowledge 
about a person (even if it is merely an “act”), Lucy’s silence refuses to fill in such details 
and thus makes the work of interpreting her identity seem nearly impossible. The 
characters that are able to show Lucy sympathy, without falsely constructing her identity, 
model a new ethic of relating to the other. This defines what I mean by “ethical” in this 
chapter: the ability to approach the other with sympathy without constructing and 
defining the other’s identity within prescriptive social categories. In addition, the reader 
must also transform her reading practice as she encounters a narrator who thwarts the 
“dear reader” relationship at every turn. The narrator-reader relationship thus offers an 
additional critique, one aimed at reading practices that masks anxieties of imperialism by 
allowing readers to feel moral just because of their capacity to sympathize with fictional 
characters.  
The need to circumscribe Lucy within a recognizable category reflects in many 
ways the English imperialist anxieties about knowing the other. Imperialist notions 
insisted on the ability to define and to describe the other, and claimed moral superiority to 
reconstruct the identity of the other. Villette challenges reading practices that mirror the 
imperialist need to know and to transform the other into a recognizable English subject 
before extending sympathy. The discourse system of silence in Villette revises the 
                                                                                                                                                 
uncertainty, we alter our interpretative model (149). Language as a symbolic act includes the use of silence 
as one way of presenting signs that must be interpreted by an audience. 
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practice of extending sympathy only to one’s likeness by employing gaps to insist on the 
inability of fully knowing the other. These gaps underscore differences between the 
reader and the characters, narrator, and text. When employed at these different levels 
silence performs different rhetorical functions. As a character, Lucy uses the 
communicative act of silence to keep her identity categorically unstable and thereby 
unknowable. As a narrator, Lucy uses silence as a rhetorical mode to challenge the ethics 
of how we respond to story and thus to the tellers of story. Brontë uses silence as a 
narrative technique to create distance between the reader and the text by thwarting the 
desire for resolution and disclosure.2
 
  These three modes of silence together form a 
discourse system that redefines sympathy predicated on knowing, showing readers how 
to sympathize in the face of the unknowable other. Tracking acts of silence across the text 
offers a new way of interpreting Lucy’s withholding: her silences create sympathy in, and 
through, difference rather than relying on assimilation. A more ethical way to negotiate 
relationships, silence frees the other from one’s horizon of norms and expectations.  
Theorizing Silence 
The lack of studies exploring the role of silence in literary texts parallels the 
general disregard for silence as a secondary form of communication defined only in 
opposition to speech – as the absence of speech and therefore less than speech. In 
addition, the connection usually made between voice and self equates silence with a lack 
                                                 
2 Laurence offers an insightful and rigorous look at specific narrative techniques for narrating silence, a 
unique discourse to convey through written words. Focusing mainly on Virginia Woolf, Laurence develops 
a theory of reading silence. While I briefly attend to silence as a narrative technique, I am less concerned to 
establish a method for categorizing narrative silences, as I am interested in the rhetoric of silence as it 
connects to identity and ethics.  
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of subjectivity. Extending attempts by feminist theory and rhetorical theory to 
reconceptualize the importance of silence, I offer an analysis of Lucy’s silence as a 
means of both ethically engaging the other and actively constructing one’s identity. I 
hope to extend Cheryl Glenn’s definition of silence as an active and productive rhetorical 
strategy by tracing the representation of silence in a literary text. Glenn acknowledges 
that enforced silence can be a form of oppression, but chosen silence can be a source of 
empowerment. One of the empowering effects of silence as a rhetorical choice, she 
claims, is how it resists dominant narratives. I am arguing this is the effect of Lucy’s 
silence: it allows her to resist fixed categories of identity and to reformulate the dominant 
narrative about sympathy in the nineteenth century.  
Ratcliffe’s study, Rhetorical Listening, also opens up definitions of silence by 
focusing on another aspect of communication the does not include spoken words. Though 
a different part of interacting with the other, listening often accompanies the space of 
silence. As Glenn argues with silence, so Ratcliffe claims an active, rather than passive, 
role for listening. Most relevant to my purposes, Ratcliffe argues that nonidentification is 
the best position for listening. Rhetorical listening uses a cultural logic that recognizes 
commonalties and differences, allowing both to exist rather than resorting to an either/or 
reasoning. This kind of listening, then, requires a dialectical process that recognizes the 
margins between self and other, allowing them to remain rather than assimilating them. 
One can thus understand an other, Ratcliffe claims, without having to elide the distance 
created through cultural difference. Perhaps most radical about Ratcliffe’s claim for 
rhetorical listening is how integral such an activity is for defining one’s identity. Her 
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theory corresponds, then, to those like Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero who claim 
constructing an identity requires another to whom we tell our story. What Ratcliffe adds 
to those theories is the role of listening in the development of identity. Both Glenn and 
Ratcliffe’s studies are foundational for expanding our notions of silence in relationships 
and the rhetorical work it accomplishes in constructing identity.  
Butler’s emphasis on the performative aspect of telling one’s story can be a useful 
way to understand silence as a form of telling. Butler’s description of the exchange 
between self and other deemphasizes the actual words spoken and places greater 
importance on the rhetorical moves used to position the self: “I am, in other words, doing 
something with that I – elaborating and positioning it in relation to a real or imagined 
audience – which is something other than telling a story about it” (66). This focus on 
positioning the self requires us to think about narrating in terms other than just verbal 
messages; silence can be an integral part of the rhetorical positioning involved in any 
exchange between self and other. Through her silence, then, Lucy’s identity remains 
outside conventional categories, requiring the other to identify with her although he or 
she may not recognize her. One of the primary ways Lucy encourages this kind of 
sympathetic identification is through the act of non-response. Lucy intentionally resists 
responding, for example, when M. Paul calls out to her, though her ear “strained its nerve 
to hear” because she loves him. She suspects should M. Paul find her he will propose to 
her; to respond thus means she will take on categories like “wife” and possibly “mother.” 
Lucy is not yet sure of M. Paul’s willingness to accept her differences and she refuses to 
be hailed into a subject position defined by somebody else’s idea of what she should be. 
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Silence in this novel demonstrates how non-response can create subjectivity that resists 
fixed categories. As a component of identity formation, silence insists on the 
impossibility of knowing the other, suggesting that sympathy must be possible even 
across distances of the unknown.  
In the following analysis of Brontë’s novel, I analyze separately Lucy’s use of 
silence as a character and as a narrator. This separation, highlighted by the model of a 
discourse system that includes silence as narrative technique (when used by Brontë), 
rhetorical technique (when used by Lucy-the-narrator), and communicative act (when 
used by Lucy-the-character), helps underscore the different critiques of social 
relationships, showing both positive and negative uses of silence as well as the ethical 
and unethical uses of sympathy engendered by those silences. Because the narrator has a 
retrospective point of view, at times Lucy-the-character responds unethically and Lucy-
the-narrator will correct herself. Thus, to interpret the model of ethical social relations 
posited in the text we must keep Lucy’s own developing ethic distinct from the final 
model required of the reader. When examining the relational ethics between characters in 
the novel, I trace examples of both ethical and unethical encounters. The unethical 
encounters range from Lucy’s own responses to the unethical efforts of other characters 
to “know” Lucy. The ethical encounters occur in varying layers of intimacy, with the 
bookseller encounter remaining fairly shallow and the encounters with M. Paul 
developing into a deep relationship. What emerges from these examples is the 
counterintuitive truth that silence often results in the most ethical approach to the other 
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because it keeps the other’s differences intact and thus fosters a sympathy that avoids 
assimilation.  
 
“Are You Anybody?”: Lucy’s Impulse to Reveal Nothing   
 Within Villette there are three possible ways characters encounter difference. 
Unethical encounters occur primarily in two ways:  a character either assimilates or 
conflates the other with his or her own self, or a character exoticizes the other to keep that 
person as a capital “O” other. Both of these responses are presented as unethical in the 
novel. A third way of encountering the other resists the binary of recognition and 
misrecognition, and instead extends sympathy through the other’s unknowableness that 
may never be resolved. Lucy’s own silences as a character, as well as the various ways 
other characters respond to this rhetorical positioning of her identity, models for the 
reader these three different possibilities. Lucy-as-narrator holds this last position as the 
ethical one, praising characters who encounter the other (most often herself) in this third 
mode. Brontë inscribes silences into the text, for example by leaving Lucy’s childhood 
and the novel’s ending open, thus compelling the reader to enact this third way by 
sympathizing with the novel’s heroine without knowing very much about her life.  
It is not a mere accident that others misread Lucy; it is by her own will that she 
remains unknown through “silent” construction of herself. In this way, she resists an 
identity fixed within normalizing categories. In contrast to Lucy, Polly willingly takes up 
cultural categories. As James Buzard suggests, the importance of Polly’s character and 
her marriage to Dr. John is the allegory it articulates of a “self-universalizing imperial 
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identity” from which, importantly, Lucy’s narrative diverges (257). Lucy’s story disrupts 
the notion of a rooted British identity with which we begin the novel at the Bretton’s 
generational home. What Lucy finds fascinating in Polly, Buzard suggests, is her ability 
to belong to the culture by accepting the roles Polly recognizes others are hailing her into. 
Lucy’s desire, in contrast, is “to be wholly uninscribed by culture, invisible to its circle of 
gazes” so that by the end of the novel Lucy takes up the “position of no position” 
becoming the “light by which we see but not an object to be seen” (266). This non-
identification is, I propose, the most ethical way one could “read” Lucy because she is 
empowered to choose roles and to present her self to others without fighting against 
socially prescribed and limiting definitions of who she should be.  
Although Polly herself easily takes on categories, she does not impose them on 
Lucy. Through a brief example, I show that young Polly operates as the exemplary for 
this third way of sympathizing, setting the tone for how other characters should, but most 
often do not, respond to Lucy. When Lucy catalogues how others construct her, she 
singles out Polly as the one who “knew” her best: 
 
What contradictory attributes of character we sometimes find ascribed to us, 
according to the eye with which we are viewed! Madame Beck esteemed me 
learned and blue; Miss Fanshawe, caustic, ironic, and cynical; Mr. Home, a model 
teacher, the essence of the sedate and discreet: somewhat conventional perhaps, 
too strict, limited and scrupulous, but still the pink and pattern of governess-
correctness; whilst another person Professor Paul Emmanuel, to wit, never lost an 
opportunity of intimating his opinion that mine was rather a fiery and rash nature 
– adventurous, indocile, and audacious. I smiled at them all. If any one knew me 
it was little Paulina Mary. (334) 
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Lucy-the-narrator points out the ways in which the other characters only understand her 
in relation to socially constructed categories of identity that they themselves are most 
comfortable with. Lucy praises Polly as the character who most understands her; yet, it is 
Polly who says, “Lucy, I wonder if anyone will ever comprehend you altogether?” (471). 
When Lucy upholds Polly as “knowing” her the best, then, she is really commending 
Polly’s ability to develop a friendship with Lucy despite her apparent unknowability. 
Rather than attempt to assimilate Lucy into a feminine mold Polly can recognize, she 
acknowledges that Lucy will remain unidentifiable.  
Lucy-as-character uses silence as a communicative act most clearly in her 
encounters with Dr. John, who makes the most unethical attempts to know Lucy by 
confining her within stereotypical categories. Her silence toward him is a strategic, 
rhetorical choice she employs to force all the categories he could ascribe to her (woman, 
teacher, wife, English, Protestant) to remain flexible and unstable. When Dr. John 
appears at Mdm Beck’s school where Lucy is now teaching, she recognizes him from her 
residence with the Brettons many years ago. When she first sees him, a strange look 
passes over her face, which annoys Dr. John: “Mademoiselle does not spare me: I am not 
vain enough to fancy that it is my merits which attract her attention; it must then be some 
defect. Dare I ask—what?” (108). He misinterprets the motive behind Lucy’s intent gaze, 
but she refuses to answer him. She explains to the reader: “I might have cleared myself 
on the spot,” but she prefers to let him “think what he chose, and accuse me of what he 
would” (109). Lucy makes sure the reader is clear about her motives for allowing his 
misconstruction:  
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To say anything on the subject, to hint at my discovery, had not suited my habits 
of thought, or assimilated with my system of feeling.  On the contrary, I had 
preferred to keep the matter to myself.  I liked entering his presence covered with 
a cloud he had not seen through, while he stood before me under a ray of special 
illumination, which shone partial over his head, trembled about his feet, and cast 
light no farther. (109) 
 
Why does Lucy resist being “seen through” by Dr. John? Because from her prior 
knowledge of him when she lived with the Brettons, she already knows that Dr. John will 
only see her through his limited vision of social categories like gender and class. The 
unethical response in this scene is not Dr. John’s inability to recognize Lucy; rather, it is 
the fact that he fills in the gap of his nonrecognition with his own assumptions.3
That Dr. John does not recognize Lucy is a mark of his disrespectful manners 
toward others who are not like him (i.e., of the same class). In recounting this episode to 
 He does 
not leave Lucy’s identity open, he imposes his own interpretative categories on her. He 
proves this very fact through his lack of notice or interest in Lucy when he encounters her 
at Mdm Beck’s school. Rather than Lucy’s silence causing him surprise and making him 
readjust his estimation of her, her silence instead fits into his assumption of her servant 
status. Her silence here is misinterpreted and actually furthers her circumscription within 
a social category. However, because Lucy herself does not accept this categorization, it 
does not confine her actions, something we witness as she attends operas and will 
eventually run her own school, neither of which a servant would do.  
                                                 
3 Bock interprets John’s actions as not reading her at all, rather than misreading on his part (131). Even 
worse than being misread, Bock suggests, is not being read at all. I disagree, however, arguing instead that 
Brontë created a character who does not mind being misread sometimes, and goes to great lengths at other 
times not to be read at all.  
 
  155 
the reader, Lucy clearly describes the neglect with which Dr. John behaved towards her: 
He gives her the “degree of notice…given to unobtrusive articles of furniture” and he 
“never remembered that I had eyes in my head; much less a brain behind them” (107-
108). My epigraph qualifies Lucy’s delight in misconstruction; such delight only occurs 
“in quarters where we can never be rightly known” or, in other words, when we know the 
encounter involves a person who is too blinded by his or her own conceits to ethically 
engage with someone who is that person’s other. Had Dr. John given Lucy the same 
notice she gave him, acknowledgment might have existed on both sides. Dr. John’s 
behavior is telling – Lucy knows he will always try to construct her within the 
appropriate cultural norms, and so her silence is Lucy’s strategy to resist being known by 
someone who does not approach with genuine sympathy, the kind of sympathy willing to 
expand one’s horizons of understanding and move beyond known categories.  
 Although Lucy will open up to a few characters by the end of the novel, she 
continues to remain hidden from Dr. John both figuratively and literally. In the famous 
festival scene near the novel’s end, Lucy hides in the shadow to avoid Dr. John’s 
recognition because, she tells the reader, “I would not be known” (438).  Lucy realizes 
that mis-recognition would be better than Dr. John’s attempts to assimilate her into a 
character that suits his tastes and views of the world – into someone like Polly. “I liked to 
find myself the silent, unknown, consequently unaccosted neighbor of the short petticoat 
and the sabot,” she tells the reader, “and only the distant gazer at the silk robe, the velvet 
mantle, and the plumed chapeau. Amidst so much life and joy too, it suited me to be 
alone – quite alone” (502). At times, certainly, Lucy’s claim, “it suited me to be alone,” 
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sounds like the assertion of one struggling to accept her lot in life and pretend she 
actually prefers it. It is interesting to note, however, the connections she makes between 
being silent and unknown and being unaccosted. She also contrasts her plain clothing 
with the luxurious clothing of which she wishes only to be a “distant gazer.” The silk 
robe, petticoat, and other articles of clothing act as markers of identity Lucy does not 
desire.  She resists this socially prescribed identity by remaining only a “neighbor” of the 
petticoats and a “gazer” at the silk robes while dressing plainly herself.  
Although one would expect Lucy to find more comfort with someone she has 
known for a long time, someone like Dr. John, she surprisingly connects more with a 
stranger at the festival. This shows that sometimes the distance between self and other 
can foster a more ethical sympathy. While she successfully hides herself from Dr John (a 
metaphor for the way she cloaks her identity from him), the bookseller who she has only 
seen occasionally recognizes her: “Strange to say, this man knew me under my straw-hat 
and closely-folded shawl.” She calls his offer of help to find her a better seat 
“disinterested civility” (503). This unselfishly motivated disinterest in Lucy fills the 
distance between the bookseller and Lucy with a more ethical kind of sympathy, one that 
does not act out of an egoistic replication of the other as self, nor does the act depend on 
any self-seeking gain. Ethical distance, labeled here as “disinterest,” prevents false 
knowledge of Lucy, such as Dr. John might construct by erasing her differences in order 
to understand and thus sympathize with her. The stranger makes no claims on Lucy, but 
merely offers to help her find a more comfortable seat. He is able to sympathize with her 
discomfort without attempting to know her as a person. It is important to remember 
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Lucy’s alien status as a foreigner, in particular an English woman, in Brussels. Lucy is 
doubly other through national and gender differences, making the stranger’s behavior all 
the more remarkable. Although the briefest of the ethical encounters in the novel, its 
placement next to Dr. John’s unethical treatment of Lucy highlights the qualities that 
make the bookseller a model for how to engage the other.  
The social relationships I have discussed so far show that Lucy desires to form 
relationships that allow her to remain outside typical feminine constructions. She would 
rather encounter the bookseller, a stranger who approaches her without trying to define 
her, than to encounter an old friend like Dr. John who continually confines her within his 
narrow horizon of womanhood. Genevra is another character who misinterprets Lucy, but 
to whom Lucy grants more tolerance. One of the rhetorical effects of Genevera’s 
character, which seems exaggerated at times, is the foil she forms to Polly. Polly is 
willing to acknowledge that she can never know Lucy while Genevra is determined to fix 
her within some social script. Genevra asks Lucy “but are you anybody?” pleading, “Do 
– do tell me who you are?” to which Lucy refuses an answer. Unsatisfied at letting Lucy 
escape with silence, Genevra proceeds to concoct the “most fanciful changes on this 
theme” proving, according to Lucy-as-narrator, Genevra’s narrow horizon of 
understanding the other, “her incapacity to conceive how any person not bolstered up by 
birth or wealth, not supported by some consciousness of name or connection, could 
maintain an attitude of reasonable integrity” (343). Lucy does not appear bothered by 
Ginevra’s fanciful descriptions, perhaps because the many stories Ginevra concocts 
mirrors the open possibility of multiple identities with which Lucy feels more 
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comfortable. Ginevra’s perspective on identity represents what the world is concerned 
with (pedigree, social position, ect), set in opposition to what concerns Lucy (which 
characteristically she does not divulge). Lucy-as-narrator enacts the practice of allowing 
differences to co-exist by declaring, “the world is very right in its view, yet believe also 
that I am not quite wrong in mine” (343). Rather than claim one right perspective, Lucy-
as-narrator reinforces the ethics of multiple possibilities. Lucy’s silence encourages 
Ginevra’s speculations about her background. Although Ginevra herself is not 
comfortable to leave Lucy’s identity open in this way, Lucy’s silence insists on this 
fluidity. When others approach Lucy unethically, silence can thwart assimilation and 
refuse the sympathy offered on the basis of likeness alone. 
Silence encourages disparate views to co-exist by resisting the impulse to resolve 
unknowability. This ability to make available multiple interpretations enables ethical 
encounters between self and other.4
                                                 
4 In Lucy’s search for meaning (the narrative trajectory argued by Bock), Bock describes the structure of 
truth that Lucy posits based in paradox. Lucy reveals a different definition of truth to us: “not as a 
supposedly genuine interiority hidden by a false and opposing exterior, but as a paradox of alternative 
realities that can be brought ‘within the compass’ of understanding” (138).  
 In an uncharacteristically didactic moment, Lucy-as-
narrator explains how she arrived at this ability: “the longer we live, the more our 
experience widens; the less prone are we to judge our neighbour’s conduct, to question 
the world’s wisdom: wherever an accumulation of small defences [sic] is found, whether 
surrounding the prude’s virtue or the man of the world’s respectability, there, be sure, it is 
needed” (343). Being “less prone to question” does not mean losing one’s own beliefs. 
Rather, Lucy describes a stance of openness to the other, a recognition that we should be 
less apt to judge just because someone else does not fit into our conceptual categories. 
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What makes the above scenarios from Villette serve as examples of unethical encounters 
is how the characters assume they can, and must, know Lucy. The numerous attempts 
characters make to categorize Lucy demonstrate the unethical assumption that social 
relations require such knowledge to activate sympathy at all.   
  As a last example of the unethical attempt to construct an other’s identity based 
on one’s own experiences, I look at the way Lucy herself responds to other characters. In 
one of the early scenes between Lucy and Polly, Lucy-the-narrator describes three 
different responses to Polly’s sadness when her father leaves her at the Bretton 
household. Mrs. Bretton shed a tear, Dr. John gazed at her, and “I, Lucy Snowe, was 
calm” (25).  Mrs. Bretton arranges her whole world around her son Dr. John, and all of 
her reactions in the novel are a product of her worldview as his mother. It is thus doubtful 
that Mrs. Bretton is really sympathizing with Polly. Rather, she probably equates Polly’s 
feeling of missing her father with her own feelings of missing Graham when he is away; 
she sympathizes by assimilating Polly’s feelings to her own.  Graham’s reaction is of 
another unethical kind, the objectifying gaze. His gaze directly contrasts Mrs. Bretton’s 
tears, which would be understood by a nineteenth-century audience as a mark of 
sympathy (though this is precisely the kind of sympathy Brontë’s novel questions).  
Lucy’s response shows that she does not always approach the other ethically. 
Lucy misreads Polly at first because she assimilates Polly’s emotion into two categories: 
how Lucy expects young girls to act and how Lucy understands her own experience as a 
young child. Lucy overlays her history of emotion onto Polly, “I perceived she endured 
agony” (25). The “I perceive” is very important here, for the description following 
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certainly sounds similar to how Lucy describes her own tormented inner life earlier in the 
novel.  From her retrospective point of view, Lucy-as-narrator recognizes that her 
representation of Polly in this scene merges Polly’s emotional life with Lucy’s own.  
Lucy-as-narrator traces how her younger self, Lucy-as-character, learns to more 
ethically approach Polly in another scene where she forces Lucy to revise her assumption 
that all girls are chatty and shallow (like Genevra). Lucy’s surprise at Polly’s ability to sit 
quietly reveals that Lucy had categorized Polly as she did all young girls (321). Lucy now 
begins to recognize Polly’s emotional responses as different from her own: “the 
peculiarity of this little scene was, that she said nothing: she could feel, without pouring 
out her feelings in a flux of words” (322). Polly’s silence, because it does not fit with 
Lucy’s understanding of young girls, creates a gap that makes Lucy pause and reconsider 
her interpretation of Polly. Lucy’s self-corrective statements create a clear link between 
ethics and interpretative acts, thus pointing to the reader’s own responsibility in the act of 
reading as interpretation. Lucy’s initial misreadings are a rhetorical move that “allows 
two opposing realities to stand” (144), a model that asks readers, Bock argues, to 
recognize “that the reading experience may result, not in a definitive interpretation, but in 
an understanding that encompasses divergent meanings” (147).  This way of reading 
others, modeled in this scene by Lucy-as-character, will become the model the reader 
needs in order to approach the unresolved ending to the novel.   
I turn now to two examples that develop a different pattern for the way Lucy 
interacts with others. In both her relationships with Père Silas and M. Paul she shows a 
greater desire to tell than to be silent. Lucy’s willingness to be known by these two men 
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emerges as she learns that they are willing to engage her without trying to erase her 
difference. The scene of Lucy’s confession to Père Silas, a Catholic priest, much 
discussed by critics in terms of nationalism, sets up an encounter between two people 
who would be perceived in nineteenth-century Britain as having the irreconcilable 
difference of religion. Despite such radical difference, both Lucy and the Priest interact in 
fulfilling and ethical ways. This scene seems anomalous to the rest of the novel because 
Lucy insists on telling her story to the Priest rather than claiming her usual silent space. It 
proves, however, that Lucy desires community; her prior silences do not signify her 
aversion to intimate relationships. Rather, Lucy’s silences single out the kind of 
relationships she desires: those that build from difference rather than erasing it.  
Like her silences, in this instance Lucy uses her voice to disrupt the socially 
scripted confession between priest and parishioner by beginning with the statement “I am 
a Protestant,” which breaks from the proper “formula of confession” and disrupts the 
priest’s ability to go through the confession as a duty of form “with the phlegm of 
custom.” Added to this blunt declaration of difference, Lucy also redefines the 
conventional purpose for confessing. Confession usually signifies that one desires to be 
reinstated within a community by turning from some aberrant behavior. Lucy’s 
confession does not come under this definition; she does not actually need or desire the 
priest’s advice to reform her behavior. What she really wants is the “relief of 
communication in an ear which was human and sentient” (179). Lucy’s purpose and 
opening statement, the Priest tells her, “take me unawares…I have not had such a case as 
yours before: ordinarily we know our routine and are prepared, but this makes a great 
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break in the common course of confession. I am hardly furnished with counsel fitting the 
circumstances” (178-79). The priest has no ready response within his normal horizon of 
understanding those who come to confession.  
Lucy’s approach to Silas not only highlights their difference but also overturns the 
hierarchy of confessor and confessee. This unequal relationship is undermined because 
Silas’s normal horizon of response is disrupted; without the script Silas normally follows, 
he must step down from his role as priest and create another way of interacting with 
Lucy. The encounter moves from the confessor/confessee hierarchy to a more open 
interaction between two people who, once forced to let go of their assumptions, now 
expand their horizon of understanding to create a new narrative about one another, and by 
extension about other religious faiths (not all Catholics are bad, not all Protestants are 
bad). Lucy can now separate her dislike for the Catholic Church and her appreciation for 
the priest of whom she will always “retain a grateful recollection” because he “was kind 
when I needed kindness; he did me good” (180). This confession scene, with all the 
complex meanings that it alludes to, offers the hope that people separated by extreme 
difference can still ethically interact in the way they each approach the other with surprise 
or openness and strive to relate to the individual and not a category.  
 I have been talking so far as though Lucy’s silence provides a complete break 
with social scripts and allows her to easily resist others’ categorization of her. It is not so 
simple of course, and even Lucy realizes the ways in which she is already confined 
within social definitions even in the way she understands herself. When she meets Père 
Silas again some time after the confession scene, he says how jealous he is that she 
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belongs to the Protestants because he recognizes in her the potential for a high “spiritual 
rank” if she were to pass under the “discipline of Rome, moulded by her high training, 
inoculated by her salutary doctrines” (437). Lucy reflects to herself: “I half-realized 
myself in that condition also; passed under discipline, moulded, trained, inoculated, and 
so on” as if she recognizes that despite trying to keep others from fitting her into a mold, 
she is already formed by culture’s requirements. Throughout the novel her inward battles 
take this form: she fights between reason and passion, between society’s requirements of 
her as a woman and her own desires. Indeed, the battle between individual and society 
takes place within Lucy, and she knows it. Her silence may hold social scripts at bay, but 
it does not prevent the struggle against the definitions she desires to throw off. 
 The third and final ethical encounter modeled in the novel takes place between M. 
Paul and Lucy, who gradually fall in love. Although early in their relationship Lucy 
employs the same strategy of silence with M. Paul, once she learns that he respects her 
uniqueness she begins to speak more openly with him. M. Paul becomes the one with 
whom reticent Lucy indulges her desire to tell because she recognizes that he will allow 
their differences to remain. In an important, yet often-neglected scene, M. Paul proves he 
will not try to conform Lucy to his own worldviews by assuring her he does not think 
their opposing religious beliefs are an obstacle to their relationship. Once Lucy candidly 
tells M. Paul she has finally and formally decided that after all her exposure to 
Catholicism she clings more tightly to Protestantism, she thinks this pronouncement will 
end any possibility of a relationship between them: “I had spoken, so declared my faith, 
and so widely severed myself from him I addressed” (467). Throughout the novel she 
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returns again and again to the differences of Protestantism and Catholicism, thinking this 
difference will ultimately keep her and M. Paul apart. M. Paul’s response surprises Lucy, 
then, coming as “an echo responsive, one sweet chord of harmony in two conflicting 
spirits” (467). M. Paul proceeds to affirm each of their separate beliefs, but grasps to the 
one they have in common – the cry “God be merciful to me, a sinner.” M. Paul thus 
emphasizes their common beliefs but without assimilating their differences.5
 The longest part of his speech here, in fact, focuses on how they are different: 
“How seem in the eyes of God who made all firmaments, from whose nostrils issued 
whatever of life is here, or in the stars shining yonder – how seem the difference of man? 
But as Time is not for God, nor Space, so neither is Measure, nor Comparison” (467). 
Because Lucy trusts that M. Paul can love her without confining her within his own 
worldview, he becomes the person to whom she will “tell all.” Yet, the novel does not 
end with the scene of telling in the schoolroom between the two lovers. Rather, we are 
left with no ending at all. It is to the relationship between narrator and reader I now turn 
in an attempt to explain the function of ending with “sunny imaginations” instead of the 
lovers’ scene. 
  
 
Lucy as Narrator: Ethically Reading the “I” of an Other   
The following analysis of Lucy’s silences as a narrator importantly reinterprets 
critical perception of her moments of withholding. Ultimately, I argue that Brontë created 
                                                 
5 Buzard interprets this novel within his study about auto-ethnography in the nineteenth century as a 
critique of self-universalizing mentalities. The fact that M. Paul leaves Lucy’s Protestantism intact and 
even says he loves it in her is a “remarkable passage” for that time and one Buzard uses to show the text’s 
critique of universalizing by applauding Paul’s gesture here (250).  
 
  165 
a narrator-reader relationship that redefines what it means to extend ethical sympathy. 
Lucy’s silences as a narrator critique reading practices in Britain, by showing readers that 
they can never really know her and by extension that they can never really know an other. 
If we accept the positive ramifications of non-recognition, however, then the distance 
maintained between self and other actually creates a more ethical encounter.  Lucy is not 
just a reticent narrator; she is an ethical one who forces readers to acknowledge 
difference. We are not the intimate listeners of Jane Eyre’s “dear reader.” Lucy instead 
insists that we keep her defined as other, that we do not base our sympathy on recognition 
of “you are like me.” Rather, we must learn to sympathize with someone who will always 
remain other to our self, and not only other, but also unknowable. The point, in other 
words, of Lucy’s silences as both character and narrator is to represent what an ethical 
relationship with the other looks like. 
I focus on how Lucy’s silences transform social relationships, a focus necessary 
for understanding her silence as an ethical endeavor. Without this focus on relationships 
in the novel, her silences are more often represented as a skeptical or even cynical 
practice. For example, Carol Bock’s discussion of the novel, though insightful, focuses 
on the interpretative act itself. Bock describes Villette as a novel concerned explicitly 
with the scope and limits of interpretation. My discussion of the novel refocuses the issue 
of interpretation more within relationships, rather than just the act of reading itself. When 
Bock focuses on Lucy-as-character, she also sees Lucy’s “invisibility” as an intentional 
strategy. Bock argues, however, that this strategy results in characters’ inability to decode 
Lucy and thus implies “that interpretation is endlessly creative (and hence never 
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definitive) and entirely futile” (132). Because Bock focuses on the act of interpretation, 
the end result indeed seems futile when interpretation fails to produce truth of some kind. 
I suggest, however, that if we see this failed interpretation as the point, we discover that 
Lucy-as-character uses her invisibility to transform the structure of social relationships.  
An ethical encounter with the other should not begin with attempts to read or to 
interpret, attempts that result most often in misreading or misconstruction. When Bock 
moves to discuss Lucy-as-narrator, she does suggest that in recounting her life story, 
Lucy models the act of interpretation as a reading experience that results “not in a 
definitive interpretation, but in an understanding that encompasses divergent meanings” 
(147). I suggest it is important to place this model of producing “divergent meanings” not 
just within the act of reading, where Bock situates it, but to extend it to social 
relationships. The ethical encounter with the other, Lucy-as-narrator models, should 
include these divergent meanings rather than attempt an interpretation of the other to fit 
our understandings.  
The distance Lucy-as-narrator constructs between herself and the reader, I argue, 
is an important strategy she uses in redefining how one ethically engages with the other. 
Critics who focus on Lucy’s distancing strategy as narrator generally see this as an 
attempt to avoid relationships rather than enhance them. Ivan Kreilkamp argues that the 
association between novel-writing and speech was not always the best strategy for 
women writers. Lucy’s refusal to narrate, then, demonstrates a tactic women could use to 
gain social power, by creating an anonymous or impersonal voice. Kreilkamp 
acknowledges her silence as chosen strategy, but he ascribes a purpose to those silences 
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that focuses on the problem of women’s voice in the Victorian period. Kreilkamp thus 
interprets Lucy’s refusal to narrate the ending as a recognition of the limits of narrative 
and voice. I find this reading symptomatic of most interpretations of the ending of 
Villette, and I would like to propose, instead, that the unresolved ending needs to be read 
as expressing the possibility of narrative rather than its limits. Lucy’s strategy of 
withholding does not emphasize Lucy’s isolation, a “successful but partnerless 
professional” (153). Rather, her withholding is meant to encourage relationship, but to 
encourage a more ethical type of relationship that does not insist on full knowledge of the 
other. This distance created by the unresolved ending, then, emphasizes the need to allow 
multiple interpretations to exist at once, a distance that is therefore positive in its ethical 
implications.  
While many critics interpret Lucy’s silence as desiring distance, they fail to 
recognize that this distance is intended to create a more ethical relationship between self 
and other. Amanda Anderson insightfully reads the detachment in this novel as a critique 
of gender ideologies; the distance Lucy cultivates helps her resist restrictive categories. 
However, Anderson ultimately construes this distance in negative terms, mirroring the 
“forms of surveillance, impersonality, and neutrality that marked Victorian discourses of 
femininity and professionalism” (48). Lucy distances herself from others’ attempts to 
read her, Anderson argues, because she is “wary of the perpetual threat of failed intimacy 
and the acute potential of misrecognition” (48). Recasting her established distance in 
more positive terms, I suggest, helps uncover the way Lucy works to transform 
relationships rather than just resist them.  I argue that Lucy’s rhetorical stance of silence 
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(what Anderson refers to as detachment) illustrates how silence presents an unknowable 
identity that requires sympathetic engagement without the identification that so often 
elides differences into sameness. Therefore, I interpret Lucy’s distancing technique as a 
way to encourage connection between self and other through the positive distance of 
difference.  
Lucy describes the ethical distance between self and other by narrating how her 
own attitude transforms toward audiences. A typical witty and combative exchange 
between M. Paul and Lucy illustrates young Lucy’s approach to an audience of strangers. 
M. Paul tries to irritate her by describing her infatuation with her leading role in the 
upcoming examination day: “So…you will be enthroned like a queen; tomorrow – 
enthroned by my side. Doubtless you savour in advance the delights of your authority. I 
believe I see something radiant in you, you little ambitious woman!” (170). Though she 
does not immediately respond to M. Paul, Lucy corrects his perception for the reader:  
 
Now the fact was, he happened to be entirely mistaken. I did not—could not—
estimate the admiration or the good opinion of to-morrow’s audience at the same 
rate he did. Had that audience numbered as many personal friends and 
acquaintance for me, as for him, I know not how it might have been: I speak of 
the case as it stood . . . He cared for them too much; I, probably, too little. (171)  
 
Lucy cares little for the audience of school children because they are all strangers to her. 
In contrast, she feels M. Paul is too assured of his audience’s good opinion and cares for 
them too much. Lucy’s indifference to her audience results from their relation to her as 
strangers. Considering her position now as narrating her life story to an audience of 
strangers, older Lucy seems to take much more care with how she cultivates the 
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relationship between herself and her readers. M. Paul continues to bait her by referring to 
her “passionate ardour for triumph” when she performed the leading role in the school 
play. Provoked into finally responding, Lucy declares: “I had not the slightest sympathy 
with the audience below the stage. They are good people, doubtless, but do I know them? 
Are they anything to me?” (171).  The narrator, an older Lucy, presents a very different 
way of relating to the audience than we see young Lucy enact in this scene. The 
discussion between M. Paul and Lucy about audiences shows her earlier self’s 
unwillingness to cultivate a relationship with people she does not know. Yet, the very 
way that older Lucy narrates her story, demanding that readers sympathize with her while 
accepting they do not really know her, shows that Lucy herself has learned a more ethical 
way to approach an audience of strangers.  
Brontë uses Lucy as a vehicle to revise the type of narrator she developed in Jane 
Eyre. Jane performs an assumed intimacy with the reader through endearing references to 
“dear” or “my” reader. Lucy from the outset creates distance between herself and the 
reader by refusing to act as the reader’s guide. Instead, Lucy offers multiple 
interpretations of plot situations without suggesting which is the “correct” one. For 
example, when she tries to explain how she felt the first month of her isolation during the 
“long vacation,” she includes a paragraph addressing several kinds of readers (religious, 
moralist, stern sage, stoic, cynic, epicure) who would each have different reactions to her 
feelings. But she says “I accept the sermon, frown, sneer and laugh; perhaps you are all 
right: and perhaps, circumstanced like me, you would have been, like me, wrong” (173). 
Thus, while presenting several interpretations, including her own, Lucy allows for any of 
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them to be true and does not privilege any one over the other. The rhetorical effect of 
continually refusing to choose just one perspective helps readers become more 
comfortable with variant meanings. If Lucy is willing to consider others’ judgments of 
her own situation, then we as readers should not be so quick to fill in her intentional 
silences with our own interpretations.  
 Lucy-the-narrator’s request for readers’ sympathy is at times quite direct. The sort 
of sparring illustrated above in M. Paul and Lucy’s conversation about audiences 
entertains the reader throughout the novel. Lucy-as-narrator indicates she knows that 
readers enjoy these scenes, despite how they might make Lucy-as-character feel. After a 
time of “first-rate humour and spirits” between M. Paul and Lucy, she admits they were 
fighting again soon after: “after all this amiability, the reader will be sorry for my sake to 
hear that I was quarrelling with M. Paul again before night” (364). Lucy here explicitly 
asks the reader to extend sympathy toward her, despite the fact that she knows the reader 
probably enjoys the comedy of their squabbles more than the sedate conversations 
without antagonism. She thus qualifies that the sympathy is “for my sake.” In the interest 
of story, readers might want to see them quarreling again because it is entertaining, but 
she asks us to separate our feelings on the matter for how she must feel about it. This is 
the foundation for ethical sympathy; the sympathy does not have to emerge out of similar 
feelings or self-interest. In this instance, readers can sympathize with Lucy-the-
character’s feelings at fighting again with M. Paul, while still acknowledging the 
enjoyment their sparring adds to the process of reading (though we should be suspicious 
that Lucy actually enjoys sparing with M. Paul also).  
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Just as characters in the novel struggle to define Lucy and must eventually accept 
her unknowable status, the readers of Villette must learn how to show sympathy for the 
narrator without understanding her. My reading of Lucy’s silence as rhetorical strategy 
helps make sense of the beginning and ending in which Lucy-the-narrator intentionally 
withholds any specific information about herself. In the first chapters of the novel, Lucy 
gestures toward the way a reader might construct her according to whatever “amiable 
conjecture” he or she chooses:  
 
It will be conjectured that I was of course glad to return to the bosom of my 
kindred. Well! The amiable conjecture does no harm, and may therefore be safely 
left uncontradicted. Far from saying nay, indeed, I will permit the reader to 
picture me, for the next eight years, as a bark slumbering through halcyon 
weather, in a harbour still as glass…A great many women and girls are supposed 
to pass their lives something in that fashion; why not I with the rest? Picture me 
then idle, basking, plump, and happy, stretched on a cushioned deck, warmed 
with constant sunshine, rocked by breezes indolently soft. (39) 
 
The irony in her statement, created through the hyperbolic picture of an “idle, plump, and 
happy” girl on a “cushioned deck” with “constant sunshine” alerts the reader to the 
insincerity of her suggestion to fill in the gap of her childhood. The reader’s freedom in 
filling in her early years is tempered by this irony as well as the conflicting picture Lucy 
presents just a few lines later “I too well remember a time – a long time, of cold, of 
danger, of contention” (39).  This incongruity forces the reader to acknowledge that if the 
“amiable conjecture” is made, it will be of the reader’s own construction and not a true 
representation of Lucy’s circumstances.  What we desire to hear is how Lucy constructs 
her early years because this tells us something about Lucy. Even if Lucy’s story were 
inaccurate, her telling would illuminate important aspects of her character. She denies us 
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this, however, establishing her unknowability at an early stage in the novel. If the reader 
were to fill in the narrative gap, instead of leaving the story’s possibilities open, the 
narrative would then reflect the reader’s own story and life experience, not Lucy’s. 
Assimilating her identity within the horizon of the reader’s experience closes down the 
possible meanings for Lucy’s story and assigns only one meaning – and that meaning 
comes from the other and not the subject herself.  
 Lucy performs the same rhetorical tactic again at the end of the novel, thwarting 
the fulfillment of our desire to know by denying the reader any real closure: 
 
Here pause: pause at once. There is enough said. Trouble no quiet, kind heart; 
leave sunny imaginations hope. Let it be theirs to conceive the delight of joy born 
again fresh out of great terror, the rapture of rescue from peril, the wondrous 
reprieve from dread, the fruition of return. Let them picture union and a happy 
succeeding life. (546) 
 
Lucy passes no judgment here should the reader decide to provide closure through her 
own “sunny imagination”; however, Lucy’s intentional withholding positions the reader 
to commit a certain violence against the story by ascribing a meaning limited to the 
reader’s own horizon of experience. In a letter to her publisher, George Smith, Brontë 
describes how the ending will be created according to the individual reader:  
 
Drowning and Matrimony are the fearful alternatives. The Merciful – like Miss 
Mulock, Mr. Williams, Lady Harriet St. Clair and Mr. Alexander Frazer – will of 
course choose the former and milder doom – drown him to put him out of pain. 
The cruel-hearted will on the contrary pitilessly impale him on the second horn of 
dilemma – marrying him without ruth or compunction to that – person – that – 
that – individual – ‘Lucy Snowe.’ (55-56) 
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We should not miss Brontë’s ironic humor in this passage by suggesting the cruelest 
ending is marriage, not death. She also leaves out any adjectives in describing Lucy, 
managing to put only vague nouns, “person” and “individual,” before finally casting her 
name in quotation marks. Though she appears unconcerned that others will form an 
ending for her (as her father certainly tried to do), I would suggest that her caustic humor 
here indicates a critical attitude toward the demands of readers that the novel should end 
as they see fit and not as fits the heroine. Creating our own ending limits the text’s 
meaning to one interpretation and situates Lucy’s identity within a category constructed 
by the reader to fit this ending. Lucy resists this unethical construction by leaving the 
ending unresolved. She therefore models the more ethical way readers should encounter 
difference in their own lives: they should resist imposing one way of constructing an 
other’s identity (their way) and instead use the possibility of multiple interpretive 
viewpoints to expand their own horizons of understanding.  
 Lucy’s withholding is thus not simply the result of Brontë’s lack of trust in 
readers as some critics suggest. For example, Bock interprets the novel’s ending as 
another failed moment; like Lucy-the-character fails as “a decoder of signs,” Lucy-the-
narrator fails “in her attempt to elicit from her readers the proper response for 
understanding her encoded tale” (137). She goes on to argue, “Villette thus appears to 
confirm Shirley’s skepticism about the power of readers and storytellers to find truth in 
the fiction-making process” (137). It seems strange, however, to argue that a novel writer 
would ultimately think there is no truth in narrative. Rather than ascribe Lucy’s 
withholding to some mistrust between author and audience, such gaps and silences 
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instead point to a new way of sympathizing across difference that Lucy enacts as both a 
character and a narrator. Rather than just sympathizing with someone we understand, 
whose story we fully comprehend, Lucy wants us to be able to sympathize in spite of (or 
even because of) difference. 
 So how are we to respond ethically to Lucy and her story, avoiding the binary of 
either assimilating her or constructing her as an exotic other? We must follow the third 
way suggested by Lucy’s silences as a character and as a narrator, a strategy for engaging 
the other that begins with recognition of the other as a subject without necessarily seeking 
something of ourselves in the other (7). Leaving the ending of the novel open to multiple 
interpretations in our minds symbolizes our willingness to approach Lucy without 
assimilating her story into our own. To respond ethically to the text, we should not be 
Miss Mulocks or Mr. Frazers; rather, we should listen to how Lucy describes those three 
years building up her school and waiting for M. Paul’s return, acknowledging her as a 
feeling subject without having to understand or agree with her experience.  
Charlotte Brontë invests much of her novel with the desire to tell, but she does so 
primarily through textual silences. Lucy Snowe, both as character and narrator, employs 
silence to resist the identity that others want to assign her. We are not the intimate 
listeners of Jane Eyre’s “dear reader.” Lucy instead insists that readers learn to 
sympathize with someone who remains unknown and thus other to one’s self. The gesture 
towards fulfilling our desire for a happy ending is only just that, an empty gesture that 
turns Lucy’s story into our own construction. If readers impose their own final 
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interpretation, they perform the violence of fashioning her life story to fulfill their own 
desires rather than truly listening to the silence that preserves difference. 
The kind of sympathy Lucy requires sets her apart from other narrators, like those 
described by Carla Kaplan who refuse to narrate an identity to an “unreliable, unworthy, 
or otherwise inadequate” audience (113). I am suggesting that Brontë’s novel, while also 
wanting the audience to recognize difference, more importantly uses Lucy’s role as 
narrator to ask readers to sympathize and receive her story despite these differences. In 
the scene of Lucy telling her story to the Catholic priest, a listener who is most unlike 
herself, Brontë models this third way of sympathizing.  The rhetorical effect of Lucy’s 
silence does not indicate a mistrust of the reader; rather, that distance is intended to enact 
a new way of approaching difference.  Lucy’s silence calls us to acknowledge her 
subjectivity despite the differences that may not allow characters (or readers) to recognize 
her. If an ethical encounter is one where I can express my identity without being confined 
to the other’s categories, then silence, more often than language, offers the best 
opportunity for such an encounter. Silence transforms social relationships by creating the 
ability to sympathize across the space of difference between self and other. 
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CHAPTER V 
LAUGHTER, FORM, AND THE LIMITS OF SYMPATHY  
 
The world is a looking-glass, and gives back to every man the reflection of his 
own face. Frown at it, and it will in turn look sourly upon you; laugh at it and with 
it, and it is a jolly, kind companion. ~ Vanity Fair 17 
 
Gwendolen rather valued herself on her superior freedom in laughing where 
others might only see matter for seriousness.  ~ Daniel Deronda 109 
 
 
In claiming that sympathy could be extended to an unknowable other, Charlotte 
Brontë suggested a radical alteration of nineteenth-century notions of sympathy 
predicated on knowing and understanding the other. In this chapter, I use the discourse 
system of laughter to illustrate the limits of sympathy because laughter itself most often 
resides at the extremes of signaling either sympathy with the other or rejection of the 
other. I explore two laughing heroines, Gwendolen Harleth in Daniel Deronda and Becky 
Sharp in Vanity Fair, who both use laughter to challenge social conventions. Unlike 
Brontë, who suggests the distance that Lucy constructs through her silence is necessary 
for ethical sympathy, George Eliot and William Thackeray cannot link the distance of 
laughter with sympathy in their heroines. Although both Eliot in Daniel Deronda and 
Thackeray in Vanity Fair at times represent ethical laughter in the service of sympathy, 
they ultimately retreat from it as neither can find the right balance between distance and 
sympathy; it would seem that laughter is opposed to sympathy. Part of what obstructs  
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ethical sympathy in these novels, however, is the context of genre; realism and satire, 
born out of certain ideologies and worldviews, present limits to what the ideology of 
sympathy can achieve. Laughter, automatically connected in many ways to satire and 
often overlooked in realism, pushes on the limits of how both forms are able to engage 
with an ethical kind of sympathy. 
In the epigraph above from Vanity Fair, the narrator employs a mirror as 
metaphor, a common device when describing realism as a mirror that reflects truth about 
the world. In this example, however, the reflection is not the world but a narcissistic 
image of himself. The narrator suggests, then, that if one can laugh at oneself the world 
will turn out to be a jolly place. Only this does not exactly hold true when one considers 
where Becky, who laughs all the way through the novel, finally ends up. If laugher is 
aligned with this narcissistic image of seeing only oneself, then can laughter ever produce 
the outward impulse of sympathy? What kind of world does satire construct and how 
does it compare to realism’s vision of the world? These are questions I consider at the 
end of the chapter as I move from the characters’ use of laughter to the ways Eliot and 
Thackeray explore sympathy and ultimately find its limits. Indeed, the kind of sympathy 
Eliot seems to be searching for in Daniel Deronda actually suggests the need for a 
different model of realism than the one predicated on reading-as-knowing. The 
assumptions on which realism and satire are based represent two poles for the unethical 
ways in which self and other can relate. Realism attempts to present the other as 
knowable and thereby requires sympathy to participate in assimilation and 
homogenization of the other’s differences. Satire presupposes a distance that is based on 
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a sense of superiority. This distance, then, prevents the exchange of sympathy by 
maintaining hierarchy and altarity. When sympathy is no longer enough to facilitate an 
ethical encounter between self and other, it is better, I argue, to acknowledge the limits of 
sympathy and to walk away. At the very least, we have preserved the others subjectivity 
and difference. 
Today, popular sayings like “laughter is the best medicine” support customary 
understandings that laughter is a mostly congenial response to a humorous situation, 
though many people also distinguish between laughing with versus laughing at someone. 
Laughter’s effects also depend on who is laughing, as laughter is a clearly gendered 
discourse in the nineteenth century and continues to be so today.1
                                                        
1 Crawford’s essay points out how experimental research in humor studies begins from a biased point of 
view, beginning with categories of the comical based on traditionally male forms of humor. 
 Genial, soft laughter 
(acceptable for women) we associate with building intimacy; this is the laughter we use 
with our friends in support of a joke, statement, or situation. In contrast, loud, raucous 
laughter (not acceptable for women) we associate with alienating someone; this is the 
laughter we use with our enemies to expose them and build ourselves up. The problem 
with the former kind of laughter is the way it usually elides all distance between self and 
other; sympathy extended through this laughter, then, is not really ethical. I do not think, 
however, that we can only laugh sympathetically with those who we presuppose to fully 
know and understand. I identify a third kind of laughter that combines elements of both 
extremes detailed above by employing sympathy at the same time that it maintains the 
distance that enables important distinctions between self and other to remain. In this 
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chapter, I focus on the laughter of incongruity as offering the best model for ethically 
engaging the other.  
My claim for the place of sympathy within the laughter of incongruity rests on the 
effect of laughter; more than just incite characters or readers to laugh for the sake of 
release, laughter is meant to expose the unethical practice that rejects disparate views and 
insists on normative practices. This exposure, and the opening up to alternative ways of 
viewing the world, is the ethical value in the laughter of incongruity. In The Victorian 
Comic Spirit: New Perspectives, Jennifer Wagner-Lawlor asserts “humorous and comic 
representations function politically by revealing contradictions in ideological discourses, 
by exposing repressed illogicalities and prejudices, by way of irony or ridicule, attendant 
to nineteenth-century ideologies of gender, class, race, nationalism” (xvi). Laughter is not 
just a response to humorous situations, as Wagner-Lawlor asserts; it can expose 
contradictions in ideologies that oppress certain populations. One of the ideological 
discourses it can disrupt, I suggest, is the dominant narrative that sympathy must be 
predicated on understanding. Laughter can work in the service of sympathy by 
transforming hostile differences formed on the basis of prejudices and “repressed 
illogicalities” into a distance that respectfully recognizes difference by allowing 
contradictions, when they arise, to remain in place.  
In order to uncover the way laughter can produce ethical sympathy, I explore 
laughter as a discourse system in two novels. Characters within Vanity Fair and Daniel 
Deronda use laughter as a communicative act. When Becky and Miss Crawley laugh 
together, they express their superiority over other people at the parties they attend while 
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simultaneously communicating a common bond with one another because they share this 
sense of superiority. Laughter as a communicative act can be misconstrued, as often 
happens between Gwendolen and Grandcourt. In one of the few instances when 
Gwendolen laughs in Grandcourt’s presence, she means to be playful and flirty, but he 
misinterprets her laughter as an expression of disdain. The narrator’s role becomes 
important in ensuring the reader properly interprets instances of laughter, even when the 
characters do not. I primarily focus on the narrator in Vanity Fair, examining how the 
narrator uses laughter as a rhetorical technique to manipulate the distance between the 
reader and the character, drawing attention to gaps in the text that create the laughter of 
incongruity.  Laughter is also a narrative technique used by Thackeray and Eliot to draw 
attention to the incongruities in life; Eliot attempts to propose sympathy as the solution, 
but she finds sympathy cannot resolve the extreme differences inherent in the complex 
interiorities of her characters in Daniel Deronda. Thackeray encourages the reader to 
adopt an array of perspectives presented by the narrator, but this acceptance of open-
endedness does not increase the reader’s sympathy for characters.  
In claiming laughter as a communicative act, rhetorical technique, and narrative 
technique, I am working from the assumption that laughter is not just a physiological 
response; that one can control what one laughs at and when. As a type of discourse, 
laughter communicates individual and group identity and works to negotiate those 
identities. In Laughter in Interaction, Phillip Glenn claims, “laughing contributes to the 
ongoing creation of meaning, self, relationship, society, and culture” (3). While laughter 
can also contribute to the creation of unethical relationships, such as the hierarchical 
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relationships established through the laughter of superiority, the effect of the laughter of 
incongruity encourages a more positive view of difference that allows various viewpoints 
to coexist. This laughter forms an important contrast to the usual tendency to create 
unsympathetic barriers between the self’s perspective and the other’s perspective. I first 
contextualize the laughter in these two novels by discussing how laughter was 
constructed in the nineteenth century, and then further develop a definition of the laughter 
of incongruity by examining some recent theories about laughter that I find essential for 
re-conceptualizing laughter to enable ethical sympathy. I then turn to Daniel Deronda 
and Vanity Fair to trace the way each of these novels expose the limits of sympathy as it 
pushes against extreme difference and the form of the novel itself. 
 
Theorizing Laughter  
Although common perceptions of Victorians construe the period as repressed and 
somber, the tensions of modernity often produced a comic view of the world. Peter 
Berger theorizes that the modern spirit encourages a comic perception because:  
 
Modernity pluralizes the world. It throws together people with different values 
and different worldviews; it undermines taken-for-granted traditions; it 
accelerates all processes of change. This brings about a multiplicity of 
incongruities – and it is the perception of incongruence that is at the core of the 
comic experience. (202)  
 
According to Berger, the comedy emerging from modernity is produced out of 
contradictions; Berger’s observations thus identify incongruity as the primary source for 
laughter. There were other kinds of laughter recognized in the Victorian period, of 
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course. In fact, there are three main theories that converge in nineteenth-century accounts 
of laughter. The oldest and possibly most popular theory of laughter, the theory of 
superiority, descends from Aristotle to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’s theory is best 
summarized by the often-cited quotation: “Laughter is a sudden glory arising from the 
sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of 
others, or with our own formerly” (46). Superiority theories of laughter tend to emphasize 
its disciplinary effect to corral people into socially normative behavior. As a critique of 
Hobbes, the theory of incongruity emerges in the eighteenth century largely through the 
philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer. Andrew Stott argues this shift 
makes sense alongside the privileging of wit in the eighteenth century as a form of humor 
that delights in exposing incongruities (136-137). Finally, the relief theory also enters 
discussions of laughter in the nineteenth century through Herbert Spencer and Sigmund 
Freud. They saw laughter as “a symptom of division and struggle within the self, 
recognition, as it were, of incongruous selfhood” (Stott 138). In light of Freud’s other 
theories, in particular the way he popularized notions of Victorian sexual repression, one 
can see how Freud would view laughter as the release of repressed tensions.  
What my brief historical survey demonstrates is that no single theory can explain 
laughter. Laughter itself is paradoxical and dependent on social contexts; these two facts 
should encourage studies of laughter to acknowledge the multiplicity of motives for 
laughing and the variety of work laughter accomplishes. While acknowledging laughter’s 
diversity, I limit the focus of this chapter to the laughter produced out of the context of 
incongruity, both because, as Berger states above, it seems most fitting to the modern 
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world view emerging in the nineteenth century, and because I find the laughter of 
incongruity theory resonates most deeply with my exploration of laughter producing an 
ethical distance between self and other. Like the other discourse systems in this study, 
laughter is inflected by gender, particularly because of my focus on the incongruities 
exposed by laughter, incongruities experienced most strongly by disempowered groups 
like women. A woman who laughed in the nineteenth century took greater risks than a 
laughing man, namely for the social injunctions against women laughing. In fact, for a 
woman to laugh uproariously was sure to gain her the label of madness and turn her into 
a hysteric.2
What one chooses to laugh at usually conveys a lot about one’s beliefs and values. 
A person who tends to laugh at incongruity exhibits what John Marmysz calls the 
“humorist attitude”:  “What is central in the humorist attitude is not the discovery of 
some solution to an apparent incongruity but rather the openness involved in surveying 
incongruities from a variety of perspectives and taking pleasure in the process along the 
way” (154).  What makes the laughter of incongruity ethical is that the central aim, as 
Marmysz claims, is not to resolve the incongruities but to take pleasure in “surveying” 
multiple viewpoints. Laughter produces sympathy when it recognizes different 
perspectives but does not necessarily feel compelled to pick one. Not resolving 
 If she were not labeled mad, then a witty woman’s chastity could be 
questioned, just as we see the uncertainty revolving around Gwendolen’s and Becky’s 
virtue.  
                                                        
2 Suggestive of Gregg Camfield’s title, Necessary Madness, women who demonstrated wit, and the 
aggressive behavior linked to it, were popularly considered to be psychologically disturbed. Barreca also 
points to the perceived danger of women engaging in humor, the resulting construction resting on the 
“figure of the hysteric” (31-32). Gillooly traces the historical trend of the hysterical woman in her book 
(see pages 32-38).  
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incongruities does not mean laughter ignores them; on the contrary, laughter draws 
attention to those incongruities, but for the purpose of allowing additional perspectives to 
arise. When a social norm or category clashes with the way we actually experience the 
other, we are forced to re-evaluate our interpretive lens, in essence creating a new way of 
viewing the other and the world. This is the value of humor, as Gregg Camfield claims: 
“(humor) juxtaposes ostensibly incompatible systems of thought to inspire a different 
order of viewing” (xi). While Camfield argues that all forms of humor work by 
contrasting two different views, I focus on the laughter of incongruity as having the 
particular effect of creating distance between self and other.  
I am concerned to show not just how laughter produces sympathy, but how it 
must also produce distance. There are some forms of laughter, like the sentimental, that 
seem easily aligned with sympathy. In her study of humor in nineteenth-century British 
fiction, Eileen Gillooly argues that “feminine humor” has the potential to build 
sympathetic identification, rather than create distance between humorist and object like 
most other forms of humor.3
                                                        
3 I am uncomfortable with suggesting that the laughter of incongruity is the special province of women or 
the “feminine,” though many critics make this connection because women experience firsthand the 
incongruity of life. For example, in her essay “The Divided Lives of Women in Literature,” Pope says 
much of women’s humor is based on “the incongruity between the inner and outer self, between reality as 
women perceive it and the myths of male superiority” (qtd. in Unger 23). As I will show in my discussion 
of Vanity Fair, a male writer can also recognize the incongruity of women’s inner lives and what society 
requires of them. Rather than gendering the laughter itself, I recognize the historical practice of applying 
gender to categories of laughter, but in my own analysis I posit the laughter of incongruity as ungendered.  
 While Gillooly draws important connections between 
laughter and sympathy, I extend her discussion to include loud, raucous, or otherwise 
“unfeminine” laughter. I argue that the distance emerging from eruptions of laughter is 
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necessary to the kind of sympathy that can be used to formulate ethical relationships.4
Laughter does not have to be congenial, familiar, or sentimental in order to 
produce sympathy. The laughter of incongruity relies on a certain attitude toward 
difference rather than a certain quality of the laugh itself. To reveal unethical practices of 
relating to the other may, in fact, require raucous laughter, such as the kind Diane Davis 
discusses in her book Breaking Up at Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter. Davis makes an 
important contribution to recent theories of laughter because, unlike Gillooly, she argues 
for the importance of laughter that is loud and disruptive. This kind of laughter, Davis 
contends, has the ability to break apart categories that we cling to so insistently in order 
to make meaning out of our experiences. The most ethical moments of relating to the 
other, Davis suggests, may occur where laughter resides in the gaps and fissures beyond 
 
Ronald De Sousa helps explain how the distance created by laughter can produce 
sympathy. He suggests that the usual pairing of detachment-with-alienation and 
identification-with-engagement does not always coincide. One can be engaged with 
someone radically different, he says, and one can act in a detached manner within an 
intimate relationship (Morreall 238). This is important for my purposes in delineating 
laughter that creates distance and sympathy at the same time. I am proposing the most 
ethical kind of sympathy is that which occurs through detached identification, precisely 
what laughter creates.  
                                                        
4 I do not think that feminine strategies of laughter include only the gentle, sympathetic sort explored by 
Gillooly. To her study we must also add the kind of feminine humor Barreca focuses on. She argues that 
characteristics of women’s comedy include the use of humor to destroy social order. She wants to thwart 
the view that women’s humor is “gentle, subtle, and reconciling;” instead, she argues women’s laughter is 
not a safety valve but inflammatory; it is not used to purge desire and frustration but to transform those 
frustrations into action (7).  
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linguistic expression, helping to create identities that are not subject to strict discursive 
categories. Social, economic, and institutional forces work to solidify the fluidity created 
in the excesses of meaning, but it is precisely these excesses, in the form of incongruities, 
that laughter exposes. Davis’s emphasis on disruptive laughter highlights the productive 
work of the laughter that Gwendolen and Becky employ, a laughter that defies the social 
norm of polite, feminine laughter and exposes restrictive norms.   
Laughter thus offers the possibility of creating a sympathetic distance rather than 
an alienating distance. Stuart Tave makes this kind of distinction between sentimental 
and satirical humor, identifying “amiable humor” as inhabiting a middle ground:  
 
To make a general distinction, amiable humor measured reality not, as the satirist 
tends, by an ideal against which reality is terribly wanting, nor did it, in the 
manner of the sentimentalist, deny or falsify the gap between the real and the 
ideal. It accepted the difference with a liberal tolerance, or unlike both satirist and 
sentimentalist, it found the ideal in the varied fullness of the real with all its 
imperfections. (166-67)  
 
Tave’s term “amiable humor” reflects the attitude that produces the laughter of 
incongruity.  His description mirrors my earlier discussion of the two extremes we most 
often associate with laughter: either the laughter is sympathetic but limited to those who 
we intimately identify with through sameness, or the laughter constructs barriers because 
of the gap found between self and other (or in Tave’s terms between ideal and real). The 
third alternative, what Tave describes as a “liberal tolerance” toward difference, does not 
choose one particular norm or category in order to relieve the tension of incongruity. 
When laughter identifies disparate categories of reality and allows those categories to 
coexist, then the distance between the self and other that clings to each category becomes 
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less threatening. It is not a matter of whose reality will win out (the aim of the laughter of 
superiority), but becomes instead a search for ways of reordering the world to include 
new realities.  
To clarify what I mean by incongruity in the phrase “the laughter of incongruity,” 
I mean laughter in the presence of conflicting realities. The laughter of incongruity is one 
way to respond to the gaps created by conflicting norms that guide our understanding of 
reality. Kant, one of the founding theorists of the incongruity theory of laughter, 
highlights the role of understanding in laughter: “in everything that is to excite a lively 
convulsive laugh there must be something absurd (in which the understanding, therefore, 
can find no satisfaction)” (qtd. in Bussie 13). In short, laughter exposes the limits of 
understanding and requires a certain amount of flexibility in adapting our horizon of 
understanding as we reach its limits.  I suggest this is why the narrator aligns our 
sympathies with Becky in Vanity Fair. The narrator describes his Becky Puppet as 
“uncommonly flexible in the joints” (6).  This kind of flexibility is precisely the attitude 
needed to recognize and respond appropriately to incongruity. Marmysz writes that the 
humorist stance relies on creative flexibility:  
 
The humorist attitude, in fact, is that distinctly human capacity that enables us to 
actively interpret incongruity in terms of amused pleasure rather than painful 
anxiety. A humorous attitude encourages us to linger in contemplation of various 
incongruities and to consider them from a variety of differing angles, or 
perspectives. (124)  
 
We can see this flexible response in the way that Becky responds when she and Rawdon 
are denied any inheritance from his aunt.  They are expecting the envelope left them to 
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contain a large sum of money, and Becky laughs when Rawdon opens it to find a mere 
twenty pounds. Who knows what various perspectives Becky considered here (and we 
probably should suspect she was at the center of each perspective), what we do know is 
that her laugh is evidence of her ability to take “amused pleasure” instead of “painful 
anxiety” at the incongruity of her expectations and the actual contents of the envelope.    
When laughter exposes the limitations of a social norm or worldview, it creates 
the need for alternative worldviews. Indeed, it is the presence of marginal realities that 
causes Berger to label laughter (with delight) as dangerous in the way it produces 
“ecstasies” that provide a way of “standing outside ordinary reality,” a position of danger 
for how it undermines social order (207). He describes the comic as an intrusion into the 
reality of life, a reality constituted by the social order that “envelops the individual in a 
web of habits and meanings that are experienced as self-evidently real” (65). Mikhail 
Bakhtin, also writing about laughter’s effect of producing alternative worldviews, 
explores the medieval and renaissance carnival traditions as a moment where laughter 
creates a counterworld: “[medieval laughter] builds its own world versus the official 
world, its own church versus the official church, its own state versus the official state” 
(88). This carnival atmosphere, for Bakhtin, is “a peculiar point of view relative to the 
world; the world is seen anew” (66). Bakhtin points to the power of laughter not just to 
interrupt reality but also to suggest a new way of viewing reality. The laughter of 
incongruity produces carnival within the daily realities of life.  
The main effect of ethical laughter, then, exposes incongruities to open the 
possibility for alternative worldviews. This points to another important component of 
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ethical laughter: the object of the laughter should be institutions, not people. The laughter 
most often used by nineteenth-century women, as Regenia Gagnier suggests, was aimed 
at institutions and systems, not at individuals. This is a crucial distinction, for my 
purposes, between laughter that employs sympathy and laughter with a more malicious 
intent. It is also a crucial distinction for laughter that accomplishes the transformation of 
social relationships. Women’s laughter “had socio-behavioral implications for exploring 
difference rather than merely disparaging it,” Gagnier claims, “and for prolonged critical 
action rather than momentary release” (138). Through their novels, Eliot and Thackeray 
show they recognize the unethical potential of both sympathy and laughter. They each 
attempt in different ways, however, to use laughter to facilitate an ethical distance 
between self and other, and therefore produce sympathy that could transform social 
relationships. 
 
The Loss of Laughter and the Limits of Sympathy: The Absorption of Selves in 
Daniel Deronda 
 
In her last novel, George Eliot introduces more barriers to sympathy than she 
tackled in her previous novels. Whether she set out to test the limits of sympathy or not, 
by choosing to construct a relationship between an English woman and a Jewish man, she 
establishes an acute sense of difference between two complex subjectivities. In what I see 
as an admission of the failure of sympathy, Eliot actually splits laughter and sympathy 
between two characters: Gwendolen embodies the spirit of laughter and Daniel Deronda 
embodies the spirit of sympathy. However, the novel does not present him as the positive 
antithesis to Gwendolen’s wit. Deronda’s sympathy misses the essential distance that 
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Gwendolen’s laughter produces. Her laughter, I argue, marks the distinction from her 
earlier ability to keep the distance of difference and her later attempts to assimilate 
herself into Deronda’s experience. In other words, laughter in this novel gives one the 
ability to maintain an ethical distance.5
Gwendolen stands out among Eliot’s other heroines as a woman “daring in 
ridicule” (88) with “a keen sense of absurdity in others” (74). She does not have 
Dorothea’s martyr spirit, Maggie’s loyalty, or Dinah’s faithfulness. However, unlike the 
narrator of Vanity Fair, Eliot’s narrator in Daniel Deronda rarely laughs at characters and 
rarely encourages the reader to laugh. Within the context of this rather serious and tragic 
novel, it may seem odd that Eliot creates her only witty heroine.
  
6
                                                        
5Doyle identifies distance as the primary rhetorical technique of Eliot’s fiction. Distance, she says, is the 
“precise degree of the reader’s involvement with or detachment from a character.” The function of rhetoric 
in the novels is to control the kind and amount of sympathy given to each character (8). Doyle’s connection 
between distance and sympathy is important for my project, though I identify laughter as the primary 
rhetorical device to create distance in Daniel Deronda.  
 This serious context 
offers a good moment to see laughter occur in response to non-comedic situations.  
Gwendolen does not laugh spontaneously or with delight; she uses laughter for rhetorical 
purposes, particularly aimed to expose false norms and to attempt her own subversion of 
them by living as she pleases. Ultimately, Gwendolen falls into the category of the witty 
woman demonized because she laughs freely. The erasure of Gwendolen’s laughter is 
 
6 Indeed, for some it may seem odd to associate laughter at all with Eliot’s work. One of Eliot’s 
biographers, G.W. Cooke, says “she is too much in sympathy with human nature to laugh at its follies and 
its weaknesses. . . the foibles of the world she cannot treat in the vein of the satirist.” Russell says this could 
only be true if the only type of satire was Juvenalian or Popeian, and proposes a new view of satire that 
mixes intellectualism and tragedy, within which the form of Eliot’s work fits comfortably (281). See also 
Jenkins. 
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one way that Eliot represents the limits of sympathy within the realist mode that desires 
to resolve the tensions of incongruity rather than imagine a world where they coexist.  
Eliot seemed to believe in the ability to sympathize with people who were 
different from oneself or even to sympathize with people one had never met:  
 
Through my union and fellowship with the men and women I have seen, I feel a 
like, though fainter, sympathy with those I have not seen; and I am able to live in 
imagination with the generations to come, that their good is not alien to me, and is 
a stimulus to me to labour for ends which may not benefit myself, but will benefit 
them. (Essays 201)  
 
She seems less sure of this assumption when she actually tests it out in her fiction and 
creates a Jewish character, in many ways epitomized as other in the Victorian period.7
                                                        
7 Eliot’s use of Jewish characters forms the basis for the problem of radical difference she engages with in 
this novel. For more on the critical conversation surrounding Eliot’s exploration of “The Jewish Question” 
see Himmelfarb, Mahawatte, Smith, Levenson, and Alexander. 
 
The definition of sympathy that emerges through Eliot’s work reaches its limits, Ellen 
Argyros suggests, in Daniel Deronda. Argyros describes Eliot’s sympathy as beginning 
with “a kind of imaginative transportation beyond the boundaries of self” and then 
moving to “a recognition of the differences between self and other” and finally arriving at 
“an identification between self and other that leads one to take action on behalf of that 
other” (1-2). Eliot shows Deronda’s desire to “take action” for Gwendolen, but this desire 
falls short when he cannot find some way to identify with her. Argyros claims Eliot’s 
sympathy thus reveals a paradox: she desires “to respectfully recognize difference while 
at the same time resolving or transcending it” (145). By the time she writes Daniel 
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Deronda, Eliot realizes that we cannot always understand the other and that it may be 
presumptuous to think we can (146).8
While Argyros focuses on the revelation of limits through the rivalry that exists 
between females in Eliot’s novel, I suggest one can also see these limits expressed in the 
way Eliot split the qualities of ethical sympathy between two characters: Gwendolen’s 
laughter enables her to maintain the needed distance between self and other, and 
Deronda’s willingness to explore the viewpoint of another enables him to respond with 
sympathy. Each character, however, pushes these various positions to a logical extreme, 
so that Gwendolen never learns to recognize the other’s subject position, only her own, 
and Deronda never learns to recognize his own subject position, only the other’s. In both 
cases, the distance between self and other collapses.  
   
In order to understand how Gwendolen uses laughter, we must first outline her 
general outlook on the world. We are invited to read her as a flawed, egotistical 
character; the reader’s introduction to her occurs in Book One entitled “The Spoiled 
Child.” Gwendolen’s desire to be the center of attention certainly complicates the strong 
sense of self she uses to maintain distance from others. Yet, I would like to suggest that 
Eliot’s exploration of this confidence in self is meant to demonstrate the necessary 
                                                        
8 Many other critics echo Argyros’s theory that Eliot’s conception of sympathy changes over time. See, for 
example, Jackson. Although Argyros does not use Silas Marner, one can place it on a similar trajectory 
according to her assertion that Middlemarch, written around the same time, is her most optimistic work on 
what sympathy can achieve. I would add a caveat to that trajectory by pointing out that in my analysis of 
Silas Marner I showed how Eliot kept Marner’s difference in tact to the degree that the villagers still 
thought he was strange. Their ability to sympathize with him came along with his involvement within the 
community, beginning with the sharing of his story. Silas Marner bears some difference then, to Argyros’s 
assertion that the only way Eliot achieved sympathetic identification in Middlemarch was by suppressing 
the subjectivity of the characters. It seems to me that while Marner certainly refashions his identity because 
he cannot recuperate his history, this does not mean he loses the sense of his self, or that the reader no 
longer recognizes what is distinct about Marner.  
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quality of sympathy that Deronda, Gwendolen’s foil, lacks.  She laughs often early in the 
novel, but her laughter almost completely disappears after her marriage. This has much to 
do, I suggest, with how her worldview changes as she loses her sense of independence. 
Before her marriage she sees much promise in the world because the possibilities for her 
own place in society seem open to a great many choices. As those choices begin to close 
down, first with Klesmer’s view that she cannot be a singer or actress and then with her 
marriage to Grandcourt, Gwendolen loses the hope of choice and begins to feel trapped in 
a life where she is insignificant. The problem is that Gwendolen loses her sense of 
absurdity when she loses control of her life through an oppressive marriage. She no 
longer laughs at disappointed expectations, she only feels subjugated by them. 
Many critics interpret Gwendolen’s laughter as that of ridicule or superiority.9
                                                        
9 For example, in showing Gwendolen’s lack of any ability to sympathize with those different from herself 
During says that “her habitual response to the accidents of others was laughter” (78). 
 
Her sense of the absurd in life, however, helps underscore how she laughs at social norms 
more than individuals, recognizing the world is not fair in its representation of people. 
For example, when Gwendolen laughs at Rex’s broken bones, she does not laugh at Rex 
himself, but the absurd picture conjured by her Uncle’s explanation of the accident. 
When her uncle describes just how Rex fell off his horse the “descriptive suggestions in 
the latter part of her uncle’s speech” made Gwendolen’s “features less manageable than 
usual; the smiles broke forth, and finally a descending scale of laughter” (109). Both her 
uncle and her mother chastise her for laughing at another’s misfortune, but the narrator 
provides the reader with additional insight into Gwendolen’s motives: “Gwendolen rather 
valued herself on her superior freedom in laughing where others might only see matter 
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for seriousness. Indeed, the laughter became her person so well that her opinion of its 
gracefulness was often shared by others” (109). The narrator describes Gwendolen’s 
laughter as a rhetorical stance toward situations, not something aimed specifically at 
people. Indeed, although her Uncle outwardly chastises her, he inwardly admires her 
humorous attitude: “no wonder a boy should be fascinated by this young witch.” His 
admiration is tempered by using a typical label for a witty woman, calling her a witch and 
affirming the inappropriateness of this kind of forwardness in a woman “who, however, 
was more mischievous than could be desired” (109). This example illustrates how 
Gwendolen’s laughter is often aimed at society’s sense of propriety, and how such 
expectations often make humans look ridiculous when they fail to uphold the standards of 
a gentleman or lady. She may feel superior in her ability to laugh at Rex’s situation, but it 
is not the laughter of superiority where she intends to lower Rex in the eyes of herself or 
his family.  
Gwendolen’s laughter does lack one important quality: she has trouble laughing at 
herself. Just as laughter establishes important distance between self and other, it can also 
produce necessary distance from oneself. Distance from the self helps create the 
awareness that identity, including one’s own, is situated within a complex nexus of social 
categories. Gwendolen struggles to laugh at herself when Klesmer criticizes her singing 
skills, which she prizes highly. The narrator shows us her inward battle to conquer her 
feelings and somehow find humor in them:  
 
Gwendolen, in spite of her wounded egoism, had fullness of nature enough to feel 
the power of this playing, and it gradually turned her inward sob of mortification 
into an excitement which lifted her for the moment into a desperate indifference 
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about her own doings, or at least a determination to get a superiority over them by 
laughing at them as if they belonged to somebody else. (80)  
 
For Gwendolen to laugh, she must go through the exercise of projecting her feelings 
away from herself so that it feels like she is laughing at someone else rather than herself. 
She has a much easier time laughing at herself when she finds some ground for feeling 
superior to others: “Klesmer’s verdict on her singing had been an easier joke to her since 
he had been struck by her plastik” (137). Obviously Gwendolen, like Darcy in Pride and 
Prejudice, has not fully learned to laugh at herself. Distance from the self can produce a 
better understanding of identity and the way one’s actions become implicated in social 
norms. Because Gwendolen does not have this distanced perspective, the tenuous hold on 
her identity demands that she constantly maintain a sense of superiority, marked by her 
laughter. It also means that her identity is vulnerable to consumption, an attribute 
Grandcourt finds irresistible.  
Ultimately, laughter fails to maintain Gwendolen’s independence as her marriage 
subsumes her identity. Grandcourt’s strange power over Gwendolen stops her laughter 
even early in their relationship. He walks with her in complete silence at a ball for some 
time, a situation Gwendolen finds funny, and yet she does not laugh:  
 
If the situation had been described to Gwendolen half an hour before, she would 
have laughed merrily at it, and could only have imagined herself returning a 
playful, satirical answer. But for some mysterious reason – it was a mystery of 
which she had a faint wondering consciousness – she dared not be satirical: she 
had begun to feel a wand over her that made her afraid of offending Grandcourt. 
(158)  
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Although Gwendolen does not seem fully aware of her hesitancy to laugh, her mother 
immediately notices Gwendolen’s “marked abstinence from satirical observations” about 
Grandcourt (167). When they go walking again together, this time outside, Grandcourt 
makes an observation so funny in its obtuseness that the narrator wonders “how was it 
that Gwendolen did not laugh? She was perfectly silent, holding up the folds of her robe 
like a statue, and giving a harder grasp to the handle of her whip” (171). As Gwendolen 
weighs whether or not to marry him, the narrator points specifically to her lack of 
laughter: “how was it that he caused her unusual constraint now? – that she was less 
daring and playful in her talk with him than with any other admirer she had known?” 
(173).  
Judith Wilt traces the typical comic figure she labels the Matriarch, a woman who 
laughs at men but does not subvert her own position within a patriarchal society.  She is 
“committed to small revelations and large reconciliations” (176). In contrast, the laughter 
of the maiden figure “expresses, rather than represses…exposes and deflates… finding no 
role in the world which totally satisfies her. She hesitates, laughing, at the edge, 
withholding fertility, humility, community” (179-180). In her discussion of Daniel 
Deronda, Wilt argues Gwendolen’s laughter “is her way of keeping her space free from 
the intrusions of those who think it their right to intrude upon the maiden – the matriarchs 
and the males” (184). This is the distance I argue laughter creates, the ethical distance 
that allows the uniqueness of subjectivity to thrive. This uniqueness of identity is slowly 
“battered” and “blunted” by Grandcourt (Wilt 186).  
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Once situated in an oppressive marriage, Gwendolen’s worldview can no longer 
bear the heightened tension of her broken expectations because she no longer recognizes 
the distance between herself and others; she loses her sense of self within her marriage, 
mirrored by her loss of laughter. She still recognizes general maxims as ridiculous, such 
as her Uncle’s reliance on stereotypical views of marriage, but rather than laugh she sees 
it as tragic: “To Gwendolen the whole speech had the flavour of bitter comedy. If she had 
been merry, she must have laughed at her uncle’s explanation to her that he had not heard 
Grandcourt express himself very fully on politics. And the wife’s great influence! 
General maxims about husbands and wives seemed now of a precarious usefulness” 
(611).  
The reader further witnesses this change in her attitude during a conversation with 
Deronda when she admits to him the world seems like “a dance set beforehand. I seem to 
see all that it can be – and I am tired and sick of it. And the world is all confusion to me’ 
– she made a gesture of disgust. ‘You say I am ignorant. But what is the good of trying to 
know more, unless life were worth more?” (507). Once Gwendolen has lost her 
humorous worldview and the ability to laugh at incongruities, Deronda enters her life and 
becomes, for Gwendolen, the image of a savior. Deronda is described throughout the 
novel as having an uncommon capacity to sympathize: “Deronda’s conscience included 
sensibilities beyond the common, enlarged by his early habit of thinking himself 
imaginatively into the experience of others” (570). Deronda’s innate ability to sympathize 
is implicitly connected to his ability to leave interpretation open. The novel begins by 
constrating Gwendolen’s assumption that her viewpoint is always correct and Deronda’s 
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ability to leave interpretation open. As Deronda stares at her, Gwendolen interprets his 
gaze as “looking down on her as an inferior,” and never considers another possible 
meaning (38).  In contrast, Deronda mentally asks a series of questions about Gwendolen 
that he leaves unanswered “Was she beautiful or not beautiful? And what was the secret 
of form or expression which gave the dynamic quality to her glance?” (35). The novel 
praises characters who recognize the fallibility of interpretation. By the novel’s end, 
however, even Deronda will fail in this area. 
The sympathetic impulse in Deronda gives him the ability “to read events and 
characters in terms of their own being, rather than as reflections of his own desires” 
(Jackson 233). This reading-as-knowing motif, Tony Jackson argues, determines how 
characters interpret the world. Daniel Deronda is presented as a “right reader,” one who 
adapts “his horizon to allow for others as others” (63). Deronda’s sympathetic nature, 
manifested through such reading practices (of people and texts) is contrasted with 
misreaders, like Mordecai, who attempt “to fit people and events into his interpretive 
horizon” (63). Deronda proves to be a good reader because he has the skill that 
Gwendolen lacks, described by Jackson as “the ability to alter his interpretive horizon 
when confronted with a new human text” (49). Through the metaphor of reading, this 
novel emphasizes one of realism’s tenets, the ability to know the other’s perspective.  The 
emphasis on knowing becomes, however, the challenge and failure of sympathy. 
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Deronda’s desire to know, his sympathy, always seems tainted by the danger of 
too much understanding.10
 
 Because it was Deronda’s “habitual disposition that he should 
meet rather than resist any claim on him in the shape of another’s need,” his sympathy, 
particularly when enacted toward Mordecai, tends to result in losing his own sense of self 
in the other (551). Unlike Gwendolen, who has no trouble distinguishing herself from 
others, Deronda has never established a sense of self apart from others:  
A too reflective and diffusive sympathy was in danger of paralyzing in him that 
indignation against wrong and that selectness of fellowship which are the 
conditions of moral force. . . what he most longed for was either some external 
event, or some inward light, that would urge him into a definite line of action, and 
compress his wandering energy. (413) 
 
Deronda’s enlarged capacity for sympathy has the negative side effect of hindering him 
from specific action. Daniel’s failing could be seen, then, as lacking the individuality that 
contributes to one’s place in a community; if one can be anybody, then one is effectually 
nobody: “the radically sympathetic man, who lacks grounding either in an organically 
unified community or in some absolute belief, such a man has failed to find the evidence 
to prove his individuality” (Jackson 53). Jackson proposes Eliot cannot accept this model 
of an other-centered, self-relativized character because she believes people must be 
connected to a community or an absolute belief to have an identity (237).  
                                                        
10 This novel points out the dangers of sympathy: the erasure of difference, of borders between self and 
other. During says “The action of sympathy fills up all the empty spaces where private subjectivity might 
come to exist. The object enjoying the sympathy is encouraged to think that the sympathizer truly ‘lives’ in 
them. And this has the effect of making it very difficult for the dynamic of sympathy to be reciprocal” (77). 
Deronda might represent sympathy, but During argues that Gwendolen’s “moral significance” in the novel 
is ambiguity: “In the story this novel tells, ambiguity – or being difficult to read – is also the heroine’s final 
performance…she is at least framed, rather than annihilated, by solitude” (73). 
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Rather than Deronda lacking connection to others, I suggest instead that he is too 
connected. By splitting laughter and sympathy between two characters, Eliot 
demonstrates what happens when there is no balance between totally distancing self and 
other or totaling subsuming self and other. Deronda’s sympathy fails because it is always 
based on understanding, which requires blending the identity of self and other. As the 
narrator explains, sympathy becomes neutralized when it depends solely on 
understanding:  
 
[Deronda’s] imagination had so wrought itself to the habit of seeing things as they 
probably appeared to others, that a strong partisanship, unless it were against an 
immediate oppression, had become an insincerity for him. His plenteous, flexible 
sympathy had ended by falling into one current with that reflective analysis which 
tends to neutralize sympathy. (412) 
 
 Here the connection between imagination and sympathy becomes problematic. Indeed, 
Daniel’s “habit of seeing things as they probably appeared to others” sounds much like 
the novelist’s ability to project multiple perspectives and create characters as they 
probably would act in life. We discover that Deronda assumes he can always understand 
the other’s perspective, but through Gwendolen’s difference he realizes the limits of his 
ability to understand and therefore the limits of his sympathy.  
Although Deronda appears to have an idealized capacity to sympathize, the text 
subtly articulates Deronda’s growing ability to sympathize with the Jewish other in this 
text only when he begins to fall in love with Mirah: “but now, with Mirah before him as a 
living reality whose experience he had to care for, he saw every common Jew and Jewess 
in the light of comparison with her” (431). Furthermore, once the reader discovers 
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Deronda’s own Jewish heritage, his ability to sympathize no longer seems astounding. 
Indeed, it turns out he has been extending sympathy to those who are just like him after 
all. If Deronda’s sympathy is based on assimilation, then as Gwendolen’s moral guide it 
becomes clear that his program of healing asks her to lose her self in others.11
 
 Without 
her laugher to preserve distance between self and other, she too falls prey to the 
absorption of self as the only catalyst for sympathy.  
Vanity Fair and the Importance of Self-laughter 
I pair Daniel Deronda and Vanity Fair together in this chapter in order to look at 
two heroines who begin with similar attitudes and both end still trapped within social 
norms that define their behavior and identity. An important difference, however, is that 
Becky never loses her ability to laugh, perhaps casting her as the more “successful” 
heroine. In addition, pairing these two novels also provides a comparison between how 
realism, a mode of identification, and satire, a mode of distance, each tackle the problem 
of sympathy. Within the realist mode, Eliot demonstrated how total identification with 
the other is not always possible and therefore cannot be the basis for ethical sympathy. 
Thackeray will use a satirical mode to focus on creating distance, but at the sacrifice of 
sympathy.  
The gendered treatment laughter often receives becomes particularly interesting 
as I move to discuss Vanity Fair and the only male writer included in this project. 
                                                        
11 Toker argues that sympathy is linked with consuming another human being (569). By exposing the 
dangers of this consumption, Toker suggests that the novel’s moral vision is uncomfortable with a typical 
middle-ground moral vision and instead presents a dialectic between “a commitment to future-oriented 
social goals and emotionally alert sympathy for individual human beings” (572). 
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Thackeray’s views on women have long been a source of debate.12 Micael Clarke, 
representing those critics who trace a more generous view toward women in Thackeray’s 
writing, says: “Thackeray’s critique of Victorian gender ideology encompasses not only 
women’s legal disabilities but also the social and psychological effects of gendered 
patterns of thought and behavior” (4).13
                                                        
12 In the twentieth century, Gordon Ray, Nina Auerbach, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick all praised his 
“critique of patriarchy” (13). Phelan takes a middle-of-the road approach: “although Thackeray’s focus is 
on women in a society that we clearly recognize as patriarchal, his primary purpose is not to offer a 
feminist critique of that society but to expose the multifarious workings of vanity within it” (132). Flint 
identifies the “novel’s masculine biases” both in the construction of reading practices (gendered male 
because active) and in the presentation of the women characters themselves.  Flint tempers this judgment 
by acknowledging the irony of the narrator’s voice makes it difficult to decipher if his comments about 
women are meant to uphold or subvert stereotypes, and in general the novel itself is about women and their 
survival skills rather than a more masculine approach to public life (261). 
 With less willingness to extol Thackeray’s 
feminist tendencies, James Phelan acknowledges Thackeray’s vision of women in society 
as “sometimes compatible with and sometimes antithetical to the view offered from a 
consistently feminist perspective” (132). It would be hard to disprove the presence of 
contradictory views about women in Thackeray’s novel, inconsistencies that seem to 
mirror critical perceptions of his contradictory narrator. I argue, however, that these 
shifting perspectives contribute to the prevalence of the laughter of incongruity in the 
novel. Focusing on the effects of this laughter reveals the incoherence in the text to be a 
purposeful strategy. Thackeray adeptly shows the ability of laughter to expose unethical 
social norms, but his satirical mode places limits on that laughter’s ability to fashion a 
 
13 While recognizing that biographical details cannot correlate precisely with the novels, Clarke proceeds 
with wary caution but convincing evidence that we can learn much from Thackeray’s letters and 
relationships to help us determine just what views about gender emerge in the novels: “Because he was 
gifted with an extraordinary ability to reflect on his own experiences and shortcomings, Thackeray was 
able to recognize the ways in which male socialization was implicated in women’s problems. This capacity 
for self-reflection is what enables him to explore gender relations with unusually sympathetic insight” (6).  
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space for sympathy, a problem I turn to after first examining the laughter of Becky and 
the narrator.   
Laughter of all types abounds in Vanity Fair: guffaws, chuckles, snorts, cackles, 
giggles, and snickers. Although harder to detect, there are larger structural elements of 
the novel that help create such laughter. The plot structure of the novel itself seems bent 
on exposure that will make readers laugh; the narrator points out that novels often end 
with marriage, but states this one will go on long after to reveal marriage is not always a 
happy ending (297). Thackeray also brings together contexts normally kept distinct, such 
as the blending of war and domestic matters. Thus, chapter titles like “In which Amelia 
invades the Low Countries” throw disparate ideas together in close proximity on the page 
and in the reader’s mind. Finally, the novel also overturns common hierarchies, creating 
funny scenarios that readers laugh at precisely because they contradict expectation. For 
example, people began ignoring Rawdon after his marriage to Becky and recognizing 
him only as Becky’s husband, “indeed, that was now his avocation in life. He was 
Colonel Crawley no more. He was Mrs. Crawley’s husband” (439). The reversal of 
gender roles makes this statement funny. Rather than have the woman’s identity 
disappear and become only part of her husband’s title, Rawdon, the man, becomes 
nothing more than a husband hailed by his wife’s name. I take the time to trace the 
humorous context of the novel itself in order to show the particular kind of laughter 
Thackeray’s novel evokes from his readers. Laughter emerges from the incongruity 
between registers, a concept Alan Partington defines as “a way of speaking or writing 
regularly associated by a set of participants with a certain set of contextual 
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circumstances” (74). By putting contrary registers into play, the structure of the novel 
itself makes clear that the focus of the novel is incongruity; therefore, the most 
appropriate response is the laughter of incongruity.  
My attention to even just one character, Becky, quickly reveals that laughter of all 
kinds exists within the pages of the novel. Becky fascinates readers because of the 
mixture of virtue and vice in her character. Thus, she engages often in the laughter of 
superiority, the kind of self-centered laughter that closes the space for sympathy by filling 
in the distance between self and other with hierarchy. Becky’s success in winning the 
favor of Rawdon’s rich Aunt, Miss Crawley, rests in her ability to get Miss Crawley to 
laugh at others: “As for the Misses Wapshot’s toilettes and Lady Fuddleston’s famous 
yellow hat, Miss Sharp tore them to tatters, to the infinite amusement of her audience” 
(118).  Their relationship is built, therefore, on the laughter of superiority as they laugh 
together at everyone else’s faults. Becky also uses the laughter of superiority as a form of 
revenge on those who formerly snubbed her. For example, the countess begs Becky for 
her horses in order to escape Brussels and the impending army. Becky, now in a position 
of superiority, “laughed in her face” and “enjoy[ed] the humiliation of her enemy” (365).  
Indeed, one of the first times we meet Becky she laughs at her schoolmistress with a 
“horrid sarcastic demoniacal laughter” (21). 
From these instances of Becky’s laughter, one would think she would easily be 
marked as a wicked character, or at least one the reader would not like very much. The 
narrator positions Becky in a more positive light, however, by suggesting, sometimes 
directly and sometimes through the force of wit, that her behavior is the necessary 
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condition of the restricted position society has placed her in. The narrator can criticize 
Becky’s morals while standing up for her at the same time because of the incongruity of 
her circumstances. How can a woman possibly be good in a situation that requires her to 
use the only tools she has, her feminine charms, to survive? Becky’s own summary of her 
situation suggests the same conclusion: “I think I could be a good woman if I had five 
thousand a year” (490). Unexpectedly, the narrator agrees with Becky: “And who knows 
but Rebecca was right in her speculations – and that it was only a question of money and 
fortune which made the difference between her and an honest woman?” (490).  
The fact that the narrator constantly highlights the social conventions that drive 
Becky to her immoral actions is a key point in demonstrating the kind of sympathy found 
in this satirical mode.  The reader must maintain sympathy for Becky, as John Frazee 
argues, because if not the novel loses its ability to critique larger social structures beyond 
the individual: “As Becky vainly pursues social position, Thackeray never wants the 
reader to lose sympathy with her, to turn away from her in disgust: a reader disgusted by 
Becky’s immorality would not feel implicated in her fate or acknowledge its general 
significance.”14
                                                        
14 Frazee 239. He argues that Thackeray was aware of women’s dependent and restricted position in the 
world, and he thought this made them more sympathetic than males. Thus, Frazee asserts that when 
Thackeray wanted to create a character who would engage in all kinds of immoral activities, he knew he 
could maintain readerly sympathy by making that character a female (231). Russell also finds Becky a 
sympathetic character: “[Becky] is more human and has the claim of normal humanity on our sympathy; 
she is the product of circumstances, clearly shown to be largely responsible for her failure both in 
aspiration and achievement” (103). 
 It is laughter, I suggest, that staves off our disgust and instead creates a 
sense of sympathy through the shared experience of the ways in which individuals often 
feel constrained by society’s rules.  
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 The narrator does not solely depend on casting blame on society in order to gain 
the reader’s sympathy for Becky. We also like Becky, I argue, because she laughs at 
herself, even when her own life becomes absurd. Miss Crawley only leaves her and 
Rawdon a note for twenty pounds in her will when the couple had expected much more 
from her, indeed had depended on much more in order to pay off their growing debts. 
Becky recognizes the way Miss Crawley had led them on and decides, “the joke was too 
good, and Becky burst out laughing” (293). This ability to laugh at oneself is a leveling 
device that works against the development of hierarchy. Although Becky often betrays a 
superior attitude toward others, moments like this one demonstrate that she understands 
no one is exempt from the harsh realities of life. Her acute sense of the absurd, a quality 
she shares with Gwendolen, acts as the impetus for her self-laughter. 
Throughout the novel the narrator repeatedly draws attention to Becky’s sense of 
the absurd. When Becky has to retrieve Mrs. Dowd to comfort a sorrowing Amelia 
(comfort that Becky’s unsentimental nature cannot provide), Mrs. Dowd seems quite 
upset that Becky herself will not go. The caricature of Mrs. Dowd flouncing off causes 
“Mrs. Crawley” to “almost upset” her gravity, a seriousness Becky puts on for the sake of 
the situation as all the soldiers have just been called off to war (355-356). This scene 
models so many others where Becky’s attitude is compared, often implicitly, to other 
characters’. Amelia’s sentimentalized sorrow and Mrs. Dowd’s righteous sense of duty 
are both contrasted to Becky’s laughter, which undermines their serious and even 
sanctimonious attitudes. The narrator has fun promoting Becky’s humorous worldview in 
this grave scene of the soldiers going off to war by claiming her reaction as heroic: “If 
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this is a novel without a hero, at least let us lay claim to a heroine. No man in the British 
army which has marched away, not the great Duke himself, could be more cool or 
collected in the presence of doubts and difficulties, than the indomitable little aide-de-
camp’s wife” (340). The passage must be taken ironically to be funny; the reader must 
recognize that Becky’s composure does not fit the script of a loving, bereaved wife – the 
response most people would qualify as right and desirable. Similarly, making an 
unsentimental woman the heroine directly contrasts the tradition of sentimental novels 
that extol the ability to cry and faint at a moments notice. Thus, the narrator knowingly 
thwarts this expected response by framing Becky’s rather coldhearted reaction as “cool” 
and “collected.”   
Despite the moments when Becky engages in the laughter of incongruity, she 
proves to be an imperfect model for laughter that can produce sympathy and result in 
ethical relationships. Becky is only capable of employing one element of the laughter of 
incongruity at a time: she cannot laugh at herself at the same time that she laughs at 
social norms. She cannot laugh both at and with the world, the kind of laughter promoted 
by the narrator in this chapter’s epigraph. Karen Gindele suggests Becky’s laughter 
receives the narrator’s approval when she balances the giving and receiving of pleasure. 
All of these moments come, Gindele argues, during her marriage to Rawdon when they 
operate as a team thwarting the upper class and exposing the powerful. Gindele is right to 
point to these moments of Becky’s laughter because they reflect laughter aimed at larger 
structures of oppression, not at individuals. Her laughter serves, therefore, to connect 
herself and Rawdon despite their differences. The connection occurs in their common 
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actions to survive and triumph over a system bent on keeping them out of the upper 
echelons of society. Becky is ultimately inconsistent in her ability to sympathize, 
however, and the narrator turns his attention to the reader, beginning with where Becky 
leaves off, insisting the reader laugh at herself.  
The narrator uses laughter as a rhetorical device to shape the distance, and 
therefore the sympathy, between characters and readers.15
 
 The narrator persuades the 
reader to follow in his example of laughing at oneself by first establishing a 
conspiratorial, bonding relationship by encouraging the reader to laugh with him at the 
characters: 
And, as we bring our characters forward, I will ask leave, as a man and a brother, 
not only to introduce them, but occasionally to step down from the platform, and 
talk about them: if they are good and kindly, to love them and shake them by the 
hand: if they are silly, to laugh at them confidentially in the reader’s sleeve: if 
they are wicked and heartless, to abuse them in the strongest terms which 
politeness admits of. (90) 
 
 
According to these directions, laughing at someone is an appropriate response only if 
done confidentially and toward someone who is merely silly. However, those who have 
read the text in its entirety will recognize that the narrator does not hold to these 
distinctions. He laughs at Amelia, who is good and kindly, and he laughs at Becky who is 
often wicked and heartless. Nor is the laughter always confidential. The disparity 
between what the narrator says he will do and what he actually does makes the target of 
                                                        
15 One reason the satire is not corrosive, according to Harriet Blodgett, is that the narrator includes himself 
in the theme of human imperfection and wrong doing: “The narrator does not exclude himself; his self-
portrayal is the measure of his own sense of involvement in Vanity Fair where no man is perfect . . . the 
narrator’s mitigating sense of personal involvement tempers the satire” (213). Thus, for Blodgett, 
Thackeray’s text falls neither into cutting satire nor into total morbidity by maintaining a hopeful view that 
humans can change, including the narrator and the reader. 
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laughter unclear. Perhaps most important in this quote is the fact that the narrator steps 
down from his platform, coming to stand on the same plane as those he laughs at (or 
with). When we think we are bonding over the laughter of superiority, therefore, the 
narrator subtly brings us down with him from this lofty position to recognize how we, 
too, are implicated in activities and values that are laughable.  
The danger in inviting the reader to laugh at hypocrisy is that it will be the 
laughter of superiority. However, the narrator prevents this by making fun of not only the 
characters, but also the reader and himself all at once: “Picture to yourself, O fair young 
reader, a wordly, selfish, graceless, thankless, religionless old woman, writhing in pain 
and fear, and without her wig. Picture her to yourself and ere you be old, learn to love 
and pray” (151). This description of a dying Miss Crawley mimics how we imagine 
Becky herself would describe her, though loving her to her face. It mocks the moralizing 
tendency of novels by exposing Becky’s hypocrisy, it mocks the reader by using an 
exaggerated address, and it mocks the world’s sense of morality that in facing death one 
only then begins to think about love and prays desperately for oneself.  
The narrator thus prevents readers from developing a sense of superiority by 
encouraging the combination of laughter at other characters while also laughing at 
ourselves. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen defines sympathetic laughter as the laugh that relates 
the fall of the other to the fall of the self (757). Borch-Jacobsen thus contends in the 
laughing instance we “are at once ourselves and the other” (758). This is not the same as 
assimilation; I do not become the other nor does the other become me. Rather, in the 
space of difference we recognize the possibility of adopting the other’s perspective. For 
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example, in describing Dobbin’s love for Amelia, the narrator in Vanity Fair makes his 
love seem ridiculous: “Mr. Dobbin’s sentimental Amelia was no more like the real one 
than this absurd little print which he cherished” (506). The image of Dobbin tearing a 
picture from one of his sister’s magazines so that he might stare at it and imagine Amelia 
is certainly laughable. But in the middle of the reader’s laugh, the narrator reminds us: 
“But what man in love, of us, is better informed? Or is he much happier when he sees and 
owns his delusion?” (507). For our laughter to continue, therefore, we must laugh at both 
Dobbin and ourselves.   
 Although the narrator encourages us to laugh at characters, he also aligns our 
sympathies in various way with the characters, such as pointing out our own silly ideas 
about love like Dobbin’s and helping us see Becky’s actions are not the result of her evil 
nature but rather the result of her circumstances. Another way the narrator works to 
produce ethical sympathy in the reader is by criticizing false sympathy. When Becky 
reflects on what an opportunity she missed by having to turn down Sir Pitt’s offer of 
marriage, the narrator says to the reader “I am sure our friend Becky’s disappointment 
deserves and will command every sympathy” (171). Remembering the way women have 
treated Becky out of jealousy, one must question how they can now sympathize with her. 
The narrator asks “what well-bred young person is there in all Vanity Fair, who will not 
feel for a hardworking, ingenious, meritorious girl, who gets such an honourable, 
advantageous, provoking offer, just at the moment when it is out of her power to accept 
it?” (171). The exaggerated use of adjectives here should call the reader’s attention to the 
ironic undertones, as well as the contrast between the narrator’s other descriptions of 
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people in Vanity Fair who never condescend to feel for anyone but themselves. Thus, it 
would seem the sympathy felt in this instance occurs only because Becky missed this 
opportunity. Had she succeeded in propelling herself into high society, there would be 
many other feelings directed toward her, but certainly not sympathy. In this example, 
then, the narrator sarcastically calls attention to how persons tend to sympathize only 
when it is at no cost to themselves.  
I come now to the question of whether satire can achieve a positive construction 
of sympathy.  The narrator indicates that Satire and Sentiment visit Vanity Fair arm-in-
arm. This image tends to complicate the question at hand, because while it separates the 
two as distinct entities, their arm-in-arm stance also suggests the ability to work together 
or to at least co-exist. The blend of realism and satire, the vacillation between the 
narrator’s scorn and sympathy, has kept critics divided on the tone of Vanity Fair. 
Thackeray’s decision to use laughter as a narrative technique, to adopt this satirical stance 
within a realist text, reveals something about the worldview and thus the tone of the 
novel. As Robert Martin claims:  
 
It demands considerable self-possession to believe that laughter and comedy are 
valid ways of viewing the world, even to accept them as wholesome human 
activities, for comedy is in part dependent upon the triumphant revelation of a 
discrepancy between the ideal and the actual, and it is never safe to make that 
kind of revelation unless one is so confident of the fundamental unity of the world 
as to be able to laugh at the apparent chinks in its solidity. (4-5)  
 
Martin’s description of the “self-possession” required when using laughter as a guiding 
principle identifies a reason for the underlying tone of optimism in the novel, the feeling 
that the narrator is not quite a cynic. To laugh and poke fun, even to mock, suggests a 
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confidence in the “fundamental unity of the world.”16 This optimistic tone is subtle 
enough, and undermined frequently by the narrator’s sarcastic tone, so that critics can 
still debate just exactly what attitude Thackeray adopts toward the world. His 
contemporaries tended to criticize the novel’s satirical tone: Thackeray’s “scepticism is 
pushed too far,” “a cynical, sarcastic tone . . . too much pervades the work,” he insists on 
moving “too much in the direction of satire” (qtd. in Harden 12). I think it is fair to say 
that critics in his day and ours remain puzzled by the tone and cannot decide on what side 
of the humorous/satirical divide it falls.17
Part of the problem with identifying an ethical stance toward sympathy, or any 
ethical stance for that matter, in Thackeray’s novel is where the mode of satire prevents 
the satisfying ending of realism. And by satisfying, I do not mean a happy ending 
necessarily, but one in which an ethical view of the world is fully developed and the 
respective characters are situated accordingly within it. Satire often seems to resist 
resolution, parodying extremes on both sides of the issue rather than proposing one 
correct interpretation. For example, Becky and Amelia represent two extremes of 
  
                                                        
16 Martin documents the change of comic theory in the Victorian period from a belief in “amiable, 
sentimental humour to an acceptance of intellect as the basis of comedy” (vii). He traces a gradual 
acceptance of incongruity and wit as the essence of comedy and moves away from the acceptance of 
sentimental humour (viii). Most broadly he defines this shift from humour to wit, or from the comedy of 
character to the comedy of intellect and idea, or from personality to idea (3). 
 
17 Critics today often discuss the satirical elements of Vanity Fair in terms of the narrator’s role. Harden 
says while many have identified the narrator’s voice as “sympathetic mockery,” he feels the narrator 
exhibits a range where sometimes the sympathy disappears into sharp satire, and sometimes the mockery 
disappears into solely pathos (113). Blodgett argues that the narrator is encouraging readers to maintain a 
certain distance but not to place themselves above the laughable characters: “the narrator’s rhetorical stance 
meets the intentions of Thackeray’s type of satire: not corrosive, but genial and plaintive in its aptness, 
intended to make mankind smile wryly even while shifting about uncomfortably” (214). Sharp argues 
against those who say the narrator dissimulates and says instead that his changing attitude is part of his 
irony. She accounts for the flip-flop of the narrator’s criticism as pointing to criticism, not of characters per 
se, but of the morality that judges others. 
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femininity without a middle-ground representation; Thackeray mocks both of them and 
yet does not suggest what would be an acceptable way to behave (Palmeri 770).  
The lack of resolution is actually one of the limits of laughter in articulating a 
new, more ethical, way to sympathize with the other. Laughter is very good at exposing 
incongruities, yet it does not do the work of proposing alternatives like gossip, gazing, 
and silence. These elements actually begin to enact a new reality by positioning the self 
and other to engage in a different way. Gossip not only reveals the artificiality of 
boundaries between self and other, it actually deflates them through the act of gossiping. 
When one listens to the other’s story in a moment of ethical gazing, the relationship 
becomes restructured around bearing witness rather than understanding. As silence 
constructs an unknowable other, new ways of sympathizing without having to fully 
understand the other are created. But the self and other can engage in a moment of 
laughing at the incongruity of life without a clear sense of how laughter restructures 
sympathy. Whether this is a problem of laughter itself, or more a problem of laughter 
within realism and satire, is a question of how form shapes representations of sympathy. 
 
Form and the Limits of Sympathy  
On the face of it, sympathy resides uncomfortably in Thackeray’s mixture of 
satire and realism primarily because of the mocking tone the narrator adopts toward all 
the characters and the reader. Sympathy also usually connotes some kind of resolution, as 
a sense of community develops out of feeling sympathy for another. The ending of 
Thackeray’s novel, if nothing else, resists closure. No character seems particularly happy 
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or rewarded, and this makes it more difficult for the reader to determine which characters 
deserve sympathy. What I would like to suggest, though, is that sympathy does have a 
place in Thackeray’s satirical text; he restructures sympathy so that it does not have to be 
based on resolving the tensions of difference or incongruity.  
Victorians themselves would have found it unusual to locate sympathy within 
satire. It was not uncommon in the Victorian period to align humor with sympathy, but 
wit was assumed to be antithetical to feeling for another. Humor was usually 
distinguished from wit by qualities of sympathy, love, and understanding as compared to 
the scorn, degradation, and condescension of wit (Martin 26). Gerald Massey 
distinguishes between them in the North British Review (1860): “wit is more artificial, 
and a thing of culture; humour lies nearer to nature”  (36 qtd. in Martin). Walter Pater 
even more overtly connected humor with compassion; humor was “the laughter which 
blends with tears and . . . in its most exquisite motives, is one with pity,” while wit was 
“that unreal transitory mirth which is as the crackling of thorns under the pot” (qtd. in 
Martin 36-37). What made wit and satire incapable of producing sympathy? Perhaps part 
of the problem was the understood aims of each. Satire was meant to expose and punish 
what was bad in humanity and humor was meant to create identification. On the one 
hand, Martin explains: “What the theories of both superiority and the incongruous 
postulated was sufficient distance from the object of comedy to perceive how it was out 
of joint,” but on the other hand, “what sentimental comedy, like that of Dickens, 
advocated was the eradication of that distance and an identification between perceiver 
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and perceived” (Martin 29). Because wit was seen to create distance, it could not 
therefore also produce sympathy.  
The aim of satire was also to teach, an aim similar to the claim of realist novels. 
In his “Essay on Comedy” George Meredith argues: “the satirist is a moral agent, often a 
social scavenger, working on a storage of bile” (44). Gifford, in the Preface to the 
Translation of Juvenal also points to the moral aim of satire: “To raise a laugh at vice . . . 
is not the legitimate office of Satire, which is to hold up the vicious as objects of 
reprobation and scorn, for the example of others, who may be deterred by their 
sufferings” (qtd. in Russell 14). But if realism taught readers to sympathize, this moral 
trait did not seem to be what the mode of satire taught readers. Rather, satire was bent on 
exposing follies and warning readers away from vice. If a text combines realism and 
satire, however, can the blend result in a dual purpose?  
Thackeray’s novel aligns sympathy and satire, I suggest, because he revises 
sympathetic identification to be an act that recognizes what is incoherent in society, the 
very recognition that satire aims to produce in readers. We are not meant to judge Becky 
or Amelia, but to judge the social dictates that insidiously decide their behavior. Satire 
and sympathy are united in this novel through the common recognition of paradoxical 
social norms and the tensions that develop between the opposing viewpoints of 
individuals and society. The sympathetic reader in Thackeray’s novel is not one who 
identifies with a character that matches some ideal or matches the reader’s own character; 
the sympathetic reader instead is the one who recognizes that everyone is susceptible to 
the incongruous situations thrust upon individuals by incoherent social ideologies. The 
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satirical mode within Thackeray’s realist novel allows him to emphasize this point: “In 
Thackeray . . . satire opens all intellectual positions to questioning and allows the socially 
marginal points of view to compete with the most powerfully entrenched ideas” (Clarke 
82). Rather than invoking sympathy for the triumphs of a character situated rightly within 
a community, Thackeray instead uses satire to resist the pressure of resolution in the 
realist mode. He thereby invokes sympathy for the failure of society to produce 
cohesiveness in individual lives. Readers of realist novels can be too confident that once 
we have traveled through the struggles of a character’s life, we will reach a better 
understanding of how that individual fits into a local community, imagined consistent 
with our worldview. Satire and laughter challenge this kind of reading, the one that 
situates people and events neatly into categories, satisfying our desire to know where we 
fit and where the other fits.  
If Thackeray’s satirical mode challenges the conception of sympathy based on 
finding a resolution in understanding, then Eliot’s sympathy challenges the classical 
notion of realism predicated on knowing.18 The difficulty in coming to know and 
understand Gwendolen’s character destabilizes realism by “violating one of the precepts 
of classical realism…the unified, knowable ‘essence’ of character beneath the external 
signs” (Sypher 507).19
                                                        
18 Jackson argues the limits of sympathy in Daniel Deronda are represented in the formal collapse of 
realism, where the realist heroine who does not learn to sympathize becomes the heroine of a naturalist 
novel, and the hero of sympathy becomes part of a romance plot, an epic story rather than a realist one (64). 
 Deronda’s discomfort with his inability to know Gwendolen, to 
  
19 During also emphasizes Gwendolen’s unknowability, arguing her “moral significance” in the novel is 
ambiguity: “In the story this novel tells, ambiguity – or being difficult to read – is also the heroine’s final 
performance . . . she is at least framed, rather than annihilated, by solitude” (73). Eliot proposes a sympathy 
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understand her, becomes also the reader’s discomfort. As the novel develops, Eliot 
reveals Deronda’s attempts to understand as the greatest flaw in his otherwise idealistic 
character. Eliot may want to idealize the sympathetic impulse in Deronda, but ultimately 
she cannot escape his flawed sympathy extended only to those he can fully understand. 
Bernard Paris suggests that Deronda learns about the limits of sympathy from 
Gwendolen: “His relationship with Gwendolen is also presented as an education of sorts 
for Deronda, presumably concerning the limits of altruism, of what we can do for other 
people” (197). Paris points out how often Deronda’s advice to Gwendolen, supposedly 
given out of sympathy for her, reflects more his own feelings and experiences rather than 
hers (204). Deronda ultimately fails, by his own estimation and Eliot’s, in using 
sympathy to help Gwendolen.   
Had Deronda a better sense of his own nature, he could perhaps have offered 
better advice through a sympathy that ethically recognized the uniqueness of 
Gwendolen’s situation; instead he always sees her experience in the light of his own. He 
begins to sense the limitations of his sympathy when he struggles with his inability to 
understand Gwendolen. In one of their last meetings before Grandcourt’s death, when 
Gwendolen is filled with her most desperate sense of guilt and helplessness, Deronda 
feels that “Words seemed to have no more rescue in them than if he had been beholding a 
vessel in peril of wreck . . . How could he grasp the long-growing process of this young 
creature’s wretchedness?” This realization, the narrator tells us, would be “afterwards 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that is beyond what Britishness can comprehend, it is a “Hebraic ethic” that is not afraid to identify “with 
the repellent, the ostracized, the ugly, the unloved” (81). 
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called horrible” by Deronda. Instead of accepting that he cannot understand Gwendolen, 
he seems repulsed. The parting scene reveals that Deronda seems afraid of differences 
instead of embracing them as ethical sympathy might. When he tries to comfort 
Gwendolen about this impending departure, he tells her “I shall be more with you than I 
used to be . . . If we had been much together before, we should have felt our differences 
more, and seemed to get farther apart” (878). Difference, for Deronda, represents the 
impossibility of fully understanding and therefore the hindrance to sympathy. If we find 
Deronda’s attempt to comfort Gwendolen ultimately unsatisfying, so does she. Once he 
leaves the house, Gwendolen falls into fits of hysterics.  
Eliot and Thackeray’s novels push against the limits of what sympathy, even a 
reformulated sympathy, can accomplish. But is finding the limits such a terrible thing? It 
would seem that Deronda’s example demonstrates what happens when we cling too 
insistently to sympathy and its transformative possibilities: the ethical sympathy we have 
been striving to create comes full circle to the assimilative sympathy we meant to avoid. 
When the other’s differences are too great, perhaps we ought not to assume that 
sympathy is the answer. Deronda’s leaving at the end of the novel suggests this solution, 
though his motivations are from a fear of difference rather than recognition of difference. 
Deronda leaves with the feeling that his sympathy failed Gwendolen because he could 
not fully comprehend her. Had he not feared their differences, his departure could have 
signaled the choice to leave their respective differences intact by walking away instead of 
trying to conform Gwendolen to his own ideals.  
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Reading ethical sympathy in realism and satire requires, perhaps, a new 
understanding of what constitutes resolution. The last words in Eliot’s novel leave us 
queasy, as they evoke Milton to offer a sense of rightness that seems contradictory to the 
condition of the character’s fates. Perhaps Thackeray’s ending offers the most satisfaction 
after all; when the narrator of Vanity Fair shuts up the box and puppets, he leaves Becky 
smiling “demurely” as if she knows that the reader, like Amelia, will “scurry off” when 
faced with what seems like an unresolved ending for “our Becky doll.” Rather than 
attempt to satisfy the reader’s desire for closure by artificially matching the characters’ 
circumstances with what we think we know about their inner lives, the narrator simply 
tells us the story is over, and indeed it is: “for our play is played out” (809). 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having considered the various iterations of sympathy in several nineteenth-
century novels, I now turn to some of the implications of my exploration. What is at stake 
here is the reformulation of gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter, usually disregarded as 
inconsequential, as forms of interacting that are capable of substantial critiques of 
dominant narratives and social ideologies.  Furthermore, the vision of ethical sympathy 
proposed in each chapter can foster conversations as we reconsider our use of sympathy 
across global communities today. The elements of gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter 
encourage a distinctive approach to difference as they highlight the important role of 
narrative gaps and communicative gaps in developing an ethical approach to the other.1
Narrative Gaps encourage an ethical approach to difference by focusing readers’ 
attention on the way a customary response may not be adequate. Leona Toker describes 
responses to gaps as: 
  
 
a conjecture and a set of expectations that are either fulfilled or thwarted by 
subsequent portions of the text. The thwarting is a usually more interesting 
phenomenon, not only because, like everything unexpected, it carries more 
information, but also because it can alert us to subjective reasons for our mistakes. 
Then our own attitudes, formerly unconscious or taken for granted, become the 
object of our attention. (7) 
                                                        
1 Iser popularized the notion of “gaps” as the inconsistencies that may arise when a text’s formal qualities 
resist a reader’s interpretative framework. This indeterminate space, Iser argues, incites the reader to act: 
“the lack of a common situation and a common frame of reference corresponds to the contingency and the 
“no-thing” which bring about the interaction between persons” (167).  
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Toker importantly points out that reactions to gaps are connected to what readers expect 
from the text, expectations created through the rhetorical devices of the narrative. By 
using gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter in unexpected ways, the writers I examined 
“thwart” expectations about what both reading and sympathizing mean. These disrupted 
expectations call attention to the “formerly unconscious” ways reader would normally 
react to the text or to the other, and such disruptions require a new response. This new 
response encourages a revision of one’s horizon of understanding; the value of narrative 
or communicative gaps appears, then, in the way they encourage revision of the 
paradigms and norms through which one perceives the other.  
An important reason for looking at gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter as 
discourse systems rests in the fact that communicative gaps work alongside narrative 
gaps in these novels to challenge interpretative horizons. In other words, I have not just 
considered how silence created narrative gaps, but also how it created gaps in 
communication between characters, or what one might label cognitive gaps. Ellen 
Spolsky describes how such cognitive gaps cause us to pause before making assumptions 
in the way we construct the other by filling in indeterminate spaces. Spolsky emphasizes 
gaps, then, as necessary to changing how we interact with an other: “the gaps in human 
cognitive structure – the vacancies between fragments of understanding – not only permit 
but actually encourage transformation and innovation” (2). Because we can no longer 
leap to a categorical conclusion in the face of a gap we do not recognize or understand, 
Spolsky argues that we must instead listen to the other. The process of listening is vital 
for allowing others to define themselves instead of being defined by one’s own 
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assumptions about the other. Gaps thus allow for the “structural possibility of slowing 
down categorization sufficiently to take into account others’ accounts of their own self-
definition” (Spolsky 206). The difference presented in the other’s self-definition 
promotes the transformation of our own horizons of understanding. In this dissertation, I 
have focused specifically on the ways gossip, gazing, silence, and laughter as discourse 
systems created gaps in order to transform our understanding of sympathy. 
Throughout this dissertation I have worked from the assumption that literary texts 
transform more than just reading practices; the act of reading also carries with it the 
possibility of transforming social relations, the way real readers engage with real people 
in their lives. One way we can understand the extension of a text’s influence into the 
actual lived experience of readers is through the notion of horizons as discussed by first 
Hans-George Gadamer and then Hans Robert Jauss. Interpretations of the world around 
us, which become naturalized as reality, are based on our horizons of understanding. 
These horizons are formed by the contexts in which each person is situated, so they are 
both personal and public. Reading transforms the way we interact with other people by 
pushing on the limits of our own horizon of understanding when new viewpoints and 
scenarios are presented within the text. For Gadamer, the concept of horizons, built into 
his hermeneutic method, draws attention to the preconceived beliefs we bring to any 
encounter. Difference is what exists beyond our horizon; when we encounter difference 
we become more aware of the edges of our horizons and we learn more about our 
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beliefs.1
While Gadamer speaks of horizons and difference primarily in lived experience, 
Jauss discusses horizons mainly in terms of how we approach literature. Jauss uses the 
term “horizon of expectation” to mean all the judgments, beliefs, and reactions we bring 
to a text. Novels can expand readers’ horizons, according to Jauss, by disrupting genre 
expectations. When a novel does not allow readers the comfort of following convention, 
readers experience the work as difference. A new form of literature, Jauss argues:  
 Because difference requires a new way of responding, an encounter with the 
other opens the possibility for transforming our interpretative lens. Thus, difference is not 
something to be feared or avoided, but rather a quality that we should embrace as the 
moment for transforming our selves.  
 
can make possible a new perception of things by performing the content of a new 
experience first brought to light in the form of literature. The relationship between 
literature and reader can actualize itself in the sensorial realm as an incitement to 
aesthetic perception as well as in the ethical realm as a summons to moral 
reflection. (41)  
 
Realist texts, in their attempt to engage directly with social issues, make the connection 
Jauss draws here between aesthetic and moral perception. When these texts create a 
problem or tension in social relations that cannot be answered by socially prescribed 
solutions, the literary form suggests to readers new ways of thinking about those 
                                                        
1 It is important to understand that Gadamer does not propose that we learn to approach the other without 
any biases. Rather, his hermeneutics emphasizes the way we enter understanding with our own beliefs and 
expectations at the same time that we encounter something unfamiliar or alien (Jauss xi). 
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questions.2
I turn now to look at each of the discourse systems in relation to gaps and the 
transformation of social relations they accomplished. Gossip and gaps in narrative are 
fundamentally connected; gossip’s purpose is to fill in the gaps in a story and satisfy our 
desire to know, our desire for narrative wholeness. Because these stories are integral to 
constructing identity, how gossip fills the gaps has ethical implications. In chapter two, I 
showed how gossip could be used unethically to construct the other’s identity by 
confining that identity to social categories that have a tendency to create false boundaries 
between self and other. Martineau and Gaskell’s novels also provided an example of how 
gossip can transcend those boundaries because gossip itself permeates categories of 
public/private or male/female. Mrs. Rowland’s gossip in Deerbrook, though unethical 
and without sympathy, demonstrated that gossip is not a frivolous feminine discourse that 
resides only in the domestic realm, but is a political tool with the power to restructure 
both private and public realms. As gossip reveals boundaries to be artificial and harmful, 
it transforms the gap between self and other, revealing this distance to be predicated on 
differences that are not severe enough to prevent ethical relationships. Thus, the Cranford 
ladies learn that marriage and men do not have to be othered by us/them dichotomies and 
can actually contribute to their community in meaningful ways. Gossip develops an 
 As readers attempt to resolve the tensions within the text, they alter their 
interpretative horizons, the same horizons used in engaging the other in lived experience.  
                                                        
2He uses the trial of Flaubert for writing Madame Bovary to show how a literary work can have great 
influence over moral questions in lived praxis: “The consternating effect of the formal innovations of 
Flaubert’s narrative style…compelled his readers to perceive things differently …at the same time thrust 
them into an alienating uncertainty of judgment” (43). 
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ethical sympathy that is willing to cross over the usual boundaries that exploit fear and 
prejudice, transforming rigorous categories of difference into fluid boundaries that make 
an exchange of sympathy possible and even desirable.  
Gazing does not attempt to fill the gap between horizons of experience with 
understanding; rather it legitimates the other’s subjectivity by recognizing the other also 
has a story. Chapter three takes up a more challenging view of sympathy compared to the 
way, in chapter two, sympathy did not have to overcome extreme differences. Rather, the 
self just had to be willing to recognize how categories often create difference where there 
is the possibility for similarities. In chapter three, a more acute case of difference arises 
between Silas Marner, clearly cast as a stranger and an outsider, and the Raveloe villagers 
who have customs and beliefs radically different from Marner’s. The gap between 
Marner and the villagers, at first filled with animosity, becomes inhabited by sympathy 
through the process of witnessing each other’s story. Gazing thus constructs the gap 
between self and other with an embodied presence that signals openness toward the other. 
As, for example, in the Rainbow Inn scene where Marner feels himself surrounded by the 
“presence of faces” turned to him in rapt attention. This stance, which recognizes the 
other has a story to tell, must also be accompanied with listening, or bearing witness to 
that story. Ethical gazing encourages multiple perspectives to coexist because one does 
not listen to the other’s story in order to agree or understand, one listens simply because 
the other needs to tell his or her story. Witnessing the other’s story focuses not on the 
content, but on the act of telling. Engaging in a moment of ethical gazing, then, fills the 
gap between self and other with an exchange of sympathy through story. 
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Silence itself can be experienced as a gap in the text, such as when characters do 
not respond or when the narrator withholds information. In Brontë’s novel, silence also 
acts as a tool to maintain the gap between self and other necessary for the sense of one’s 
self as distinct from the other. The use of silence maintains this gap by resisting 
oppressive or inaccurate categories imposed by others on one’s identity. In chapter four, 
the discourse system of silence in Villette presents a totally unknowable other, yet still 
requires sympathy from both characters and readers in response to Lucy-as-character and 
Lucy-as-narrator. Lucy uses silence to remain unknown so that her identity cannot be 
confined to social categories that do not really fit her. She resists the way characters try to 
assimilate her into their own horizon of understanding, like the way Dr. John tries to 
conform her to the proper role for an English woman and Polly’s father sees her only as a 
schoolteacher. Though Lucy’s silence often makes it seem as if she does not want 
intimacy, she does desire to be in relationship with others. She insists, however, that 
people show her sympathy without having to first understand her. Gaps in Villette occur, 
then, as the void of everything that characters and readers do not know about Lucy. To 
sympathize with Lucy requires abandoning any notion of sympathy predicated on 
knowing or understanding. Silence firmly maintains the differences that create the gap 
between self and other, thus the sympathetic act must acknowledge that there is no 
sameness, and maybe even no agreement, between self and other.  
In Chapter five, I presented a challenge to the suggestion that sympathy can be 
extended despite radical differences. While laughter as a discourse system revealed the 
importance of distance (from both the self and the other), I showed that Eliot and 
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Thackeray ultimately found that the distance created by laughter proved to be too great to 
allow for sympathy. Gwendolen and Becky, the laughing heroines in each novel, were 
not able to laugh and show sympathy toward others at the same time. The distance 
Gwendolen’s laughter established was necessary, however, because Eliot shows that once 
Gwendolen’s laughter fades she can no longer maintain the gap between self and other, 
and she loses her sense of self. Thus, Eliot creates the two components necessary for an 
ethical encounter, distance represented by Gwendolen and sympathy represented by 
Deronda, but cannot find a way to bring those two qualities together. While Thackeray 
also shows Becky’s laughter as antithetical to sympathy, he requires more from the 
reader. The narrator insists that readers laugh at themselves as well as other characters; 
Thackeray succeeds in getting the reader to laugh at everything and everyone, but 
perhaps sacrifices sympathy along the way. Eliot and Thackeray are more apt than Brontë 
to point out the challenge of sympathizing when the distance between self and other is 
too great. The implications emerging from their experiments with sympathy, however, 
point to a needed revision of the way we understand realism. 
Critical conversations and definitions rely on visuality to define realism, a 
construction that often neglects what I argue is a central, defining part of a realist text: the 
discourse in, around, and exchanged between characters, narrator, author, and reader. 
Peter Brooks argues that “realism more than almost any other mode of literature makes 
sight paramount – makes it the dominant sense in our understanding of and relation to the 
world” (3). Certainly the visual and the material are vital components of realism. I am 
suggesting, however, the visual need not be the primary focus or defining quality of the 
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realist novel. Instead, I reposition realism as a rhetorical mode focused on relational 
tensions. Following Penny Boumelha’s notion that realism is a set of relationships rather 
than solely a narrative device (Furst 321), I suggest we need to focus on how the realist 
novel interrogates social relationships rather than on how it represents the world.  When 
we look at realism in this way – as sets of relationships or systems of meaning – we can 
move away from evaluating a realist novel solely on formal qualities such as mimesis or 
closure.  
Perhaps realism does not, after all, require closure if we understand realism as 
investigating a set of relationships. This definition offers a more comfortable relationship 
between the resolution that realism seems to require and the contradictory, unresolved 
endings realist novels more often produce. Especially if we understand those 
relationships in terms of the complicated notions of sympathy presented by the writers I 
have examined in this dissertation. Many of the indictments against realism concentrate 
on the transparent notion of language, the one-to-one relationship between signifier and 
signified. Recent studies of realist novels are beginning to complicate that charge; the 
most successful of those challenges are the ones that recognize realism is not limited to 
representing “the world.” Realism does not have to, and indeed cannot, present a 
transparent representations through language because it is “always interested in engaging 
the reader, not in some sort of illusion of ‘direct’ contact with the world, but in a dialogue 
in which the stakes are more rhetorical than epistemological and have more to do with the 
will than with a certain (inadequate) model of knowing” (Shaw 39). Reading realist 
novels through discourse systems, as I have done in this project, reconstructs the 
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relationship between reader and text as “more rhetorical than epistemological.” That is, 
we read less for what we know and more for how we come to know or, even better, why 
it is that we cannot and should not know.  
I am focusing here on how we read the endings of realist novels because the way 
these texts do or do not achieve closure influences heavily how readers ultimately 
interpret the social relationships in the novel. For example, by constructing characters’ 
fates as punishment or reward, endings influence which characters readers sympathize 
with. If we understand realism as the articulation and negotiation of social relationships, 
rather than a set of representations, then our reading practices can complicate tidy 
endings as a way to challenge the normative ideologies upheld through resolution. What 
better way to expose the unethical relationships between classes and between genders 
than by leaving such relationships unresolved in the endings of novels? In this project, 
Brontë and Thackeray are the writers who resisted the realist impulse to provide closure, 
and their endings usually serve to fuel critical debate. Yet we also debate the endings of 
more “classical” realist texts like Eliot’s novels. Were critics to take the “provincial life 
novels” of Gaskell and Martineau more seriously, I suspect they would debate those 
endings as well.  
What I am suggesting is that even the seemingly “happy endings” of Victorian 
novels often entail a sense of uneasiness. Bernard Paris suggests that this tension arises 
between the mimetic portrait of character and the rhetoric surrounding character, 
corresponding roughly to representation and interpretation. The narrator’s and author’s 
interpretations may say one thing about where characters end up, but the representation of 
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the characters, the portrayal of their inner lives, often suggests a different way to read 
their fates. If this contradiction is always there, perhaps it is the point of realism. Perhaps 
the best way to expand readers’ horizons is to prevent them from closing down multiple 
points of view and resolving all the tensions of plot and character into a tidy ending.  
 I have tried to avoid conflating sympathy and understanding, but I want to suggest 
now that I do see understanding as in some way fundamental to sympathy. However, 
conceptions of understanding that assume it is based on agreement or likeness need to be 
reformulated. Understanding can draw on distance and gaps in productive ways rather 
than struggle to close distance and gaps and so cover over difference. To understand 
someone, then, may actually entail the recognition of differences and the ensuing 
revelation that changes the way one thinks of the self and the other. Rather than 
identifying the act of understanding as a moment where I recognize sameness in the 
other, understanding actually consists of “revelatory moments of realization when it 
becomes apparent that the other does not think the same as me or that I can no longer 
think the same as I did about a person or a text” (Davey 5). This defamiliarization of our 
own thinking produces the possibility for an ethical encounter; that is, one in which we 
do not attempt to familiarize the other and misrepresent or misunderstand the other. 
Instead, we allow our horizon of understanding to be disrupted and challenged, accepting 
rather than refusing the difference we come face to face with.  
I would like to suggest, then, that understanding does not entail agreement or 
require adopting the other’s worldview. I feel we have misconstrued just what 
“understanding” really means; we normally equate “I understand” with “I agree.” To 
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sympathize, to understand, can simply mean I recognize the other’s perspective. In order 
to illustrate this concept I turn to Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, a Romantic text 
that grapples fundamentally, I argue, with this issue of sympathy. Although this is not 
considered a realist text, its didactic tone and allegorical mode offer an especially clear 
illustration of what I am talking about. My inclusion of Frankenstein here also attempts 
to draw attention to interpretations like Gayatri Spivak’s, which recognize Shelley’s 
representation of nineteenth-century anxiety over imperialism and otherness. Spivak 
insightfully highlights the imperialist undertones in Frankenstein, pointing to many 
examples like Henry Clerval’s entrepreneurial desire to travel to India as well as the 
representations of otherness in characters like Safie. The numerous implicit references to 
imperialism and the overt strangeness of the monster make this novel fundamentally 
about how one manages an encounter with the other. I only discuss one encounter here, 
but there are many more where the narrative focuses with explicit detail on the moment at 
which various characters first come in contact with the monster, including the De 
Lacey’s, William, the rustic in the woods, and Frankenstein himself.  
In each of these encounters, the monster is positioned as other. While the 
characters all respond in unethical ways, rejecting the monster based solely on his 
appearance as other, the reader is asked to sympathize with the monster once we have 
heard his tale. As we “listen” to the monster’s story, our sympathy wanes for Victor 
because his responses to the monster seem increasingly abhorrent. And yet, what Shelley 
really asks of us is to be able to say “I understand” to both Victor and the monster. She 
achieves this by first aligning our sympathies with Victor as we journey through his inner 
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life, his domestic affections, and his ambitions. Then she aligns our sympathies with the 
monster as we make the same journey through his experiences, his craving after domestic 
affections, and his ambition to have a mate like himself. By showing us that we can say 
“I understand” to Victor in volume one and then “I understand” to the monster in volume 
two, Shelley then asks why we cannot say “I understand” to both the monster and Victor 
at the same time.  
This is exactly Walton’s dilemma at the end of the novel when confronted with 
the monster who appears over Victor’s dead body. We know from the beginning of the 
novel that Walton sympathizes with Victor. Although this sympathy reflects the more 
unethical type of sympathy based in sameness, Walter exhibits an amazing capacity at the 
end of the novel for sympathy with the monster. He expresses this sympathy in two ways: 
first by listening to the monster’s tale and then by allowing him to walk away. Walton’s 
response at the end of the novel offers perhaps the only ethical response to the creature. 
For the first time in the novel someone hails Frankenstein’s monster: Walton “called on 
him to stay” (240). By hailing the monster, Walton positions himself as a listener.  
Invited to stay, the monster pours out “uncontrollable passion” over the corpse 
and Walton’s first impulse to “the duty of obeying the dying request of my friend” gives 
way to the “mixture of curiosity and compassion” at seeing this response to Victor’s 
corpse (240). The monster defends himself by trying to tell of the horrible existence he 
has endured, trying to convince Walton that his torture was “such as you cannot even 
imagine” (241). Walton tries to imagine and is “touched by the expressions of his 
misery,” an extension of sympathy and understanding that causes Walton not to comply 
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with Victor’s request to kill his creation, and instead he listens to the monster’s story with 
the intent to witness the strange tale of this other. His understanding does not extend to 
agreement, and he does not ultimately condemn or condone the monster. He simply lets 
the monster leave, and the novel ends with the image of “darkness and distance.” This 
illusive space of silence implicates the reader as listener. A response to the monster, 
which is also a response to Victor’s story and Walton’s letters, is an opportunity to be a 
more ethical reader, sympathizing in the way that Walton does by recognizing the ethical 
obligation we have to listen to the other’s tale. This sympathy can be the difference 
between an unrecognizable monster or a recognized self.  
The primary characters in Mary Shelley’s text exhibit the desire to tell and to 
know, indeed, their journeys become obsessed with these impulses. The impulses to tell 
and to know are not desires that we need to overcome; indeed, I think they are imperative 
to our need for community and the other. Instead, the new conception of sympathy I am 
proposing here helps to redefine what “knowing” the other might mean. It does not have 
to mean assimilating differences into sameness so that we can reach understanding. 
Sympathy in and through difference suggests our impulse to know can be satisfied by 
discovering new perspectives and new horizons. In other words, the impulse to know just 
could be the desire to discover difference, rather than the desire to find sameness. This 
notion of sympathy can also restructure scenes of telling, avoiding the antagonistic 
relationship between self and other developed in an effort to be the person with the 
“right” perspective, the “true” telling.  Instead, the impulse to tell becomes bound up in a 
more reciprocal exchange of stories that maintains the subjectivity of each identity by 
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listening for difference in the stories rather than listening for what is the same. This 
practice of telling encourages sympathy through the act of bearing witness to one 
another’s stories, and difference or sameness becomes irrelevant.  
As our global world comes up against more and more encounters with what are 
perceived to be radical differences that are irreconcilable, this conception of sympathy 
becomes vital. Rather than trying to overcome those differences, we need to seek out 
ways to hear and witness the presence of the other.  Sometimes this may necessitate the 
“darkness and distance” of unknowability, but the openness of endless possibility. If 
Spivak can describe Frankenstein’s open ending as “a noble resolution for a nineteenth-
century English novel” (259), then I hope we have progressed to the point now that if we 
reach the limits of sympathy, we learn to simply walk away. This, I believe, will make a 
world of difference.  
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